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Evan Braden Montgomery
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
International Security (2017) 41 (4): 202–213.
Published: 01 April 2017
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
International Security (2014) 38 (4): 115–149.
Published: 01 April 2014
Abstract
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Despite their disagreements, proponents of deep engagement and offshore balancing share an optimistic but unrealistic assessment of U.S. military power. In particular, both sides in the debate over U.S. grand strategy underestimate the potential consequences of China's military modernization. China's antiaccess/area denial strategy and conventional precision-strike capabilities are already undermining the United States’ ability to prevent local conflicts, protect longtime allies, and preserve freedom of the commons in East Asia. Whether the United States intends to uphold the status quo when threats emerge or adopt a wait-and-see approach to regional conflicts, it will need to adapt its military for power projection operations in much less permissive environments than it has become accustomed to during the unipolar era. These adaptations include developing air and undersea platforms that can survive inside denial zones, forward bases that are better able to withstand attacks, and satellite and cyberspace networks that are less vulnerable to disruption.
Includes: Supplementary data
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
International Security (2007) 32 (1): 193–200.
Published: 01 July 2007
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
International Security (2006) 31 (2): 151–185.
Published: 01 October 2006
Abstract
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In the debate between offensive and defensive realism, a central issue is whether major powers can overcome the uncertainty that drives the security dilemma. Whereas offensive realists maintain that states cannot know others' motives and intentions, defensive realists argue that states can reveal their preferences by altering their military posture. Defensive realists have, how- ever, presented an incomplete account of the constraints and opportunities associated with military reassurance. To demonstrate its motives, a security- seeking state must take actions that will often increase its vulnerability to potential aggressors. Although offense-defense variables have been invoked to address the constraint of vulnerability, the conditions usually considered most favorable for reassurance—differentiation between offense and defense and an advantage for the latter—make it no easier to achieve. A defensive advantage makes reassurance difficult by encouraging all states to adopt defensive capa- bilities and by requiring large concessions to reveal benign motives. Only when offense and defense are differentiated and the balance between them is neutral can states reveal their motives without also endangering their security. These arguments are illustrated with three empirical examples: the Anglo- German naval race, Nikita Khrushchev's troop cuts, and Mikhail Gorbachev's arms limitation and arms control policies.