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Francis J. Gavin
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
International Security (2015) 40 (1): 9–46.
Published: 01 July 2015
Abstract
View articletitled, Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation
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for article titled, Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation
The United States has gone to extraordinary lengths since the beginning of the nuclear age to inhibit—that is, to slow, halt, and reverse—the spread of nuclear weapons and, when unsuccessful, to mitigate the consequences. To accomplish this end, the United States has developed and implemented a wide range of tools, applied in a variety of combinations. These “strategies of inhibition” employ different policies rarely seen as connected to one another, from treaties and norms to alliances and security guarantees, to sanctions and preventive military action. The United States has applied these measures to friend and foe alike, often regardless of political orientation, economic system, or alliance status, to secure protection from nuclear attack and maintain freedom of action. Collectively, these linked strategies of inhibition have been an independent and driving feature of U.S. national security policy for more than seven decades, to an extent rarely documented or fully understood. The strategies of inhibition make sense of puzzles that neither containment nor openness strategies can explain, while providing critical insights into post–World War II history, theory, the causes of nuclear proliferation, and debates over the past, present, and future trajectory of U.S. grand strategy.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
International Security (2010) 34 (3): 7–37.
Published: 01 January 2010
Abstract
View articletitled, Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War
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for article titled, Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War
A widely held and largely unchallenged view among many scholars and policymakers is that nuclear proliferation is the gravest threat facing the United States today, that it is more dangerous than ever, and that few meaningful lessons can be drawn from the nuclear history of a supposed simpler and more predictable period, the Cold War. This view, labeled “nuclear alarmism,” is based on four myths about the history of the nuclear age. First, today's nuclear threats are new and more dangerous than those of the past. Second, unlike today, nuclear weapons stabilized international politics during the Cold War, when in fact the record was mixed. The third myth conflates the history of the nuclear arms race with the geopolitical and ideological competition between the Soviet Union and the United States, creating an oversimplified and misguided portrayal of the Cold War. The final myth is that the Cold War bipolar military rivalry was the only force driving nuclear proliferation. A better understanding of this history, and, in particular, of how and why the international community escaped calamity during a far more dangerous time against ruthless and powerful adversaries, can produce more effective U.S. policies than those proposed by the nuclear alarmists.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
International Security (2005) 29 (3): 100–135.
Published: 01 January 2005