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Keren Yarhi-Milo
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
International Security (2021) 45 (3): 122–161.
Published: 01 January 2021
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View articletitled, To Disclose or Deceive? Sharing Secret Information between Aligned States
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for article titled, To Disclose or Deceive? Sharing Secret Information between Aligned States
Why do aligned states sometimes disclose secret information about their miitary plans to use force, whereas other times they choose to deceive their partners? The state initiating these plans may choose among four information-sharing strategies: collusion, compartmentalization, concealment, and lying. Three main considerations shape its decision: the state's assessment of whether it needs its partner's capabilities to succeed at the military mission, the state's perception of whether the partner will be willing to support the state in the requested role, and the state's anticipated deception costs for not fully informing its partner state. Several cases illustrate how these strategies are chosen: Israel, Britain, and France's decision to use force against Egypt during the Suez Crisis (collusion between France and Israel, and concealment vis-à-vis the United States); Israel's 2007 bombing of Syria's al Kibar reactor (compartmentalization); and Israel's deliberations whether to attack Iran's nuclear reactor (lying). These strategies have implications for intra-alliance restraint and contribute to understanding deception and secrecy between allies.
Journal Articles
Arms, Alliances, and Patron-Client Relationships
UnavailablePublisher: Journals Gateway
International Security (2018) 42 (3): 183–186.
Published: 01 January 2018
Journal Articles
To Arm or to Ally? The Patron's Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances
UnavailablePublisher: Journals Gateway
International Security (2016) 41 (2): 90–139.
Published: 01 October 2016
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View articletitled, To Arm or to Ally? The Patron's Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances
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for article titled, To Arm or to Ally? The Patron's Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances
How do great powers decide whether to provide arms to or form alliances with client states? This “patron's dilemma” revolves around a decision about how to best provide security to clients without becoming entrapped in unwanted conflicts. Strong commitments worsen the risk of entrapment, whereas weak commitments intensify fears of abandonment. This traditional alliance dilemma can be addressed through the provision of arms and alliances. Great power patrons primarily make such decisions on the basis of two factors: first, the extent to which the patron believes it and its client have common security interests; and second, whether the patron believes that its client has sufficient military capabilities to deter its main adversary without the patron's assistance. Patrons assess the degree of shared threat and the local balances of capabilities in determining whether to support their clients with arms, alliances, or both. As demonstrated in the U.S. provision of security goods to Taiwan and Israel during the Cold War, this strategic logic explains how great powers manage the patron's dilemma.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
International Security (2013) 38 (1): 7–51.
Published: 01 July 2013
Abstract
View articletitled, In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries
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for article titled, In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries
How do policymakers infer the long-term political intentions of their states' adversaries? A new approach to answering this question, the “selective attention thesis,” posits that individual perceptual biases and organizational interests and practices influence which types of indicators a state's political leaders and its intelligence community regard as credible signals of an adversary's intentions. Policymakers often base their interpretations on their own theories, expectations, and needs, sometimes ignoring costly signals and paying more attention to information that, though less costly, is more vivid (i.e., personalized and emotionally involving). In contrast, intelligence organizations typically prioritize the collection and analysis of data on the adversary's military inventory. Over time, these organizations develop substantial knowledge on these material indicators that they then use to make predictions about an adversary's intentions. An examination of three cases based on 30,000 archival documents and intelligence reports shows strong support for the selective attention thesis and mixed support for two other approaches in international relations theory aimed at understanding how observers are likely to infer adversaries' political intentions: the behavior thesis and the capabilities thesis. The three cases are assessments by President Jimmy Carter and officials in his administration of Soviet intentions during the collapse of détente; assessments by President Ronald Reagan and administration officials of Soviet intentions during the end of the Cold War; and British assessments of Nazi Germany before World War II.