What is the relationship between oil and coercion? For decades states have worried that their dependence on oil gives producers a potential lever of coercion. The size, integration, and sophistication of the current oil market, however, are thought to have greatly attenuated, if not eliminated, the coercive potential of oil. The best way to analyze the current global oil market is by viewing it as a series of distinct market segments, from upstream production to midstream transport to downstream refining, with the potential for coercion varying across them. Oil-producing states do not have the greatest coercive potential in the international oil market. Instead, the United States remains the dominant presence, though its dominance has shifted from production—where it resided prior to World War II—to the maritime environment. These findings are significant for scholars’ and policymakers’ understanding of the relationship between oil and coercion. More generally, they suggest that studies of the potential for states to coerce others using economic instruments should take into account differences in the structure of markets for different goods.

Japan's status as a nonnuclear weapons state remains of ongoing interest to policy analysts and scholars of international relations. For some, Japanese nuclearization is a question not of whether but of when. This article reassesses the state of the evidence on the nuclearization of Japan. It finds that support in Japan for the development of an independent nuclear deterrent remains negligible. Evidence demonstrates that ministries and agencies with responsibility for foreign and security policy have sought to consolidate Japan's existing insurance policies against nuclear threats—multilateral regimes and the extension of the U.S. nuclear deterrent to Japan—rather than seeking an indigenous nuclear deterrent. The article also finds, however, that the door to independent nuclearization remains ajar. Policymakers have ensured that constitutional and other domestic legal hurdles do not significantly constrain Japan from developing an independent nuclear deterrent. Further, recent centralization of authority in the prime minister and Cabinet Office has increased the freedom of action of leaders, enabling them to overcome political opposition to changes in security policy to a degree not possible in the past. This suggests that Japan's future position toward nuclear weapons could be more easily altered than before, should leader preferences change.