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Ron E. Hassner
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
International Security (2015) 40 (1): 157–190.
Published: 01 July 2015
FIGURES
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Fortified boundaries are asymmetrical, physical barriers placed along borders. These boundaries are more formidable in structure than conventional boundary lines, but less robust than militarized boundaries. Their goal is to impose costs on infiltrators and in so doing deter or impede infiltration. A novel dataset of all such boundaries worldwide shows that states are constructing these barriers at an accelerating rate. More than half of barrier builders are Muslim-majority states, and so are the vast majority of targets. A multivariate analysis demonstrates that, contrary to conventional wisdom, states that construct such barriers do not tend to suffer disproportionately from terrorism, nor are they apt to be involved in a significant number of territorial disputes. Instead, differences in state wealth and migration rates are the best predictors of barrier construction. Qualitative case studies suggest that the most effective fortified boundaries are found where the initiating state controls the territory beyond a boundary that blocks the only access route into the state.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
International Security (2010) 35 (1): 201–208.
Published: 01 July 2010
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
International Security (2008) 32 (3): 191–201.
Published: 01 January 2008
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
International Security (2007) 31 (3): 107–138.
Published: 01 January 2007
Abstract
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Why do territorial disputes become more difficult to resolve over time? Why are states often unable to resolve long-standing territorial disputes over land that is of little strategic or economic value? One explanation for territorial dispute entrenchment draws on changes in dispute perception. Specifically, as territorial disputes mature they undergo processes that increase the integrity of the disputed territory, clarify the definition of the territory's boundaries, and make it more difficult to find substitutes for the territory. Territorial dispute resolution is both stochastic and exogenous to the entrenchment process and thus impossible to predict. It is possible, however, to forecast ex ante the degree to which young territorial disputes are likely to resist resolution efforts in the future based on two variables: perceptions of a territory's integrity, boundaries, and value at the outset of the dispute, and physical constraints on expansion and settlement into the territory.