The Afghan model of warfare uses indigenous allies to replace American conventional ground troops by exploiting U.S. airpower and small numbers of American special operations forces. Some argue that this model is widely applicable, enabling a major restructuring of the U.S. military and considerable freedom for American military intervention. An assessment of such claims in light of recent combat experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, finds the model's applicability to be more limited. Where U.S. allies have had skills and motivation comparable to their enemies', the Afghan model has proven extremely lethal even without U.S. conventional ground forces. But where U.S. allies have lacked these skills, they have proven unable to exploit the potential of American airpower. The model can thus be a powerful tool, but one with important preconditions for its use—and these preconditions limit its potential to transform U.S. force structure or defense policy.

When the war in Afghanistan ended in 2002, the country was largely governed by Afghans. This result came about because, rather than inserting thousands of troops into the country, the United States fought the war using a new type of military operation that relied on special forces, airpower, and Afghan allies. In the operation, approximately fifty U.S. special forces personnel accomplished what planners had believed would require 50,000 U.S. ground troops. In the wake of the war, military planners largely dismissed the Afghan model as unworkable elsewhere. The performance of the model in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, however, illustrates that the traditional military's pessimism toward this method is unwarranted. The Afghan model vastly improves U.S. leverage in coercive diplomacy and war because it requires few U.S. ground troops and facilitates the transition to stability and democracy by empowering indigenous allies.