This article builds on work published in the Journal of Cold War Studies in 2003 by James G. Hershberg, who presented newly released archival evidence from Budapest and Warsaw concerning the role that Hungary and Poland played as intermediaries between Washington and Hanoi during the 37-day pause in the U.S. bombing campaign against North Vietnam in December 1965 and January 1966. The evidence presented here, drawing on unpublished Hungarian (and partly unpublished U.S.) archival sources, refines some of Hershberg's conclusions and sheds new light on Budapest's mediatory attempt as well as Hungary's role in the Vietnam conflict. The article provides the first critical appraisal of Delusion and Reality, the 1978 book by János Radványi, Hungary's former chargé d'affaires in Washington. For 25 years, Radványi's book constituted the only available Soviet-bloc account of the secret Communist peace efforts during the Vietnam War.

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