The thrust of this book is indicated in its title and subtitle. Aurélie Gfeller argues that circumstances surrounding the 1973 oil crisis allowed Europeans to break through previous obstacles and create a common political identity. The book is meticulously documented with a wealth of primary sources but is ultimately unconvincing.
The book's central claim is that Europeans developed a common political identity largely as a result of doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees following the 1973 Arab oil embargo. But concern about the reliability of the United States as an ally was not new. Fears of U.S. isolationism were a motivating factor in European, and especially French, policy from the end of World War II. Charles de Gaulle thought that U.S. assurances offered little solace because, as he remarked to U.S. Ambassador Jefferson Caffery just after the war, “you are far away and your soldiers will not stay...