If a week is a long time in politics, to borrow Harold Wilson's well-known saying, then seven months is an eternity in European Economic Community (EEC) history. The seven months of the “empty chair” crisis, from July 1965 to January 1966, have been the focus of considerable debate. This multidisciplinary collection of essays draws on the expanding field of EEC history and on political science and legal studies to challenge received wisdom about the significance of the crisis's resolution, the Luxembourg Compromise.
The contributors draw on evidence from the six European Commission (EC) member-states as well as from the Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper). Jean-Marie Palayret's chapter reinforces the traditional thesis that the crisis broke out because of French President Charles de Gaulle's determination to curb the desire of Walter Hallstein's Commission to increase its influence. De Gaulle wanted to retain national independence...