An Ounce of Prevention—A Pound of Cure? The Reagan Administration's Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

“I swear I believe Armageddon is near,” wrote a shaken Ronald Reagan after learning about the Israeli raid against the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq.¹ The June 1981 raid was the first successful attack conducted by one state against an enemy state's nuclear reactor.² The raid has received much attention in academic and political debate on the usefulness of strikes against hostile nuclear programs, especially in the Iranian context. Yet surprisingly, and despite Reagan's emotional diary entry, some important questions have been left unanswered. How did the raid affect the initial formation of Reagan's nonproliferation policy, and how was the raid perceived by relevant administration officials? How did the administration design its political strategy of response to the raid, and how did this strategy play out at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)? What does this episode tell us about Reagan's foreign policy priorities? This article addresses these questions by exploring recently declassified documents from numerous archives.³

The article focuses on several critical aspects. To place the discussion of Reagan's policy in context, we begin by exploring the evolution of President Jimmy Carter's nonproliferation policy and his administration's approach to the Pakistani and Iraqi nuclear programs in the second half of his term. We describe the growing skepticism among Carter administration officials about the original policy of universal nuclear denial and outline the administration's increasingly severe assessments of the Iraqi nuclear program and the rising concern over the possibility of an Israeli strike against it.

Following this, we examine the period between Reagan's election in November 1980 and the raid, outlining how Reagan administration officials, during both the transition period and their first months in office, contemplated and designed the administration's proposed nonproliferation policy. Despite harsh rhetoric leveled against the policy of the outgoing administration, crucial elements of the new policy represented a continuation of Carter's policy, not a departure from it, including several key themes that were discussed during Carter's final year in office.

The raid was consequential for the development of Reagan's initial nonproliferation policy, as presented in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 6, issued on 16 July 1981.⁴ Before the raid took place, the Reagan administration was considering revising the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA), legislation that included harsh limitations on nuclear exports. After the Israeli strike, confronting Congress with a major shift in U.S. nuclear exports policy became untenable, as the raid exposed the fragile balance of the nonproliferation regime. As a consequence, the initial policy, contained in NSDD 6, did not include any revision of the NNPA.

We detail the responses of the relevant offices of the Reagan administration to the raid itself. We explore why and how the administration was caught off guard when the raid took place, and we assess the so-called gap in the administration's “institutional memory” regarding prior knowledge of Israel's intent to attack Osirak. This lack of awareness stemmed from two major failures. The first, already established in the literature, was a failure to transfer knowledge properly during the transition period. The second, hitherto unexplored, is a major failure relating to the meeting between Alexander Haig and Menachem Begin on 5 April 1981. Begin's expressed concern regarding the Iraqi nuclear program was not properly contextualized by Haig, and we outline several explanations of this event. One of the “lessons learned” from the Osirak raid is the need to ensure a smooth handover of intelligence and assessments regarding time-sensitive issues.

Following this, we explore the construction of Reagan's “political strategy,” a term used by the administration in responding to the raid. The debate surrounding the raid and a gap in “institutional memory” contributed to the decision to adopt a milder political strategy than initially considered. This was exemplified by the administration's decision to suspend the delivery of F-16 jets to Israel and then to proceed with the delivery.

Finally, we explore how the administration's political strategy of response to the raid tested its relationship with the IAEA in the following years, when the agency became a venue for diplomatic battles over Israel's status. The administration was dismayed by the IAEA's harsh response to Israel and eventually withdrew the United States from the agency in September 1982. The short-lived withdrawal proved to the administration that, despite the IAEA's shortcomings, no viable alternative existed that could serve U.S. interests.

The “Osirak” literature, both historical and contemporary, has focused on the raid's implications for the development of the Iraqi nuclear program and has explored its outcome as a strike aimed at curtailing proliferation. However, the U.S. reaction to the strike has remained largely unexplored.⁵ With the aim of addressing that gap, this article engages with three distinct strands of literature. The first strand is the literature on Reagan's nuclear policy. Some aspects of Reagan's approach to nuclear weapons have been widely discussed in the literature, particularly his arms control efforts during the Cold War's final years, but Reagan's nonproliferation policy vis-à-vis aspiring and new proliferators has received little attention to date.⁶ The traditionally accepted view is that the administration, preoccupied by strategic competition with the Soviet Union, chose to sacrifice its nonproliferation goals in favor of competing strategic interests.⁷ Recent research, however, has produced a more nuanced assessment.⁸ Our analysis here contributes to the emerging literature by mapping the initial construction of Reagan's nonproliferation policy and its internal logic.

The second strand of literature involves research on counterproliferation strikes and their usefulness as policy instruments. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, a new stream of Iraqi sources has been fueling the academic debate on the usefulness of strikes. Surprisingly, Osirak features as an example in both of the opposing camps. Some researchers cite the raid as an example of successful long-term intervention, stressing its effectiveness in “buying time” for further interruptions and interventions and its role in a larger interruption campaign.⁹ A competing camp places an emphasis on the raid's negative proliferation impact, arguing it was counterproductive because it both motivated Saddam Hussein to accelerate his nuclear efforts and convinced him to drive it underground.¹⁰ In the United States the Osirak raid has also featured in policy debates on whether, and under what conditions, Washington should consider a first strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.¹¹

Contemporary accounts from 1981 correctly portrayed the raid as an act that met with wide reproach in the United States. The 1991 Gulf War, however, prompted a reevaluation of the episode by former Reagan administration officials and by well-established nonproliferation experts. Gerard C. Smith, President Carter's special representative for nonproliferation, who in 1981 testified before Congress “critically on the Israeli attack,” reconsidered his position in 1993, candidly admitting that he “was wrong” and now favored “military actions” against possible proliferators.¹²

After the Gulf War ended, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney tacitly embraced the Osirak raid, praising the Israeli air force for having destroyed Osirak and thanking it for making the “job much easier in Desert Storm.”¹³ This reevaluation grew stronger after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and, in some cases, evolved into a revisionist narrative. Richard Perle, a former Reagan administration official and former adviser to the Bush administration, repeatedly cited the raid as an exemplary operation and claimed that the 1981 condemnation was not genuine. Perle maintained that “the State Department of course got out the obligatory condemnation of Israel's unilateral action,” but in fact “the president [actually] thought it was a terrific piece of bombing.”¹⁴ We now know, however, that Perle's account, suggesting that the raid was partly condoned, is inaccurate.

The third strand of literature deals with U.S.-Israeli bilateral relations. Existing accounts are consistent in describing how, much to the surprise of both governments, June 1981 found U.S.-Israeli relations on shaky grounds as the congenial working relationship the two sides expected did not materialize.¹⁵ Israel's raid on Osirak proved to be the first of several clashes during Reagan's first term, and the president found himself repeatedly using “the sanction whip” against Israel.¹⁶ The impact of the raid itself on bilateral relations, especially in the context of the U.S. withdrawal from the IAEA, has received limited scholarly attention.

In the first half of Carter's term, his administration emphasized efforts to prevent the spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology and highlighted the importance of establishing a credible and functioning international regime by “universally” denying nuclear supplies to clients that did not meet certain standards.¹⁷ This policy led to stricter regulations on nuclear exports, as contained in the 1978 NNPA, and increased congressional oversight of executive-branch compliance.¹⁸

However, several nuclear-related developments highlighted the policy's shortcomings. The administration was alarmed by the nuclear programs of Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan, and South Korea and was especially concerned about the Pakistani nuclear program.¹⁹ In bilateral talks held in February 1977 with the United States, the Israelis tied the Iraqi and Pakistani programs together, though the Iraqi program was not yet a U.S. concern.²⁰

The major worry for the Carter administration regarding Pakistan was that, even after U.S. officials convinced the French not to export plutonium reprocessing plants to Pakistan, the Pakistanis were still “determined to have at least a nuclear option.”²¹ A growing U.S. concern was the possibility of a Pakistani nuclear test.²² In December 1979, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the geostrategic picture changed. National Security Council (NSC) staffers now proposed resuming aid to Pakistan without first obtaining concessions on the nuclear program.²³ Carter attempted unsuccessfully in 1980 to reshape relations with Pakistan, but he reached no new strategic bargains with Pakistan's leader, General Zia ul-Haq. Still, the administration continued its efforts to limit sensitive exports to Pakistan through a policy of démarches, an approach that continued under Reagan.²⁴

Iraq's nuclear program gradually began to present a major challenge to Carter's nonproliferation policy in the second half of his term. As late as December 1978, the Iraqi program still did not present a serious concern to Washington and, unlike Pakistan, India, and South Korea, was not listed as a matter of nonproliferation concern.²⁵ But the picture gradually changed in 1979. In the second half of the 1970s the French insisted on exporting two nuclear reactors to Iraq, one relatively large, coupled with highly enriched uranium (HEU). French exports were matched by Italian supplies. The Italian authorities agreed to export numerous facilities to Iraq, including “hot cells,” in return for Iraqi oil. France's and Italy's agreements to supply Iraq with “major nuclear components” were described in a June 1979 National Intelligence Estimate as having “obvious implications for U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy.”²⁶

In July 1979, U.S. diplomats told their Italian counterparts that it was an “American strong belief” that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear capability, and they asked the Italian government to provide information on the nature of the “nuclear supplies” to Iraq. The Italians dutifully complied but rebuffed any further pressure from Washington as inappropriate.²⁷ In October, the intelligence community concluded that although Iraq was not likely to attempt to produce nuclear weapons before the late 1980s, it would “probably persist in acquiring all that it needs for this purpose under the guise of peaceful nuclear activities.”²⁸ Still, in the wake of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration did not rule out a rapprochement with Saddam Hussein's regime.²⁹ In September 1980 the assessment of Iraqi nuclear capabilities grew bleaker, and NSC staffer Jerry Oplinger contended that “a crude Iraqi bomb could conceivably be just two years away,” adding that a “summary of recent intelligence indicates that the Israelis have very good reason to be concerned.”³⁰

The reference to the Israeli “concerns” came against the backdrop of ongoing talks with Israel on the subject. Under Prime Minister Begin, the Israeli government had become increasingly wary of Iraq's nuclear program.³¹ Israel had three main concerns, which were all reflected in the talks held with the French in the year before the raid. First, the Israelis worried that Iraq would be supplied with enough HEU to enable it to produce a uranium bomb.³² Second, they were concerned that Iraq would be allowed to modify its reactor, enabling it to produce, reprocess, and accumulate plutonium.³³ Finally, Israel was concerned that Iraq would unilaterally withdraw from existing safeguard arrangements or from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), leaving it with the relevant capabilities to produce nuclear weapons—but free of any treaty obligations not to do so.³⁴ From 1978 to 1980 Israel tried to undermine the Iraqi program with a mixture of tools, including diplomatic pressure on the United States, France, and Italy and clandestine operations in Europe.³⁵ When President Reagan was sworn in, the Iraqis were progressing at full speed.

The possibility of an Israeli strike alarmed the Carter administration. Oplinger warned that Israel was “not about to wait” for hostile nuclear programs like Iraq's “to mature before responding.”³⁶ He added that “the threat of an Israeli response is now also an objective factor,” concluding that the “only alternative” was to “play hardball with France.”³⁷ In a meeting on 25 July 1980, U.S. diplomat Thomas Pickering unambiguously warned Israeli Ambassador to Washington Ephraim Evron against a strike, cautioning that “any precipitous [sic] acts would carry grave risks and should be avoided.”³⁸ The exchanges rang the administration's alarm bells. An internal memorandum from National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski stipulated that “it is important for U.S. to decide quickly on follow-up actions,” adding that “in view of the urgency,” the recommendations for “further approaches” should be prepared within the week.³⁹

This sense of urgency was underlined in September when the Israelis confirmed to U.S. officials that they were, in fact, considering a strike. This confirmation was received on 29 September 1980, just as the Iranian air force was attacking targets in Baghdad, including an unsuccessful attack against the Osirak site. Recently retired Defense Minister Ezer Weizman told U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis that “the Israeli Defense Ministry was seriously considering the possibility of carrying out an air strike against Iraq's nuclear facility under cover of the current Iranian air attacks in Baghdad.”⁴⁰ On 17 December 1980 Lewis met with Begin and told him, as instructed, that “the United States shares Israel's serious concern” and that the Iraqi installations “are intended to give that country's government the option of developing nuclear explosives in the future.”⁴¹

By 1980, the failure to curb the Pakistani and Iraqi nuclear programs had caused some administration officials to doubt the effectiveness of the existing policy. In June 1980, Gerard Smith proposed to engage Washington's European allies in a discussion of a revised approach: the United States would assume a more flexible line on plutonium reprocessing by allies in Europe and Japan in return for “improved cooperation in dealing with countries of proliferation concern, including concrete steps to strengthen restraints on exports of sensitive technology and material to such countries.”⁴² Carter supported Smith's proposal against Brzezinski's advice but asked Smith to keep the talks at an exploratory, noncommittal stage.⁴³

Yet despite being dissatisfied with the policy, Carter never made a formal decision to change it, in part because he knew that doing so would meet strong objections both domestically and internationally. In December 1980 the time came to evaluate the policy and prepare for the handover to the incoming Reagan administration. Oplinger argued: “On balance, and judged by its stated objectives, the Carter nonproliferation policy has to be considered a failure.”⁴⁴ Smith in his final report also expressed discontent, criticizing the rigidity of the administration's approach.⁴⁵ He pointed to the “serious concern” arising from Pakistan's nuclear program and the “acquisition of sensitive facilities by Iraq, Argentina and Brazil.”⁴⁶ Significantly, he proposed to increase the policy's flexibility by “eliminating certain sanction provisions in the NNPA and the Foreign Assistance Act.”⁴⁷ Carter was unsure how to pose the different options to Reagan's transition team, writing in the upper right-hand corner of the first page of Smith's memorandum, “Zbig. How best to present alternatives to next administration?”⁴⁸

After Reagan's election in November 1980, the transition team in charge of nuclear matters called for a clean break from the policies of the outgoing Carter administration. An Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) transition team headed by Eugene Rostow was placed in charge of developing the recommendations for the new nonproliferation policy.⁴⁹ In December 1980, these were submitted to James Malone, chairman of the Nonproliferation Coordinating Committee.⁵⁰

The recommendations called for treating nonproliferation policy “in the context of overall U.S. international security requirements,” adding that the United States “should make every effort to restore its credibility and reliability as a nuclear supplier and to enhance its role in international nuclear commerce as a mean of strengthening its ability to achieve nonproliferation objectives.”⁵¹ The transition team's working assumption was that Carter's nonproliferation policy, especially the adoption of the NNPA, had caused a sharp decline in the status and reputation of the United States as a reliable nuclear supplier and must be promptly revised.⁵² In a memorandum from 18 December 1980, Malone stated that the NNPA “should be revised as soon as possible,” echoing Smith's proposal.⁵³

Despite the explicit criticism of Carter's policies, the recommendations reflected a striking level of continuity with the thinking that had evolved during the second half of the Carter administration. The Reagan administration's proposed new policy drew heavily from the adjustments considered during Carter's last year in office. To address the loss of U.S. leadership in the international nuclear market and the alienation of allies, the new policy proposed the adoption of a case-by-case approach instead of universal measures, and officials suggested that the “policy of denial” of nuclear supplies be applied only to countries “posing a threat to U.S. international security interests.”⁵⁴

In the following months, administration officials sought to convert the transition team's proposals into an official policy. In April 1981 an interagency study involving the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was completed.⁵⁵ The study maintained that the best way to address nuclear proliferation was by focusing on bilateral relations and on the security motivations behind proliferation.⁵⁶

On 7 June 1981, the day of the Osirak raid, a policy paper prepared by the Senior Interagency Group on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Cooperation (SIG) was submitted to the NSC.⁵⁷ The discussion paper characterized the administration's nonproliferation efforts as a “key foreign policy objective” and as “vital to U.S. and international security” and repeated the criticism that the Carter administration had damaged U.S. export reliability. The paper also suggested revising the NNPA.⁵⁸

The SIG document, endorsing one of the themes discussed in Carter's last year in office, maintained that the United States “must recognize and deal with the security and other motivations which lead nations to acquire nuclear explosives” and that these would be affected by “our readiness to exercise power in the interest of ourselves and our friends.”⁵⁹

Addressing the conceptual difference between policies aimed at preventing proliferation by nuclear hopefuls and policies aimed at dealing with states that had already crossed the nuclear threshold, the memorandum made the following important distinction: “Our efforts will also have to deal increasingly with controlling the results of proliferation in addition to preventing it.”⁶⁰ The “control” of the “results of proliferation” was to be accomplished by “direct[ing] our efforts toward preventing or delaying testing, weaponizing or perhaps even the use of nuclear explosives by proliferating states.”⁶¹

As for relations with the IAEA, a vital component of the policy, the ACDA paper argued that the United States could achieve its nonproliferation goals by using the agency as an agent. The IAEA and the NPT were to be “further strengthened and given greater U.S. support.” To reinforce U.S. influence over the agency, the paper recommended that “support to the IAEA in the form of financial contribution, manpower and technical advice should be increased significantly.”⁶² This view, however, was not unanimous, and an internal debate addressed the agency's merits. The transition team's report stressed that the United States should focus its efforts on attempting to “reverse the trend” of increased politicization within the IAEA, and it recommended dealing with the issue by acquiring a greater political and economic role inside the agency and by influencing the selection of its next director general.⁶³

The SIG report underscored the latent skepticism toward the IAEA. A footnote in the document indicated that the Department of Defense (DoD) had expressed “reservations about the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards, the weakness of the IAEA as an international institution, its susceptibility to Third World and East Bloc, its lack of an intelligence capability, and the limits of its scope and jurisdiction” and warned against undue reliance on it.⁶⁴ Rostow shared this opinion.⁶⁵ The official formulation of Reagan's proposed nonproliferation policy was then accomplished with the adoption of NSDD 6, issued on 16 July 1981 and coupled with a public presidential statement—only four weeks after the Osirak raid.⁶⁶

How did Carter administration officials brief the incoming Reagan administration on Osirak, and was the issue flagged? The answers remain murky. The issue was not given emphasis in the months preceding the raid, leading to a sense of surprise when it finally took place. Information about Osirak was confined to the State Department, and the highest officials who came in with Reagan were not made aware of it. When asked by Israeli writer Shlomo Nakdimon about how the incoming administration was briefed on the issue, Carter replied, “Reagan chose his secretary of state and his secretary of defense only in the last minute,” a blurry answer that failed to explain how (or even whether) these officials were briefed.⁶⁷

Robert Hunter, director of Middle East affairs in the Carter administration, recalls personally briefing his successor at the NSC, Geoffrey Kemp, on the issue and warning that “if the United States didn't do something soon about [Osirak], Israel would likely bomb it.”⁶⁸ How this briefing was received is unclear. Available records and personal accounts reveal an absence of discussion on the topic; there are no available documents indicating that Reagan or his NSC team discussed the issue prior to the raid or were made aware of it.⁶⁹

RAND researcher Warren Bass interviewed Lewis on this matter in 2012. Lewis, who was apprehensive about a flawed handover of the issue, told Bass he had “made a series of secure phone calls back to Washington” during the transition to make sure the new administration was “provided with a history” of the contacts between the United States and Israel on the Osirak reactor. Lewis said he “was assured” that the issue was included in a key transition document, but “the document was subsequently slapped with an extremely high level of classification, leaving it in a compartment into which very few incoming officials had been read.” Apparently, Secretary of State Haig and other senior officials never saw it. “It got so over-classified that it stayed in a compartment and got lost in the shuffle,” Lewis told Bass.⁷⁰

Other issues—the Iran-Iraq War, the Israel-Egypt peace process, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—dominated Washington's Mideast agenda at the time.⁷¹ At the operational level, Israel's technical-military capability to conduct a successful long-range, high-precision bombing raid against the reactor was not examined. Because the Israeli press did not discuss the Iraqi nuclear program in the months leading up to the raid, U.S. analysts observing the region did not flag the issue.⁷² The diplomatic corps largely assumed that Israel would consult or inform the United States prior to any raid.⁷³ In April 1981, the possibility of an Israeli attack was briefly mentioned in a nonproliferation report but was not framed as an immediate threat.⁷⁴ Nicholas A. Veliotes, assistant secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, recalled that he spent none of his time “considering the possibility of an Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor.”⁷⁵

A further unresolved issue surrounding the degree of U.S. awareness of Israel's intentions before the raid relates to Haig's visit to Israel and his private meeting with Begin on 5 April 1981.⁷⁶ As secretary of state, Haig would have been briefed on the State Department assessments on Osirak before his trip, and Begin and Haig did discuss the Iraqi nuclear program during their meeting.⁷⁷ Begin asked Haig, “What did the U.S. do in light of Israel's incessant requests to halt Iraqi nuclear development.” Haig replied, “We intervened with Italy and France, but to no avail.”⁷⁸ Veliotes, who accompanied Haig to Israel, was not informed by the secretary of any mention of the Iraqi reactor, and the issue was not probed further.

Is it therefore plausible, as Haig later wrote in his memoirs, that the Reagan administration did not become fully aware of Israeli concerns and intentions until after the raid, even though Haid had explicitly discussed Osirak with Begin?⁷⁹ Available accounts show that Haig seemed genuinely surprised by the raid. Why did he ignore the concern Begin expressed on 5 April? According to Veliotes, Haig might have discounted Begin's apprehension and attributed it instead to Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, who had voiced deep trepidation about Osirak. During the visit, Sharon “was quite obnoxious and bombastic, verging on insulting in meetings with Haig,” conceivably causing Haig to underestimate his anxiety.⁸⁰ Another possibility, noted by Douglas J. Feith, an NSC staffer at the time, is that Haig did not realize that by giving Begin a discouraging report about diplomatic progress with the French and the Italians, “he was in fact making Israeli military action more likely.”⁸¹ Alternatively, perhaps Haig did note Begin's concern but, believing that an Israeli raid would not be harmful to U.S. regional interests, decided to turn a blind eye.

Contemporary accounts demonstrate the existence of a complex mixture of elements, including a lack of interest and experience, poor flow of information, prejudice, and conflicts within the incoming administration. These factors produced a confused and incoherent interpretation of the episode's background. Polarized attitudes toward Israel further complicated the flow of information and opinions within the administration and prevented a deep understanding of the situation.

On 7 June 1981, the Israelis conducted the raid against the Osirak nuclear reactor with F-16 jets purchased from the United States under a 1952 bilateral agreement. That agreement prohibited Israel from using U.S.-bought weapons to attack its neighbors unless doing so was an act of “legitimate self-defense.”⁸² The raid also represented a potential legal challenge in light of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976. The ensuing legal debate within the White House and on Capitol Hill focused on whether the raid violated the AECA, which prohibited the use of U.S.-supplied weapons except in self-defense.⁸³

The administration was profoundly surprised by the raid—Reagan himself was “astounded”—especially given the “absence of any prior consultation” by Israel.⁸⁴ Still, Reagan's national security adviser, Richard V. Allen, recalled that after Reagan was briefed about the raid he commented, “boys will be boys.”⁸⁵ Despite the surprise of the attack, the president sympathized with the Israelis. A startled Haig was also directly briefed by the Israeli ambassador to Washington.⁸⁶

The international community's reaction was critical of the Israelis, who were condemned by friends and foes alike.⁸⁷ Arab media speculated about U.S. involvement in the attack, and the Egyptians warned Washington that, unless the administration stood “strongly against” the Israeli action, the Arab world “would believe the U.S. was behind it.”⁸⁸

Reagan's national security team dedicated the morning after the attack, 8 June, to the raid.⁸⁹ The “Haig-Weinberger split,” which separated advocates of closer strategic ties with Israel, such as Haig, from those who supported a closer affiliation with the Arab world, led by Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, was not evident in the Monday morning meeting.⁹⁰ Reagan's officials shared similar negative views of the raid, and Weinberger called for sanctions against Israel and for a suspension of deliveries of Israeli-bought F-16 jets.⁹¹

According to notes describing the exchange between Haig and Israeli diplomats, Weinberger also proposed a hard stance against Israel at the United Nations (UN), targeting Israel's nuclear program. Israel's Dimona nuclear reactor, which started operating in 1963, was never put under IAEA inspections because of Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity, which was an extremely sensitive issue in U.S.-Israeli relations.⁹² According to Haig, Weinberger expressed support for a UN resolution demanding that Israel open Dimona for inspection and calling on Israel to join the NPT.⁹³ When news of the raid had broken the previous day, Weinberger had told his interlocutor that Begin “must have taken leave of his senses.”⁹⁴ At the meeting, Vice President George Bush and his chief of staff, James Baker, both concurred with Weinberger.⁹⁵ Even Haig, a supporter of close ties with Israel, called the raid “reckless.”⁹⁶ The secretary of state was “less vocal” than usual at the meeting and chose to support “official American criticism of Israel.”⁹⁷

The State Department announced that the administration “condemned” Israel for the bombing, stressing the raid's “unprecedented character.”⁹⁸ Behind the scenes, Haig told the Israeli ambassador that the Israeli “action in Baghdad [had] caused a serious complication for the U.S., and President Reagan thinks the same.”⁹⁹ Administration officials feared that Washington would be blamed for the raid because of its close association with Israel.¹⁰⁰ This fear was compounded by the extreme precision of the attack, which indicated to expert observers around the world that Israel must have had access to “extremely precise targeting information to complete the operation without refueling”; that is, it must have had access to images from the U.S. KH-11 reconnaissance satellites.¹⁰¹ Many defense officials, including Weinberger and CIA Deputy Director Robert R. Inman, thought the raid, by exposing Washington to accusations of collusion, had severely undermined U.S. regional interests.¹⁰²

On 10 June, much to the surprise of the Israelis, Haig declared the administration's decision to suspend the delivery of four F-16 jets to Israel. No time frame was given for when the suspension might be lifted.¹⁰³ Haig briefed the Israeli ambassador, telling him that Weinberger had demanded the suspension of all military aid to Israel but that when Haig and Allen strongly objected, the administration had decided the suspension would apply only to the delivery of the four F-16 jets.¹⁰⁴ Publicly, Haig confirmed that the raid potentially represented “a substantial violation” of the 1952 U.S.-Israeli arms pact and that the administration was “conducting a review of the entire matter.”¹⁰⁵

Why were the Israelis surprised by the suspension of the F-16 deliveries? Following the 5 April 1981 talk with Haig, Begin incorrectly believed that Israel at the time of the raid was operating with Washington's support—or its partial support at least. According to Major General (ret.) David Ivry, commander of the Israeli air force at the time of the raid, Begin construed Haig's statement

Begin's cabinet secretary, Arye Naor, concurs and explains that “the interpretation of the meeting in Israel was not identical to the interpretation in Reagan's circle, and this is the reason for his [Reagan's] sense of insult and anger” by the surprise of the raid.¹⁰⁷

In the first 72 hours after the raid, only a minority of Israel's firmest supporters, such as State Department Director of Policy Planning Paul Wolfowitz, openly expressed their satisfaction with it.¹⁰⁸ At the Pentagon, Perle, who was then assistant secretary of defense, stated that the raid was “a great act of anti-proliferation.”¹⁰⁹ Perle, together with Richard Burt, director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, told British Ambassador Nicholas Henderson that the raid was “a blow on behalf of nonproliferation,” irrespective of official public statements.¹¹⁰

Even as the administration devised its response to the raid, U.S. officials came face to face with what Ambassador Lewis called a “gap” in the administration's “institutional memory.”¹¹¹ In a detailed cable, Lewis described the entire Carter-era dialogue, which left him “with no doubt that before the Iraqi reactor became operational, the Israeli forces would destroy it.”¹¹² Over the following days, it became clear to top officials that the highest leaders were not fully informed on the issue.

Lewis's cable took a few days to percolate to the top. Reagan's diaries make clear that as late as 9 June, two days after the raid, he had not yet been filled in on the history of the talks. With regard to Begin, he wrote, “He should have told U.S. & the French, we could have done something to remove the threat.”¹¹³ By contrast, Allen's memorandum to Reagan on 15 June stressed that “during the last months of the Carter administration, the State Department knew of Jerusalem's thinking on Iraq's nuclear program, including the determination to resort to force if diplomacy failed to eliminate the Iraqi nuclear threat.”¹¹⁴ On 16 June, Reagan mentioned that “Israel & the previous Admin. did communicate about Iraq & the nuclear threat & the U.S. agreed it was a threat.”¹¹⁵ According to Kemp, Lewis's memorandum “sobered us up” and consequently “lowered the anti-Israeli rhetoric in town.”¹¹⁶

Lewis's cable coincided with the Israeli effort to mitigate the potential for a harsh U.S. reaction. In response to the relatively punitive backlash, Israel launched an intensive public relations campaign in the press, in Congress, and in the White House, justifying the decision to attack by divulging sensitive intelligence on Iraq's nuclear activities.¹¹⁷ Haig reported to Reagan that inside Congress the “reaction spanned the full range, from open support to questions of possible violations of U.S. arms sales legislation” and that Israel had begun an intensive campaign to convince its supporters.¹¹⁸ Most of the diplomatic “heavy lifting” was conducted by the ambassador and his staff, who briefed members of Congress and White House officials on Israel's stance.¹¹⁹ The Israelis also asked former President Richard Nixon to intervene and mediate in the crisis.¹²⁰

The effort was also supported by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which held briefings for senators to emphasize that the raid was in Israel's self-defense.¹²¹ From Israel's perspective, the public relations campaign seemed to have an almost immediate effect. On 12 June, Israeli diplomats reported to Jerusalem a mitigation of tone.¹²² Indian diplomats based in Washington noted that, in “confidential briefings, some officials voiced their understanding and even support” for Israel.¹²³ A more careful approach was, in fact, forming in Washington. The discovery of the “gap” in memory and the Israeli campaign contributed to this shift.

The adoption of a more restrained, sober approach toward Israel is revealed by the way the administration constructed its “political strategy for responding to Israeli attack.”¹²⁴ Of all the executive offices, NSC staffers supported the mildest response, though they stopped short of overt support of the raid. Raymond Tanter, for example, recommended a “middle course of action,” one that would distance the United States from the strike “while avoiding extreme measures designed to punish Israel.”¹²⁵ Douglas J. Feith took the debate a step further by stating that “no rebuke of Israel's raid against Iraq should be issued without an equally emphatic rebuke of Iraq.”¹²⁶

One clearly pro-Israeli voice belonged to Rostow. For him, the raid was framed by the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union, and he contended that the administration should “lead great coalitions” to “restore the policy of containment” and reinstate “world public order.”¹²⁷ He stressed that Israel should basically be given an exemption from the NPT on the grounds that “no one can ask or expect nations facing destruction to adhere to the NPT or accept IAEA inspection in good faith.”¹²⁸

Haig also departed from Weinberger's critical line by introducing a third, intermediate approach to the issue, plotting a path between Weinberger and the NSC.¹²⁹ His suggested political strategy, approved by Reagan on 12 June, also took a milder course compared to the initial condemnation of 8 June.¹³⁰ The policy was constructed around the notion of red lines. Rather than the line proposed by the NSC, the United States would harshly condemn Israel but would also “draw the line on punishment,” making clear that “if Israel is expelled from the UN General Assembly, or any other UN body, U.S. participation would be jeopardized.”¹³¹

On 16 June Reagan publicly addressed the raid. Adopting the proposed “mirrored rebuke,” he stated that “Israel had reason for concern” because of Iraq's history and that “Israel might have sincerely believed that [the attack] was a defensive move.”¹³² Haig's deputy, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., repeated these points to the Senate and admitted that the United States had “long been concerned about the Iraqi nuclear facility.”¹³³

Another aspect of the U.S. response to the Israeli raid was the suspension of the F-16 deliveries. The suspension prompts several questions: Was the raid a legitimate, legal act within a “self-defense” framework? Or was it an illegal, unprovoked attack in violation of the arms agreement? The Iraqi installation was, after all, an IAEA-safeguarded nuclear facility, established by an NPT member-state, attacked by a non-member-state. Reagan, like other observers, expected an official finding on the raid's legality. Showing his positive sentiments for Israel, he confided in his diary on 10 June that, if Congress found that Israel had indeed violated the agreement, “I'll grant a Presidential waiver. Iraq is technically still at war with Israel & I believe they were preparing to build an atom bomb.”¹³⁴

However, no presidential waiver proved to be necessary. The new discovery regarding the so-called “gap” in institutional memory, which, given Haig's discussion with Begin in April, was not a “gap” but more of a bungle, changed the tone in the White House. A week after the raid— unbeknownst to the Israelis, who were still extremely concerned and disappointed about losing the jets—the suspension of the F-16 deliveries was approaching its end.¹³⁵ The administration was backing away from its declared intention to conduct a legal review of the raid. Allen informed Reagan that the administration was “not required to make a legal determination on whether Israel violated U.S. law” and commented that the issue of the raid was “to be treated as a political rather than a legal question.”¹³⁶ Stoessel agreed: “We will try to avoid an extended congressional review which could interfere with our decision to resume F-16 deliveries when we deem that step desirable.”¹³⁷ Although the White House and Congress debated the legal implications of the raid, no official determination was ever made. Political concerns prevailed over legal matters, and the suspension was officially lifted on 17 August 1981.¹³⁸ Whether the Israelis were informed about U.S. intentions prior to this date is unclear.

Rostow, a former law professor, offered a legal interpretation of the raid that was not officially endorsed. He stated, “The Israeli move parallels our own behavior in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and represents a similar combination of circumstances. … [Both] come within the inherent right of a state to defend itself under article 51 of the [UN] Charter.”¹³⁹ Arthur J. Goldberg, former associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and a former permanent representative of the United States to the UN, sent a letter to Begin offering his own legal analysis, which concluded that the raid was indeed legal.¹⁴⁰

Indian diplomats speculated at the time that the fighter jet suspension may have been a U.S. gesture of goodwill toward Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat, aimed at appeasing him and keeping the embryonic peace process with Israel alive.¹⁴¹ A memorandum from Haig reinforces this view, stating that the Israelis were dismayed at the “Egyptian intervention in this important bilateral U.S.-Israeli matter.”¹⁴² The lifting of the suspension might have been coordinated with Sadat, who, according to Haig, had asked for “daylight” between his visit to Washington and the announcement of resumed deliveries.¹⁴³ Further research is required to determine the depth of Sadat's involvement and whether the administration would have lifted the suspension earlier, had it not been for Sadat's request (or later in the absence of Israel's efforts to get the deliveries resumed).¹⁴⁴

Following the logic of the “red lines,” the U.S. government endorsed the international condemnation of the Israeli raid at the UN. With the support of the U.S. delegation, on 19 June the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 487.¹⁴⁵ The resolution “strongly” condemned the attack and stated, in opposition to Rostow's legal analysis, that it was “in clear violation” of the UN Charter.¹⁴⁶ The resolution also stated that the attack was a serious threat to the “entire safeguards regime” of the IAEA and stressed that Israel should “urgently place its nuclear facilities under safeguards,” also specifying that Iraq was entitled to redress.¹⁴⁷

On Capitol Hill, congressional debate moved from considering the raid itself to scrutinizing the administration's intentions regarding its emerging nonproliferation policy. This review transpired weeks before the release of NSDD 6 and before the White House had the opportunity to introduce its new proposed policy to Congress and the public. In the wake of the Israeli attack, the NNPA “was pulled off the congressional shelf, dusted off and read carefully” by congressional members who had a newfound interest in nonproliferation.¹⁴⁸

Administration officials addressing the raid were asked to comment on the administration's stance toward the nuclear programs of Pakistan and India and on Reagan's nonproliferation agenda.¹⁴⁹ Almost unanimously, congressional representatives stated the importance of preserving and reinforcing the existing domestic and international rules and legislation on proliferation when discussing the Osirak raid. On 18 June, Stoessel sought to deflect congressional criticism by testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the administration's “nonproliferation policy guidelines” were soon to be released. Toning down the emphasis on change and flexibility that had dominated the internal debate in the previous months, he now stressed the need for strict control and highlighted U.S. support for “global adherence [to], and respect for, the most stringent safeguards.”¹⁵⁰

The same cautious approach was evident in testimony given by other administration officials.¹⁵¹ The White House had no chance to win a confrontation on the NNPA revision without causing a major clash in Congress, and the issue was simply dropped. Not surprisingly, NSDD 6 did not contain any specific reference to revision of existing U.S. nonproliferation legislation, nor did Reagan's official statement of 16 July.

The IAEA's safeguard system was another recurrent item of discussion during the congressional debate on the raid. Its credibility was questioned, especially after Roger Richter, a former IAEA inspector, gave controversial testimony.¹⁵²

The U.S. government was aware of the negative impact the Israeli bombing could have on the IAEA and on the credibility of the international nonproliferation regime. An interagency intelligence assessment from July warned of the raid's damaging impact on “the Nonproliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguard system” and argued that it might enhance Third World sympathies for an Arab nuclear deterrent.¹⁵³ U.S. officials also feared that India might decide to attack Pakistani nuclear facilities in a similar fashion, thus establishing a pattern that could disrupt the existing nonproliferation regime.¹⁵⁴

The international community was critical of the raid, and diplomatic battles over Israel's status began to play out in the IAEA and its General Conference (GC) in the months that followed. For the Reagan administration, the two policy questions stemming from the raid converged: how to handle the diplomatic fallout, and how to keep the IAEA from being hopelessly politicized.

After the raid, some administration officials revisited their views of the role of the IAEA and the NPT. Rostow, for example, stressed that “the principles of the NPT and the IAEA should be the lodestars of our policy,” adding that the IAEA is “is the only mechanism there is.”¹⁵⁵ Later he added that expulsion of Israel from the agency would “gravely weaken the IAEA as an institution and endanger our nonproliferation objectives in the Middle East.” He went so far as to warn that expulsion could lead Israel to reconsider its policy of nuclear ambiguity.¹⁵⁶

The second casualty of the raid, in addition to Iraq's reactor, was, therefore, the IAEA's credibility.¹⁵⁷ In 1982, the administration raised “questions concerning the credibility and reliability of IAEA safeguards,” and both the Senate and the House held special hearings on the “technical and institutional shortcomings” of the agency.¹⁵⁸ Richard T. Kennedy, Reagan's representative to the IAEA, raised similar concerns, stressing the “uneven” nature of the organization's safeguard system.¹⁵⁹

September 1981 found the atmosphere at the IAEA's annual GC meeting ripe for conflict. The U.S. delegation was instructed by Haig to address the anticipated “severe attack” against Israel. Building on Haig's “red lines strategy” employed at the UN Security Council, the delegation was told to “go along regretfully with a condemnation but object vigorously [to] suspension of technical aid.”¹⁶⁰

Haig informed Reagan that the U.S. delegation would “condemn exclusion of Israel” but would not walk out; however, if Israel's IAEA membership was suspended, the U.S. delegation “would immediately withdraw from the meeting,” and the United States would reassess “participation in the IAEA.”¹⁶¹ The difference between the two paths, exclusion and suspension, is important. Suspension would have amounted to the official expulsion of Israel, a harsh move requiring a two-thirds majority vote. On the other hand, the motion to reject the credentials of the Israeli delegation would qualify as a “slap on the wrist”; Israel would still officially be a member of the IAEA, but its delegation to the meeting would not be officially recognized. Consequently, it would be barred from participating in the remainder of that specific GC meeting.¹⁶²

On 26 September 1981, the GC adopted Resolution 381, which called for the IAEA to consider suspending Israel if it failed to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 487; that is, if it refused to open the Dimona site for inspection.¹⁶³ Confirming an earlier decision by the agency's board, the GC immediately suspended any aid to Israel under the IAEA assistance program.

Because no one expected that Israel would reconsider its policy of nuclear ambiguity and open its Dimona installation for inspections, GC Resolution 381 effectively called for Israel's suspension from the IAEA, paving the way to a second showdown in September 1982. A July 1982 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on proliferation trends noted a “global accumulation of information damaging to the IAEA.”¹⁶⁴ It also predicted “a major indictment of IAEA effectiveness,” causing a detrimental impact on the entire international regime if the agency's political and technical deficiencies were not remedied.¹⁶⁵

The summer of 1982 saw several diplomatic moves against Israel at UN agencies, most of them motivated by Israel's invasion of Lebanon.¹⁶⁶ Israel's IAEA status at the September 1982 GC meeting was of particular concern, prompting Kennedy to warn a British diplomat that attempts to “score a few cheap political points” by undermining the UN principle of universality would induce the administration to reconsider “whether those institutions were any longer able to serve their purpose.”¹⁶⁷

Prior to the GC meeting, some British diplomats wondered whether the replacement of the pro-Israeli Haig with the more moderate George P. Shultz could “lead the U.S. to adopt a slightly less pro-Israel position.”¹⁶⁸ They were informed that, with Haig's departure, “the attitude of Washington to the suspension of Israel had hardened.”¹⁶⁹ Days before the GC meeting convened, the Europeans already understood that the U.S. delegation would likely “walk out of the conference and review its policy towards the agency” if Israel lost the suspension vote. The Europeans were unsure what action they ought to take, and in the end they “all decided to abstain” from the vote.¹⁷⁰

Eventually, the harsher vote on Israel's suspension was defeated, and the milder vote to reject its credentials was adopted.¹⁷¹ In a departure from Haig's 1981 policy, two hours before the vote the U.S. delegation received new instructions requiring a walkout if the meeting rejected Israel's credentials.¹⁷² For the agency, U.S. withdrawal meant the suspension of Washington's financial contributions, which could lead to “severe program cuts” and jeopardize IAEA activities.¹⁷³ Of the agency's proposed 1983 budget of $82 million, the U.S. contribution was expected to cover 25 percent.¹⁷⁴ The “safeguards” component of that budget amounted to $52 million.¹⁷⁵

A State Department source told the press that the U.S. government hoped the walkout would discourage “similar challenges to Israel” at the UN.¹⁷⁶ Soon after, Shultz informed Reagan that the State Department was studying “the legal implications of withdrawing from the UNGA [UN General Assembly] including options for deferring, reducing or stopping our financial contributions.”¹⁷⁷ Congress supported the administration, passing a resolution in early December that called for the government to withhold contributions to any other UN agency that expelled Israel.¹⁷⁸

But the withdrawal was surprisingly short-lived. It was followed by the establishment of an interagency group to conduct a three-month policy reassessment. Although a State Department source told the press that the reassessment “must be a very serious one,” in reality it was non-existent.¹⁷⁹ Before it was concluded, the administration had already decided to resume full participation in the IAEA. This transpired in February 1983, once the IAEA's Board of Governors had clarified Israel's status.¹⁸⁰

In a report to Congress, the administration explained that it had withdrawn from the agency because of “the seriously disturbing trend by some IAEA member states to introduce extraneous and divisive political issues” into the agency's deliberations.¹⁸¹ However, the administration explained, given the unique tasks of the IAEA, its critical role, and the lack of alternatives for its safeguards system, the United States would resume participation.¹⁸² The administration clarified that the decision was also based on commitments given by key member-states to support U.S. efforts “to reduce extraneous political controversy” in the agency.¹⁸³

The U.S. withdrawal was thus successful in convincing the Europeans to cooperate with the United States in subsequent GC votes. In the October 1983 meeting, a fresh attempt by the Iraqis to expel the Israelis was defeated by a firm U.S.-European front.¹⁸⁴ The 1985 ACDA report to the Congress, an extensive account aimed at presenting the administration's arms control and nonproliferation achievements, confirmed Washington's lingering doubts surrounding the agency. Most of the discussion of the IAEA focused on its politicization and the impact that this political malfunction had on its overall technical credibility.¹⁸⁵ Although Israel's position within the agency remained firm throughout Reagan's presidency, the conflict over Israel's IAEA status remained a bone of contention, and technical assistance to Israel was not restored until 1994.¹⁸⁶

After the raid, and during the rest of Reagan's presidency, the Iraqi nuclear program was not considered a serious threat. Available assessments show that different intelligence evaluations deemphasized the immediate danger of the Iraqi nuclear program, though a minority still believed that Saddam Hussein might be tempted to pursue one covertly.¹⁸⁷

An interagency dispute in 1985 on the export of dual-use items to Baghdad demonstrates the clash between State Department officials, who adopted a tolerant view of Iraq's program, and Pentagon officials like Perle, who supported a stricter, more suspicious view and urged Weinberger to delay the shipment.¹⁸⁸ Commenting on the episode, a State Department internal memorandum stated that “DoD differed radically” from all other agencies (the State Department, the CIA, and the Department of Energy) in its assessment of the Iraqi nuclear threat.¹⁸⁹ According to the document, the majority of voices inside the administration believed that Iraq did “not have the resources for a weapon-program development and will not have in a foreseeable future.”¹⁹⁰ (That assumption was proven to be incorrect in 1991.)¹⁹¹ ACDA concurred with the assessment, and its 1985 annual report to the Congress did not list Iraq as an existing proliferation threat.¹⁹²

The Reagan administration was interested in establishing better relations with Saddam Hussein, and this led to the resumption of diplomatic ties in 1984.¹⁹³ From Washington's perspective, the destruction of Osirak had removed a diplomatic obstacle and a source of friction. The reactor's absence thus allowed for a rapprochement with Baghdad, something the United States had been seeking since the late 1970s.

For the Reagan administration, the Osirak raid presented a nonproliferation dilemma. Was it an act that undermined U.S. nonproliferation efforts by subverting the NPT, the IAEA, and the nonproliferation regime in general, institutions the administration supported? Or was it an “anti-proliferation operation” that complemented the U.S. strategy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East?¹⁹⁴ After all, strikes against hostile nuclear programs had not been considered illegitimate in principle by former presidents. Plans to launch a first strike against an imminent Soviet threat were considered as early as the 1950s by U.S. war planners, and attacks were also considered against China and Pakistan by Reagan's predecessors.¹⁹⁵

The administration was also truly surprised by Osirak. Absorbed by more urgent matters in the region, the administration underestimated Israeli concerns and intentions toward the reactor. A bad flow of communication and continual internal friction over U.S. policy in the Middle East further prevented a clear understanding of the threat posed by the Iraqi program, even though it was thoroughly deliberated during Carter's final year in office.

The raid, once it took place, raised questions about U.S. nonproliferation policy, U.S.-Israeli relations, U.S. geostrategic interests in the Middle East, and broader Cold War considerations. It also revealed an intricate internal power struggle that influenced the U.S. response throughout the episode and separated the supporters of closer ties with Israel from those who opposed the raid. The different approaches often produced conflicting policies, as exemplified by the F-16 suspension.

These contradictory inputs resulted in an uneven response that attempted to achieve several conflicting goals. On the one hand, the NNPA was not revised during Reagan's presidency because a public endorsement of a more relaxed nonproliferation policy became difficult to support. On the other hand, the administration adopted a blasé approach to Iraq's nuclear program after the raid, failing to notice Saddam Hussein's covert nuclear effort.¹⁹⁶

The “gap” of “institutional memory” also showed an initial lack of attention to, or even interest in, halting nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. The interagency intelligence assessments of July and September 1981 evaluated the impact of the raid, including the potentially harmful and destabilizing consequences. Similarly, the resumption of full IAEA participation just five months after the initial withdrawal and the decision to avoid any substantial reassessment of the agency's role demonstrate that the withdrawal was mainly a statement in support of Israel's status inside international agencies and was used as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis Washington's European allies.

Some U.S. government officials did view the IAEA with suspicion, and this skepticism contributed to the withdrawal. But in the end, the more moderate view, which saw the IAEA as a crucial element of the nonproliferation regime, prevailed. The episode contributed to the growing sense of mistrust toward the agency and its political neutrality. The subsequent debate on Capitol Hill, coupled with assessments of the role of the IAEA, proved that the United States during the Reagan years considered the agency the weak link of the international nonproliferation regime. For some Pentagon officials, the Osirak episode left a long-lasting impression that Iraq's program was still suspicious and that the IAEA was not a reliable instrument for safeguarding it.

As for the consequences for U.S.-Israeli relations, the fact that the administration supported a relatively tough approach against Israel in the UN Security Council is notable. The discussion of political strategy exemplified by the adoption of Resolution 487 tested the limits of U.S. support for Israel and delineated the administration's support for the existing nonproliferation regime and, by extension, the U.S. government's commitment to the IAEA and the NPT. But even though the administration was willing to join a harsh, unanimous condemnation of Israel, the line was drawn at Israel's expulsion or other severe sanctions.

This policy primarily stemmed from a preoccupation with U.S. objectives in the Middle East. Prominent members of the administration feared that the raid could hamper the peace process between Israel and Egypt and upset moderate Arab countries, jeopardizing U.S. regional standing. One of the administration's primary objectives, therefore, was to avoid any allegation of U.S. technical assistance for the raid. This relatively tough approach against Israel at the UN Security Council was also designed to prevent more severe consequences, like the expulsion of Israel from other branches of the UN, and to avoid the creation of an estranged European front inside the international organization. With the same objectives in mind, the September 1982 decision to withdraw from the IAEA was mostly aimed at containment by inhibiting further moves to expel Israel from other UN agencies.

Following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 487, the United States launched a campaign to prevent such expulsions. Preventing Israel's expulsion from the IAEA had not been motivated by a U.S. desire to undermine the agency; instead, it was part of a “red-line” tactic aimed at preventing further expulsions—including those motivated by concerns beyond the Osirak raid, such as the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The U.S. strategy vis-à-vis Israel was tied to a “bigger picture” strategy of containing the Soviet Union, one of the Reagan administration's top priorities. The administration feared the emergence of a “hostile Third World bloc” that would act as a proxy for the Soviet Union in repeatedly trying to hamper Israel's participation in international agencies. Therefore, such initiatives had to be rebuffed. In this context, nonproliferation goals were clearly not the administration's first concern, but neither were they ignored or overlooked.

The U.S. reaction to Osirak showcases the hierarchy of the Reagan administration's foreign policy priorities. Similarly, it underscores the role played by U.S. nonproliferation policy during the late Cold War. At first glance, the ambiguity of the U.S. response to the raid could be interpreted as a consequence of the conflicting positions on Israel. A deeper analysis reveals U.S. attempts to achieve policy goals that, from time to time, were incompatible with one another. Not surprisingly, the administration had to set priorities: preserving its credibility in the Middle East by firmly denying any involvement in the raid, sending warning signals to Israel while addressing the irritation of moderate Arab governments, and drawing firm “red lines” to prevent damage to Israel's international status by containing Soviet efforts to radicalize UN agencies.

Nonproliferation concerns had a shaky but steady position among U.S. priorities, and the Reagan administration adopted an improvised, cautious approach rather than a well-ordered strategy. The administration aimed to preserve the existing nonproliferation regime, seen as the only credible option at hand. Contrary to a later narrative, and with the exception of a few voices, the administration did not condone the raid and even supported harsh condemnation by the UNSC. As for the IAEA, the United States confirmed its intention to enforce the “red lines” by ceasing U.S. participation when Israel's status was in danger. Departing from its early intentions and declaratory policy, the administration embraced a quiet “damage limitation” stance that sought to reconcile its primary foreign policy goals with nonproliferation concerns.

The authors contributed equally to this article, and are grateful to all the people involved in the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project for their support and contribution to this research throughout the years.