This issue begins with an article by Jan Záhořík discussing Czechoslovakia's relations with Ethiopia from the 1950s through the 1980s, showing how the changing nature of the Cold War affected Czechoslovak policy. In the 1950s and 1960s, the leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) established close ties with Ethiopia and other African countries, mostly for reasons of economic gain. After the 1974 coup in Ethiopia that ousted Emperor Hailie Selassie and brought to power the Derg regime (a radical Marxist-Leninist military dictatorship), the Czechoslovak government stepped up its ties with Ethiopia, mainly for ideological reasons. KSČ officials refrained from criticizing the Derg's brutal policies that led to rampant bloodshed and mass starvation in the mid-1980s. Not until the KSČ’s hold on power ended in late 1989 did Czechoslovakia halt its support for the Derg's murderous rule.
The next article, by Vladimir Dobrenko, analyzes the role of the Soviet-dominated World Peace Council (WPC) in spreading false allegations in the early 1950s about the supposed use of biological warfare by U.S. troops in the Korean War. Seizing on spurious information purveyed by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea, the Soviet Politburo under Joseph Stalin authorized a wide-ranging disinformation campaign, which the WPC amplified and promoted around the world. The purpose, Dobrenko argues, was not only to bring obloquy upon the United States but also to discredit the recently created United Nations (UN), which through its Uniting for Peace resolution in the UN General Assembly in the fall of 1950 had endorsed the decision by a U.S.-led coalition of military forces to come to the defense of South Korea against North Korea's invasion. Soon after Stalin's death, his successors in Moscow repudiated the false allegations about the use of biological warfare, but the odious effects of the WPC's disinformation campaign persisted for decades in many parts of the world, not least because Chinese and North Korean propagandists (unlike their Soviet counterparts) continued to endorse the baseless charges they had concocted.
The next article, by Andrew Kenealy, examines the reaction of the U.S. government, especially the U.S. embassy in Prague, to the events in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in the Soviet bloc that culminated in the Velvet Revolution of November 1989. Drawing on declassified U.S. and Czechoslovak documents and memoirs, Kenealy takes issue with observers who have claimed that the U.S. embassy in Prague was slow and ham-handed in its response to the events of 1989. He finds that, on the contrary, U.S. Ambassador Shirley Temple Black and other senior U.S. embassy officials were adroit in encouraging far-reaching change in Czechoslovakia at a time when leaders of the KSČ were staunchly resisting any change. The onset of the “Velvet Revolution” in Czechoslovakia in mid-November 1989 enabled the embassy to use its ties with Czechoslovak dissidents and human rights activists to facilitate a remarkably swift and peaceful transformation of the country after mass protests began on 17 November. Although Ambassador Black and her staff were only “supporting actors” in the drama, the steps they took in 1989 were more skillful and effective than has been alleged by critics of U.S. policy.
The next article, by Wang Chenyi, looks at the policies adopted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chairman Mao Zedong and his successors toward the ultra-radical Khmer Rouge (CPK) in Cambodia. The PRC's acrimonious split with the Soviet Union throughout the 1960s, culminating in deadly border clashes in 1969, set the stage for China's staunch support of the CPK from the late 1960s on, providing nearly all of the group's funding. Even though Mao and PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai had forged a rapprochement with the United States in 1971–1972 to offset the Soviet threat, they turned down U.S. proposals in 1973 and 1974 to restore moderate leaders in Cambodia. Instead, Mao facilitated the victory of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in 1975 and continued to back the CPK even after the regime began forcibly moving populations out of Cambodian cities and carrying out mass slaughter and repression. Mao's death in 1976 brought no change in CCP policy toward the Khmer Rouge. After Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 with Soviet backing and drove the CPK from power, the Chinese continued to fund and arm Khmer Rouge guerrillas in their prolonged bid to wrest power back in Cambodia. Not until the 1990s, after the Cold War ended, did the PRC finally halt its support for the Khmer Rouge. The episode proved to be a humanitarian disaster for Cambodia and a debacle for Chinese foreign policy.
The next article, by He Yinan, traces the interaction between domestic policy and foreign policy during China's Cultural Revolution, showing how this interaction caused significant changes on the international scene. The chaotic violence and terror of the Cultural Revolution caused dismay not only among ordinary Chinese but also at various levels of the CCP. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and other senior Chinese officials sought to gloss over the depredations of the Cultural Revolution by attributing all hardships to the Soviet Union and the threat of a Soviet invasion. By playing up the threat posed by the USSR, Chinese leaders generated hostile responses from Soviet policymakers, who assumed that officials in Beijing were creating pretexts for raids against Soviet territory. In a dynamic similar to that of a “security dilemma,” the Cultural Revolution showed how exaggerated portrayals of foreign threats could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The next article, by John Bernell White, Jr., discusses how the U.S. government reshaped its policy in southwest Asia and the Middle East in the late 1970s and early 1980s in response to a series of grave crises and security challenges, including a Communist coup in Afghanistan in 1978, the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in early 1979, the ascendance of an Islamic dictatorship in Iran, the storming of the U.S. embassy in Tehran in November 1979 by Iranian terrorists who held 52 U.S. citizens hostage for nearly fifteen months, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979. Prior to these events, U.S. security policy in the region had been based on support for the “twin pillars” of Iran and Saudi Arabia. With the rise of an Iranian Islamic regime that was deeply hostile toward the United States, U.S policymakers had to look to other countries to safeguard U.S. interests and shore up regional stability. The U.S. administration of Jimmy Carter fostered close security ties with Oman, a country with which the United States had only minimal connections until the late 1970s. The arrangements that were devised with Oman through a Facilities Access Agreement proved invaluable in deterring Soviet and Iranian aggression and in protecting oil supply routes from Persian (Arabian) Gulf countries. The Reagan administration continued the close security relationship with Oman.
The next article, by Robert M. Hendershot and Steve Marsh, focuses on the “special relationship” between the United States and Great Britain during the Cold War. The authors show that commemorations and performative events enabled the two countries to highlight their shared democratic values and to project bilateral unity and strength in the face of challenges from the Soviet bloc. By the 1970s, as memories of cooperation during the Second World War had faded, U.S. and British officials emphasized other notable events worth commemorating, including the American Bicentennial in 1976. This event, which a century earlier might have given rise to bilateral tension, instead became a symbol of unity for the United States and Britain against the backdrop of the Cold War. The article underscores the key role of the Cold War in consolidating the “special relationship.”
The final main item, by Deborah Welch Larson, is a review essay discussing the lessons of the Cold War for U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century. Drawing on a book by Hal Brands, The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today, Larson explores various aspects of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, looking at failures as well as successes. Brands invokes the history of the Cold War to offer guidance about how the United States nowadays can best engage in “great-power competition,” the catchphrase used by many in the U.S. national security community over the past 15–20 years. Although Larson finds much of value in the book, she notes that a few of the “lessons” are based on problematic interpretations of history.
The issue ends with a section of book reviews.
As the issue was going to press, I learned from Diane Labrosse, the long-time editor of the H-Diplo website, that her co-editor, Thomas R. Maddux, had died of pancreatic cancer on 30 December 2023. Over the past quarter century, H-Diplo has been an invaluable forum for scholars of diplomatic history and international affairs, thanks largely to the efforts of Tom and Diane, who oversaw the H-Diplo staff and maintained the high quality of the site. I knew Tom throughout that time, having first met him in June 1998 at the annual convention of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) in Washington, DC. Occasionally when I meet people for the first time, I can tell immediately that I will like them a lot, and that is exactly the way I felt when I met Tom. He was a kind, generous, and amiable person. In 2008, he invited me to give a lecture at California State University in Northridge, and it proved to be a wonderful visit because of Tom's hospitality.
Tom made many important scholarly contributions with his publications on U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the 1930s and during the early Cold War, but even those who have not read his published output will be familiar with his name from the extraordinary work he did in making H-Diplo the indispensable resource it has become. Tom diligently solicited reviews of articles published in the Journal of Cold War Studies and other leading journals of diplomatic history and international relations, and he also solicited reviews of books published in Harvard's Cold War Studies Book Series. Having been one of the many scholars who benefited from Tom's sedulousness over the years, I am extremely grateful to have known him. Although his death is a huge loss, I am delighted that Diane Labrosse will be continuing the excellent work she has been doing with H-Diplo.