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Andrew Moravcsik
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cold War Studies (2012) 14 (1): 53–77.
Published: 01 January 2012
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Four distinguished analysts of French foreign policy under Charles de Gaulle provide in-depth assessments of the new book edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin, Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969 , published by Lexington Books. The commentators praise the book's wide scope and many of its essays and broad themes, but they raise questions about Garret Martin's contention (shared by a few, though not all, of the other contributors to the volume) that de Gaulle had a coherent if ultimately unsuccessful strategy to overcome the Cold War and move toward the unification of Germany and Europe. In article-length commentaries, both Andrew Moravcsik and Marc Trachtenberg take issue with Martin's view, arguing that de Gaulle's foreign policy involved more bluff and bluster than any genuine attempt to bring about the reunification of Germany or to end the Cold War. Moravcsik also provides a spirited defense of the “revisionist” conception of de Gaulle's policy toward Europe, which sees the general as having been guided mostly by his domestic economic and political interests—a conception that Trachtenberg has also come to accept. The forum ends with a reply by Nuenlist, Locher, and Martin to the four commentaries.
Journal Articles
De Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur : The Political Economy of French EC Policy, 1958–1970 (Part 2)
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cold War Studies (2000) 2 (3): 4–68.
Published: 01 September 2000
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The concluding segment of this two-part article explores two key episodes in French foreign policy under President Charles de Gaulle: (1) France's veto of British membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), and (2) de Gaulle's decisions to provoke and then resolve the “empty chair” crisis of 1965–1966. These two cases, like the two examined in Part 1 of this article, demonstrate the fundamental importance of economic considerations in de Gaulle's policy toward the EEC. De Gaulle was a democratic politician first and a geopolitical visionary second. His experience tells us a great deal about the limits imposed by modern democratic politics on any leader who might hope to make statecraft serve an idiosyncratic political vision. The article concludes with an analysis of possible counterarguments and a discussion of the proper use of historical evidence.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cold War Studies (2000) 2 (3): 117–142.
Published: 01 September 2000
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Moravcsik's reply to the six commentaries deals with sources omitted from the original article, the use of evidence in his analysis of the Fouchet Plan and the “empty chair” crisis, and broader critiques of (and proposed alternatives to) the commercial interpretation of French policy on European integration during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle. Moravcsik concedes some of the points raised by the critics and offers a more qualified and nuanced restatement of his argument, but he sticks to his basic contention that “commercial interests were a dominant and sufficient motivation for French policy in Europe.”
Journal Articles
De Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur : The Political Economy of French EC Policy, 1958–1970 (Part 1)
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cold War Studies (2000) 2 (2): 3–43.
Published: 01 May 2000
Abstract
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The thousands of books and articles on President Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration all accord primary explanatory importance to his distinctive geopolitical ideology. These analyses place secondary significance, if any at all, on commercial considerations. This two-part article seeks to revise that historiographical consensus by examining the four major decisions toward European integration taken by France during de Gaulle's presidency: to remain in the Common Market and promote the Common Agricultural Policy, to propose the Fouchet Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the European Economic Community, and to provoke the “empty chair” crisis in 1965–1966. The first two decisions are discussed here, and the other two are covered in Part 2. For each case, the overwhelming bulk of the evidence confirms that the interests pursued by de Gaulle were more commercial than geopolitical.