Over the past two decades, research on Cold War neutrality has advanced rapidly. With the declassification of important archival collections, the image of the four European “classic” neutrals—Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland—has changed considerably. New facets have emerged in the understanding of how neutrality functioned as a part of the Cold War international system. In particular, the importance and connections of neutrality's domestic political and ideational dimensions in foreign policymaking has been stressed in the latest research on Cold War neutrality.

Traditionally, Sweden has been portrayed as an active bridge-builder in international politics in the 1960s and 1970s. The country advocated a “third way” toward democratic socialism and greater “justice” in international affairs, but these foreign policy prescriptions were never applied to European affairs. This article examines Sweden's relations with Europe by contrasting European integration with the Cold War. Negotiations on Swedish membership in the European Communities and Swedish policy at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe were influenced by a general Berührungsangst toward Europe, which persisted during the years of détente. Because Swedish decision-makers believed that heavy involvement in European affairs would constrict Sweden's freedom of action, Swedish leaders' moral proclamations were applied exclusively to distant Third World countries rather than the egregious abuses of human rights in the Soviet bloc.