This article chronicles the interactions between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) during the years of the Sino-Soviet alliance (1949–1960) as experienced by the Soviet advisers in China. Based on interviews, archival sources, and other materials, the article shows that the Soviet advisers who came to the PRC during that time brought with them the management techniques of the late Stalin period, known as High Stalinism (meaning strict Communist Party control over all aspects of political, cultural, and economic life and severe management methods including a heavy reliance on mass methods, education and reeducation techniques, coercion, and the threat of imprisonment). High Stalinism was a useful management tool that fit into Mao Zedong's own plan for the “economic Stalinization” of China and helped to pave the way for Mao's later radicalization. After differences emerged between the two countries in 1956 about the merits of de-Stalinization, Mao and the Chinese Communist Party began promoting radical policies such as the Great Leap Forward, which dramatically deviated from the Soviet experience and led to the removal of Soviet advisers in 1960.

In this forum, three leading experts on Sino-Soviet relations and Mao Zedong's policy toward the Soviet Union offer their appraisals of Sergey Radchenko's Two Suns in the Heavens, The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967 , published by the Woodrow Wilson Center Press. The commentators praise many aspects of Radchenko's book, but Michael Sheng and to a lesser extent Qiang Zhai and Deborah Kaple wonder whether Radchenko has gone too far in downplaying the role of ideology in Mao's foreign policy. Unlike Lorenz Lüthi, who gives decisive weight to ideology in his own book about the Sino-Soviet split, Radchenko argues that a classical realist approach is the best framework for understanding Chinese foreign policy and the rift between China and the Soviet Union. Sheng and Zhai also raise questions about some of the sources used by Radchenko. Replying to the commentaries, Radchenko defends his conception of Mao's foreign policy, arguing that it is a more nuanced view than Sheng and Zhai imply. Radchenko also stresses the inherent shortcomings of the source base scholars are forced to use when analyzing Chinese foreign policy.

This forum includes six commentaries on Lorenz M. Lüthi's book The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World , published by Princeton University Press in 2008. Drawing on recently declassified documents and memoirs from numerous countries, Lüthi explains how and why the close alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China fell apart in a remarkably short time, dissolving into fierce mutual enmity. Amassing a wealth of evidence, Lüthi stresses the role of ideology in the split, lending support to the arguments put forth nearly five decades ago by analysts like Donald Zagoria in his pioneering book on the Sino-Soviet rift. Six leading experts on Chinese foreign policy and Sino-Soviet relations discuss the strengths of Lüthi's book but also raise questions about some interpretations and omissions. The forum includes Lüthi's reply to the commentaries.