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Ethan B. Kapstein
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cold War Studies (2020) 22 (4): 113–145.
Published: 01 December 2020
FIGURES
Abstract
View articletitled, Private Enterprise, International Development, and the Cold War
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for article titled, Private Enterprise, International Development, and the Cold War
This article sheds light on the role of foreign direct investment as an instrument for economic development and, in turn, for the advancement of U.S. foreign policy goals during the Cold War. From the earliest days of the Cold War, and especially after the U.S.-Soviet competition for influence in the developing world began in the 1950s, the United States sought to promote private enterprise on behalf of U.S. goals. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, U.S. officials believed that foreign investment would suffice to fuel international development, obviating the need for official development assistance. These hopes, however, were largely disappointed. On the one hand, U.S.-based multinational companies preferred to invest in the industrial world; on the other hand, some Third World governments were uninterested in promoting private enterprise rather than state-led development. In part because foreign investment did not meet expectations, the U.S. government ended up elaborating an official foreign aid program instead.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cold War Studies (2017) 19 (1): 125–159.
Published: 01 January 2017
Abstract
View articletitled, Success and Failure in Counterinsurgency Campaigns: Lessons from the Cold War
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for article titled, Success and Failure in Counterinsurgency Campaigns: Lessons from the Cold War
Why did U.S.-assisted counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts succeed in the Philippines in the 1950s yet falter in Vietnam a decade later? Why were counterinsurgents able to score a quick victory in Venezuela in the early 1960s but confronted by a long and bloody conflict in El Salvador in the 1970s and 1980s? In seeking to answer these questions, this article provides theoretical motivation for the oft-made claim that U.S. counterinsurgency strategy has been most effective in countries in which the local government engaged in meaningful political and economic reforms to address a population's grievances. What determines whether a government is likely to engage in a reform process? The article proposes that reform is a function of the economic structure of elite assets. When assets are immobile and highly concentrated in one sector, as in heavily agricultural societies like Vietnam or El Salvador, redistributive reforms will prove more difficult, and counterinsurgency efforts will struggle as a result. Conversely, in countries in which the structure of elite assets is more diversified, reforms will prove more feasible, making it easier to undermine an insurgency's popular appeal.