After war broke out between Arab countries and Israel in October 1973, the U.S. government asked its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to do the unthinkable: establish an agreed position on an ongoing “out-of-area” crisis. Then, on 25 October, the United States unilaterally raised the alert level of its armed forces to DEFCON III, affecting the NATO area without consulting any allies. These actions constituted a radical departure from established NATO practice and angered the Europeans. U.S. officials, for their part, were upset at what they saw as a dismal European failure to support U.S. objectives in the Middle East crisis. In subsequent months, NATO frantically searched for ways to improve consultation, especially on out-of-area issues. The outcome in 1974 was the promulgation of the Atlantic Declaration, along with a series of functional reforms in alliance consultation procedures. The crisis forced NATO to adjust to the new trends of globalization that were rapidly becoming evident.

The article presents the analysis of the study groups set up by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to assess the non-military aspects of Soviet power and potential during the era of Nikita Khrushchev. Following Stalin's death, the Western alliance tried to form a comprehensive view of the strengths and weaknesses of the USSR's economy and political system. This was part of NATO's effort to adjust to the realities of a long Cold War, the outcome of which would not be decided by military force alone. The NATO reports were largely successful in describing the long-term trends of the Soviet economy and the weaknesses of the Soviet system. However, they usually failed to anticipate specific, though significant and potentially dangerous, initiatives of the Soviet regime. On balance they were a crucial input for NATO ministers, and their importance in the shaping of Western policies needs to be evaluated carefully.