This article revisits the creation of NSC 68, a landmark in Cold War history, in the light of continuing historical debates and with the assistance of archival material recently made available. The article reviews the historiography of NSC 68, including controversies over the language adopted, together with recent writings that stress a broader political economy analysis of U.S. foreign policy. The article revisits the contested issue of whether NSC 68 represented continuity with past policy or a sharp departure from it. In addressing this issue, the article looks closely at the style and tone of the document as well as its impact on the U.S. defense budget and finally its convergence with the other transformative decision of the time, the commitment of resources to the development of the hydrogen bomb.

This article examines a hitherto unexplored aspect of the Anglo-American “special relationship,” the development of arrangements to coordinate U.S. and British forces in a joint nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. During the early Cold War, British political leaders and military officers struggled for a closer relationship with the U.S. Air Force in the hope of gaining greater insight into U.S. war plans, predicated as they were on nuclear strikes launched from bases in England. U.S. willingness to supply nuclear (and later thermo-nuclear) bombs for delivery by British bombers prompted bilateral talks from 1956 about their deployment in a joint air offensive. This prospective partnership raised difficult issues for the UK Air Staff, which was committed to the maintenance of an independent nuclear deterrent and countervalue rather than counterforce targeting. Nevertheless, the advantages of joint strike planning were such that by 1962 Bomber Command's planning had become fully integrated with that of Strategic Air Command.