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László Borhi
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cold War Studies (2012) 14 (4): 263–266.
Published: 01 October 2012
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cold War Studies (2012) 14 (2): 29–67.
Published: 01 April 2012
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This article explores how the U.S. and British governments' wartime strategy against Germany affected their policies toward Hungary, a country that had allied itself with Germany when World War II began. U.S. and British leaders wanted to facilitate an Allied landing on the French coast by diverting German troops to other theaters, thinning them out as much as possible. To this end, the United States and Britain were cool toward Hungary's peace overtures in 1943 and were willing to brook Germany's military incursions into Hungary and Romania in 1944 because German troops operating there could not be quickly redeployed to the west. Germany's occupation of those two countries led to the destruction of what remained of the once-large Jewish communities there, a tragic price that Allied leaders were ultimately willing to risk. The failure of Hungary's secret peace overtures also contributed to the later Soviet occupation of Hungary and the grim fate that befell the country after the war.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cold War Studies (2009) 11 (2): 133–137.
Published: 01 April 2009
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cold War Studies (2005) 7 (4): 181–185.
Published: 01 October 2005
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cold War Studies (2005) 7 (1): 159–167.
Published: 01 January 2005
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Five distinguished scholars offer separate commentaries on the article by Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe. All of the commentators reject the broad interpretation and many of the specific arguments put forth by Cox and Kennedy-Pipe. They point out several crucial issues that are omitted from the article and raise questions about the authors' sources, use of evidence, and selective invocation of secondary literature. They regret that Cox and Kennedy Pipe seem to dwell on a large number of the same matters that preoccupied radical revisionist historians in the 1960s. They argue that although Cox and Kennedy-Pipe offer a more sophisticated version of revisionism, their article suffers from many of the same shortcomings. Most of the commentators believe that the Marshall Plan merely reflected a division of Europe that was already well under way rather than being the precipitating cause. In that sense, the debate on the origins of the Cold War needs to go well beyond the issues raised by Cox and Kennedy-Pipe.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cold War Studies (1999) 1 (3): 67–110.
Published: 01 September 1999
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This article discusses the Eisenhower administration's policy toward Eastern Europe in the years leading up to the 1956 Hungarian revolution. The article first considers the broader context of U.S. Cold War strategy in Eastern Europe, including policies of “economic warfare” and “psychological warfare,” as well as covert operations and military supplies. It then examines U.S. policy toward Hungary, particularly during the events of October-November 1956, when the Eisenhower administration had to decide how to respond to the uprising. The article brings to light the Eisenhower administration's dual policy toward Hungary—a policy that attempted, on the one hand, to strike a negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union, and, on the other hand, to promote instability within the Soviet bloc. An analysis of these contradictory approaches sheds broader light on the dynamics of U.S. foreign policy in the 1950s.