Two British scholars reassess what they view as the decisive episode in the early Cold War, the Marshall Plan. Far from seeing the Plan as a mere act of generosity by the United States, they argue that it was an integral part of an increasingly aggressive U.S. posture toward the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was still seeking a cooperative relationship with the United States, but the U.S. decision to establish a European Recovery Program (ERP) without a sincere intention of including the Soviet Union posed a threat to Soviet security interests. Josif Stalin wanted to prevent the United States from luring the East European countries away from the Soviet Union's sphere of influence and into the Western sphere. Although Stalin was reluctant to abandon his bid for close cooperation with the West, the Marshall Plan left him with little choice. As the ERP progressed, Stalin drastically tightened his hold over Eastern Europe and imposed Soviet-style systems on the countries in the region. The Marshall Plan thus had the “tragic” effect of creating a long-term divide in Europe that consigned tens of millions of people to life under tyranny.

Cox and Kennedy-Pipe offer a staunch defense of their article, arguing that the commentators generally missed the point of what the article was supposed to accomplish.Rather than providing an exhaustive account of the early Cold War and all the complications posed by Germany, the article sought to distill the essence of U.S.and Soviet strategies.The basic problem, as highlighted in the article, is that the United States would not accept the extension of Soviet in fluence into Eastern Europe and that, in opposing and seeking to roll back Soviet in fluence, U.S.of ficials sealed the fate of the East European countries.