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Qiang Zhai
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cold War Studies (2015) 17 (3): 275–277.
Published: 01 July 2015
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cold War Studies (2012) 14 (1): 96–106.
Published: 01 January 2012
Abstract
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In this forum, three leading experts on Sino-Soviet relations and Mao Zedong's policy toward the Soviet Union offer their appraisals of Sergey Radchenko's Two Suns in the Heavens, The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967 , published by the Woodrow Wilson Center Press. The commentators praise many aspects of Radchenko's book, but Michael Sheng and to a lesser extent Qiang Zhai and Deborah Kaple wonder whether Radchenko has gone too far in downplaying the role of ideology in Mao's foreign policy. Unlike Lorenz Lüthi, who gives decisive weight to ideology in his own book about the Sino-Soviet split, Radchenko argues that a classical realist approach is the best framework for understanding Chinese foreign policy and the rift between China and the Soviet Union. Sheng and Zhai also raise questions about some of the sources used by Radchenko. Replying to the commentaries, Radchenko defends his conception of Mao's foreign policy, arguing that it is a more nuanced view than Sheng and Zhai imply. Radchenko also stresses the inherent shortcomings of the source base scholars are forced to use when analyzing Chinese foreign policy.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cold War Studies (2012) 14 (1): 125–126.
Published: 01 January 2012
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cold War Studies (2009) 11 (2): 139–141.
Published: 01 April 2009
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cold War Studies (2006) 8 (3): 34–53.
Published: 01 July 2006
Abstract
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The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who seized power in Beijing in 1949 viewed Tibet as Chinese territory. In this respect, they were no different from previous rulers of China. The chairman of the CCP, Mao Zedong, carefully devised a plan to re-annex Tibet, which had been effectively independent of China since 1911. The CCP's recent victory in the Chinese civil war gave Mao high confidence that he could reclaim Tibet without provoking outside intervention. Such a move not only would bring international political benefits but would also carry a symbolic meaning at home and thereby legitimize the rule of the CCP. Although Mao sent troops to Tibet, he also planned to rely on negotiations and coercive diplomacy. This article highlights the complicated relationships that emerged on the international scene as a result of China's actions in the early 1950s.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Journal of Cold War Studies (2002) 4 (4): 132–133.
Published: 01 October 2002