A veteran U.S. diplomat, who is now one of the last living participants in the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting at Reykjavik in October 1986, traces the genesis, nature, and aftermath of that summit. He recounts changes in U.S.-Soviet relations during the first several years of the Reagan administration, including important events such as the 1983 Pentecostalist negotiations, the shootdown of a South Korean passenger airliner by Soviet air defense forces, and the meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva in November 1985. Even though scholars in retrospect have looked on the Reykjavik summit as a turning point, it began as a failure. Two leaders, who became exhausted as the proceedings wore on, engaged in a momentous exchange on nuclear elimination but then doubled down on incompatible positions regarding strategic ballistic missile defense (BMD). Reagan sought a “personal favor,” as he had with Gorbachev's predecessors three years earlier regarding the Pentecostals, whereas Gorbachev pushed for strict limits on BMD as a matter of “principle.” Both sides then scrambled to salvage the future, in an interpretive effort, centered on the leaders’ personal relationship, that ultimately yielded today's favorable view of Reykjavik's place in history.

Llewellyn Thompson was arguably the most influential figure who ever advised U.S. presidents about policy toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War, yet until 2018 no book-length biography of him had appeared. Fortunately, a stellar biography was published last year, and it is the subject of this book forum. Thompson's two daughters, Jenny and Sherry, wrote the book after carrying out extensive archival research. The finished book is both absorbing and illuminating, a book worthy of Thompson. Five experts offer commentaries on various aspects of the book, followed by a reply from Thompson's daughters.

Six former U.S. State Department officials, all of whom were involved in U.S. foreign policy during the Carter administration, respond to the article by James Blight and janet Lang. Their reactions vary, but one common point of concern is whether Blight and Lang are correct in arguing that “empathy” as an organizing concept or analytical tool will be useful “not just in conferences in which the past is revisited, but also in the present and future, when it really matters.” Even though most of the commentators accept at least some of the points about the U.S.-Soviet détente in the late 1970s, they have questions about the conceptual underpinnings of the article. The forum ends with a response from Blight and Lang.