This survey explains how the field of Cold War studies has been able to survive and even flourish in the People's Republic of China (PRC) from 2000 to the present, despite all the practical and political obstacles. It reviews several areas that Chinese scholars have been exploring: the economic Cold War; foreign intelligence operations and psychological warfare; nuclear strategies; the sciences during the Cold War and overseas education projects; and China's policies toward neighboring countries during the Cold War. The article outlines the major practical challenges facing Chinese scholars and the potential for overcoming these challenges.

Making use of Chinese Foreign Ministry archives and provincial and municipal archives, this article traces the history of cross-border migration of ethnic Koreans from 1950 to 1962, especially the illegal migration of ethnic Koreans to North Korea (DPRK) in 1961. A historical examination of Koreans in northeast China demonstrates that the Chinese Communist Party attempted to achieve a workable policy toward Korean border crossers as well as a disposition to accommodate the DPRK's concerns and imperatives in defining nationality, handling cases of Sino-Korean marriages and exit procedures for ethnic Koreans, receiving Korean nationals to visit China, and dealing with cases of illegal border crossings. To this end, the Chinese authorities were pursuing larger Cold War interests, specifically the desire to keep the DPRK aligned with China during the Sino-Soviet split.

In October 1961 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted a policy of tacit struggle against the program of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The CPSU's resumption of de-Stalinization alarmed the Chinese leader, Mao Zedong, but he did not yet want to discard a limited rapprochement with Moscow. However, when high-level Sino-Soviet talks in July 1963 collapsed, the relationship between the CPSU and the CCP became irretrievable. Through the subsequent great polemics, the CCP intended to project itself as the spokesman of true Marxism-Leninism and the natural leader of world Communism. After the CCP attacked the top leaders of the CPSU by name, hostility between the two parties intensified. The breakdown of the CCP-CPSU organizational relationship was only a matter of time. Relying on a large array of Chinese-language sources, including records of Chinese leaders' speeches and comments at secret party meetings, this article reassesses the most critical period in the Sino-Soviet split from October 1961 to July 1964.

The Conference of World Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in November 1957 was the largest gathering of world Communists since the birth of Marxism. Scholars have long assumed that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) dominated the conference. Newly declassified archival records and memoirs indicate that the idea of convening a conference and issuing a joint declaration was proposed by both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the CPSU. During the conference the CCP leader, Mao Zedong, played an important role. Mao's extemporaneous remarks at the conference shocked the leaders of the CPSU. His comments on the Soviet intraparty struggle, his blunt remarks about nuclear war, and his declaration that China would overtake Great Britain within fifteen years created doubts and dissatisfactions in the minds of the delegates and cast a cloud over the conference. The Moscow Declaration also revealed incipient Sino-Soviet disagreements, portending Beijing's challenge to Soviet leadership in the socialist bloc. Thus, the Moscow Conference was a turning point for Sino-Soviet relations.

This forum includes five commentaries focusing on a much-acclaimed book by Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao's Last Revolution , published by Harvard University Press. The book provides a meticulous account of the Cultural Revolution in China, from 1966 to 1976. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals assess the roles of Mao Zedong and other senior Chinese officials and discuss what was happening in all regions of China during this period of terror and upheaval. Five leading experts on Chinese politics and society discuss the book's many strengths but also raise questions about some specific interpretations and omissions. The forum includes a reply by MacFarquhar and Schoenhals to the commentaries.

The study of Cold War international history in China has made major strides in the past two decades. By using newly available Chinese sources, augmented by sources from American, British, Russian, and East European archives, Chinese scholars have produced important works on Cold War history. As the latest publications in China show, Chinese scholars have been gradually adopting a more evenhanded approach in their writings about the Cold War. They have also expanded international cooperation by conducting joint research projects and engaging in meaningful academic dialogues with foreign scholars. This article offers a review of the field, including a survey of new Chinese sources, the leading Chinese scholars, and their main research interests and contributions. The article also points out the challenges, obstacles, and opportunities of the field in China.

Western scholars have long assumed that Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai encountered opposition within the Chinese leadership when they sought to improve relations with the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Formerly secret documents and first-hand accounts published in China over the last two decades cast doubt on this assumption. Drawing on newly available Chinese sources, this article examines China's policymaking process vis-à-vis the United States during the crucial period from January 1969 to February 1972. The article shows that the highest Chinese officials (especially Mao, Lin Biao, and Zhou) agreed that improvements in U.S.-China relations would be desirable to offset the threat from the Soviet Union.