Ransom draws from theories of decision making in social psychology and behavioral economics to explain why political leaders started “a war that nobody wanted, nobody understood, and nobody can forget” (272), and why they did not stop the war earlier once illusions of a quick victory had dissipated. Ransom argues that political and military leaders, faced with uncertainty and driven by fear and overconfidence, gambled on risky strategies that failed and prolonged the suffering without advancing any state interests.
The first chapter lays out the analytical themes underlying the historical narrative. Noting Keynes’ argument that human decisions are often driven by “animal spirits” rather than by a rational calculation of costs and benefits, Ransom emphasizes the role of confidence, fear, and the propensity to gamble in human decision making.1 He analyzes the propensity to gamble through the lens of “prospect theory” from social psychology (19–24).2 The theory posits...