Abstract
U.S. intelligence assessments of Mexico during the Cold War largely frame the country as a security threat. Using an intelligence agenda framework to identify the nature of a threat, this analysis scrutinizes all the President’s Daily Briefs (pdbs) from 1961 to 1977, revealing that intelligence reports emphasized perceived threats connected with Mexico’s internal affairs nearly eight times more than threats related to Mexico’s connections with strategic rivals. Despite Mexico’s geopolitical significance in the United States–Soviet Union rivalry following the Cuban Revolution, the U.S. government’s focus remained on the threats to Mexico’s political stability under its authoritarian regime. This emphasis likely aligns with the intelligence cooperation established between Mexico and the United States, which aimed at monitoring Cuban activities in Mexico, as well as the operations of the LITEMPO asset program of the Central Intelligence Agency.
This study uses newly declassified sources and innovative methodological tools to address a critical gap in Cold War scholarship. By analyzing nearly 5,000 Presidential Daily Briefs (hereinafter pdbs) on Mexico from 1961 to 1977, this article explores how U.S. intelligence prioritized internal governance, transnational concerns, and external threats in its assessments of Mexico. These intelligence reports, produced for the president and senior officials, reveal the central role that Mexico’s stability played in shaping U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War.1
Applying Lowenthal’s intelligence agenda framework and content analysis—a systematic method for interpreting qualitative data—this study investigates whether U.S. intelligence viewed Mexico as a security threat more due to its internal governance challenges or its connections to U.S. strategic rivals like the Soviet Union and Cuba. Lowenthal’s framework provides a structured lens for examining shifts in intelligence priorities, and content analysis captures the nuanced evolution of concerns over time. This approach reveals that U.S. intelligence overwhelmingly focused on Mexico’s internal political stability, with domestic governance issues cited nearly eight times more frequently than Cold War-related external threats.2
Although Mexico was not a central battleground in the U.S.–Soviet rivalry, its proximity to the United States and strategic position in Latin America made it pivotal to regional security. U.S. policymakers considered Mexico’s stability essential for maintaining regional order, particularly as communist influence spread from nearby Cuba. Despite this significance, Cold War scholars have primarily focused on more overt U.S. interventions in Latin America, such as those in Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1961), the Dominican Republic (1965), and Chile (1973), leaving Mexico’s complex role underexplored. Some of these scholars argue that U.S. officials viewed Mexico as a stable, economically growing nation governed by an authoritarian regime that maintained effective control and would align with U.S. interests in any serious conflict. As a result, they contend that Mexico was seen as less of a strategic concern compared to other Latin American countries, leading to its marginalization in U.S. security assessments. This article shows that, unlike the direct interventions observed elsewhere in Latin America, Mexico’s involvement was more subtle, but equally vital. Mexico served as a strategic hub for intelligence operations and regional stability, as long as its political and economic structures remained secure.3
This article contributes to the historiography of U.S.–Latin American relations by highlighting the underexplored influence of local actors, such as the authoritarian Partido Revolucionario Institucional (pri, Institutional Revolutionary Party), which held power in Mexico from 1929 to 2000, in shaping Cold War dynamics in the region. Building on the work of scholars like Joseph, Keller, and Pettinà, who emphasize the interconnected nature of Cold War geopolitics in Latin America—where domestic conflicts were often intertwined with external pressures—this study argues that Mexico was not a passive observer but an active and skillful participant, navigating Cold War dynamics by balancing autonomy with cooperation.4
By offering both quantitative and qualitative insights into U.S. intelligence assessments of Mexico, this article demonstrates how these evaluations shaped U.S. policy toward Mexico and sheds light on the intersection of intelligence and foreign policy during the Cold War. It ultimately reveals that U.S. intelligence overwhelmingly prioritized Mexico’s internal political stability—specifically concerns about governance, economic policies, and domestic unrest—over external threats. This prioritization reflects the broader U.S. strategic objective of maintaining regional stability through Mexico’s internal political and economic security.
Although this study offers new insights, it also acknowledges its limitations. The reliance on pdbs, which were designed to address immediate concerns rather than long-term strategy, captures only the most pressing issues of the time. Additionally, redacted material limits the comprehensiveness of the analysis. To mitigate these limitations, all available pdbs over the sixteen-year period were examined, ensuring a consistent basis for comparison.
Managing Internal and External Pressures
Although Mexico was not a central theater of the Cold War during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the victory and consolidation of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 marked a significant turning point in U.S.–Mexico relations. Mexico had been closely aligned with the United States and its network of alliances in Latin America, all of which aimed at countering the potential Soviet threat. However, with Fidel Castro’s alignment with the Soviet Union in 1960, Mexico suddenly became a key battleground in the ideological struggle between the two superpowers. The country found itself highly vulnerable, not only to expanding Soviet influence and internal subversion, but also to U.S. efforts to maintain its dominance in the region.5
Under the peaceful coexistence doctrine introduced in 1955, Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1953–1964) and Chairman of the Council of Ministers (1958–1964), reframed the conflict with the West, shifting the focus from direct military confrontation to a broader competition between opposing economic and social systems. In this context, Anastas Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Union’s Council of Ministers, visited Mexico in November 1959, officially to inaugurate the Soviet Exhibition of Science, Technology, and Culture. However, this visit was also part of a broader strategic effort to expand Soviet influence in Latin America. During his stay in Mexico, Mikoyan toured the country, utilizing the Mexican presidential airplane, and held official meetings with several Mexican officials, including President Adolfo López Mateos (1958–1964). In response, the Central Intelligence Agency (cia) closely monitored Mexico’s communist groups and Soviet infiltration of mass movements to assess internal subversion threats and regional dynamics such as economic nationalism and neutralism.6
Castro’s 1960 alignment with the Soviet Union significantly heightened geopolitical tensions, as Moscow began supplying military aid and subsidized goods to Cuba. This partnership not only bolstered Cuba’s position but also allowed the Soviet Union to extend its influence in the region through aid and trade initiatives, which directly challenged U.S. interests and reshaped the geopolitical landscape of the Western Hemisphere. The Soviets were also eager to strengthen their ties with Mexico, the largest Spanish-speaking Latin American country, which shares a 2,000-mile border with the United States.
This interest was reflected in López Mateos’ strategic move to enhance relations with the Soviet Union to diversify Mexico’s political and commercial relations. At the same time, the pri sought to avoid challenges to its legitimacy amid the revolutionary fervor sparked by Castro’s rise to power. This dynamic created a complex political environment; domestic and foreign issues became deeply intertwined.7
As a result, Mexico abstained from voting to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States (oas) in January 1962. Furthermore, when the oas passed a resolution in July 1964 urging all member nations to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba, Mexico was the only country to refuse compliance. Throughout the remainder of the decade, it remained the sole Latin American country to maintain diplomatic relations and air connections with Cuba.8
The Cuban Revolution had a profound impact on Mexico’s domestic and foreign policies, exacerbating tensions between the leftist and conservative factions within the pri and reshaping Mexico’s role in the Cold War. Keller argues that the revolution created a complex political environment where domestic and foreign issues became deeply intertwined, compelling Mexico to manage internal division while redefining its role in the broader Cold War context.9
Various groups, including workers, peasants, journalists, and even former president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940), were inspired by the Cuban example and called for the Mexican government to return to its revolutionary roots.10
López Mateos’s fear of a domestic backlash … compelled him to defend Castro. His decision established a precedent that would endure throughout Mexico’s Cold War: contradictory overt and covert foreign policies. Publicly, López Mateos declared that the United States was Mexico’s “greatest problem” and predicted that the Cuban Revolution would be “one step more toward the greatness of America.” At the same time, he quietly decreased trade with the island, instituted travel restrictions, and facilitated US efforts to spy on the Cubans.11
As López Mateos told Allen Dulles, Director of the cia, in a private meeting early in 1961, “it was easy for the United States to look at the Cuba problem as one of international character because there was no chance of Castroism having any real internal effect. Mexico, on the other hand, must consider the possibility of internal security problems. There is a lot of sympathy for Castro and his revolution in Mexico. This factor must be weighed by me in all actions concerning Cuba. For this reason, Mexico cannot take any overt action. Covert action, however, was a different story,” declared the president. “There are many things we should be able to do under the table,” he concluded.12
Ultimately, the United States not only accepted but also came to appreciate Mexico’s decision to maintain relations with Cuba. Despite recognizing Mexico’s diplomatic strategy of balancing conflicting objectives to advance its own interests amid complex domestic and geopolitical dynamics, U.S. leaders understood that though Mexico’s independent foreign policy supported Castro, it also aligned with U.S. interests. This pragmatic approach involved leveraging Mexico’s diplomatic ties with Cuba while securing its covert assistance in intelligence operations, such as sharing lists and photographs of travelers between Cuba and Mexico. By 1964, U.S. officials had concluded that maintaining diplomatic relations between Mexico and Cuba offered greater intelligence benefits than attempting to disrupt Cuba’s activities within Mexico. In a memorandum discussing the potential consequences of a diplomatic break between Mexico and Cuba, officials from the United States embassy noted that the existing communication and travel links between the two countries comprised “an extremely useful intelligence channel” for U.S. agencies. They further observed that cutting off relations would significantly harm U.S. intelligence-gathering efforts, much more than it would affect Cuba’s activities in Mexico.13
It can therefore be argued that the reduced emphasis on strategic threats reflects the intelligence cooperation between Mexico and the United States during this period, especially in monitoring Cuban activities within Mexico. Operations involved photographic surveillance, wiretapping, infiltration, and recruitment. Agents posing as students gathered intelligence on activities at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (National Autonomous University of Mexico) and the El Colegio de México. The cia station allocated at least $5,000 a month to distribute anti-communist propaganda through various means, including bulletins, articles, editorials, and advertisements.14
Declassified U.S. documents also reveal that, between 1956 and 1969, the cia successfully recruited high-level Mexican government officials through the covert program code-named LITEMPO. Notable informants included President López Mateos and his successors, President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–1970) and President Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970–1976). Based at the United States embassy in Mexico City, the LITEMPO program created a discreet channel for exchanging sensitive political information privately, bypassing official channels. cia Station Chief Winston Scott met with López Mateos for breakfast every available Sunday, and Díaz Ordaz reportedly trusted Scott to the extent that he preferred to handle U.S.–Mexican relations directly with him. This covert collaboration was mutually advantageous; while Mexican officials provided crucial intelligence, the cia supported wiretaps on the president’s primary rivals and critics. Such partnerships reveal the intelligence-gathering practices and the complex interplay between U.S. and Mexican intelligence agencies.15
Following the Cuban Revolution and Castro’s alignment with Moscow, Mexico City emerged as a critical battleground in the Cold War, becoming a central stage for the intensifying geopolitical and ideological struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. Often dubbed the “paradise of spies” or a “Soviet hotspot,” the city became a focal point for intelligence operations. As a result, monitoring the involvement of strategic rivals and their proxies in Mexico’s affairs was a crucial component of the United States’ broader intelligence objectives. In September 1961, the cia reported an attempted assassination or capture of López Mateos. This incident, along with the terrorist attacks that occurred in the middle of the month, was suspected to be part of a larger conspiracy to overthrow the government. The report described López Mateos as shaken by the events but resolute in his efforts to identify and bring the conspirators to justice.16
In the lead-up to President Kennedy’s visit to Mexico in 1962, the cia reported that the Mexican Communist Party planned to organize mass demonstrations, raising concerns about potential threats to the president’s safety. A pdb of May 24, 1962, suggests that U.S. officials requested the Mexican government to address this threat before the visit. Three weeks before Kennedy’s arrival, another pdb noted that the Communist Party had abandoned its plans for mass demonstrations. The reasons for this shift were not explicitly stated, but it was likely the result of the Mexican government’s dissuasive measures against Communist Party members. A leaked confidential document detailing the authorities’ strategy, which included arresting 1,000 “troublemakers” and detaining them for the duration of Kennedy’s visit, appeared to have effectively dampened enthusiasm for the protests.17
The significance of monitoring foreign activities in Mexico and their potential impact on key events became even more apparent following the visit of Lee Harvey Oswald to the Soviet and Cuban embassies in Mexico City on September 28, 1963, just weeks before he assassinated President Kennedy on November 22. It was reported that Oswald was attempting to secure visas for travel to the Soviet Union via Havana and that he returned to the United States on October 3. This visit later attracted intense scrutiny from U.S. security agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (fbi), the cia, and various military, naval, and labor attachés, all of whom were vigilant about dangerous activities across Latin America. Alongside tracking external threats, U.S. intelligence agencies also assessed the risks posed to Mexico’s political stability by internal actors.18
In the second half of the 1960s, the Mexican government sought to showcase its economic progress by hosting the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City, the first time that the Games were held in a developing country. The government believed the event would elevate Mexico’s international profile, attract tourism, and bring in foreign investment, justifying the significant public spending on Olympics facilities. However, economic growth in Mexico had been unevenly distributed, and the lavish expenditure on the Olympics sparked discontent, particularly among students who were already dissatisfied with the authoritarian pri regime.19
This discontent erupted into a student movement that rapidly gained momentum. It was initially triggered by a violent clash between rival students on July 22 and 23, 1968. The police’s heavy-handed response led to the arrest of several students and fuelled further protests. What began as a localized incident quickly escalated into a widespread movement, drawing large segments of university students dissatisfied with the ruling pri regime, particularly those from the Autonomous National University of Mexico. On July 26, two separate demonstrations converged in Mexico City: one from the Instituto Politécnico Nacional (National Polytechnic Institute) students protesting the police violence and another organized by the Communist youth group Estudiantes Democráticos, marking the anniversary of the Cuban Revolution’s 1952 Moncada barracks assault. The combined protests marched toward the Zócalo, the city square, but were blocked by mounted police. Over the following days, protests escalated with students setting fire to empty buses and clashing with the police, leading to hundreds of injuries and arrests.20
From the outset, Mexican officials asserted that they were targets of an international communist conspiracy. Mexican intelligence agency and secret police, Dirección Federal de Seguridad (Federal Security Directorate), believed that Cuba was involved and claimed that Castro was ready to provide weapons to the students. Walt Rostow, National Security Advisor to President Johnson, explicitly instructed the cia to investigate the individuals involved in the riots and assess the extent of Cuban Communist influence. This directive underscores the importance that the U.S. placed on understanding the forces behind the unrest.21
During this period, the cia station in Mexico City was highly active, producing almost daily reports on the situation, with a particular focus on foreign involvement in the student protests. One such report noted: “Communist agitators were behind the clash between several thousand students and police in downtown Mexico City. Scores were wounded and many arrested.” Initially, U.S. officials supported the Mexican government’s assertion that the orders originated from Moscow through the Soviet Embassy. However, they later determined that “student demonstrations were sparked by domestic politics, not orchestrated by Cubans or Soviets.”22
Their role was restricted to supplying money to student groups. … Although they did not start the trouble, Mexican Communists, Trotskyists, and Castroists all capitalized on the disorders once they began and took active parts.23
After the initial fight between student groups in central Mexico City was brutally dispersed by a substantial police force, university students organized the Consejo Nacional de Huelga (cnh, National Strike Council) to coordinate protests and articulate demands to the government. The cnh called for disbanding of the riot police, indemnifying injured students, and releasing political prisoners. The cia noted that, although President Díaz Ordaz had the strength and resolve to take a hardline approach and to “crack heads,” he might also consider offering concessions to diffuse tensions in the lead-up to the Olympics. Throughout the summer, the protests continued to grow, highlighting the students’ demands for greater political freedoms and an end to the pri’s authoritarian rule. The government, which had been making significant efforts to avoid a confrontation with the students, took a tougher stance by the end of August. “Words came down from Díaz Ordaz that student disorders must be stopped,” the cia informed.24
The International Olympics Committee threatened to relocate the Games to Los Angeles, but Díaz Ordaz was resolute in keeping them in Mexico City, even if it required severe repression. To help the Mexican government restore order before the Olympics began on October 12, the United States provided substantial support, including the delivery of military radios, weapons, ammunition, and riot control training materials. In response to escalating unrest, approximately 1,500 people were detained, and at least 52 were wounded during riots on September 23 and 24, marking the most serious violence since the student protests began in July. On September 26, embassy and cia reports to Washington increasingly reflected the belief that the government was closing in on the student movement and that the riots would be contained by October. Both the Minister of the Interior, Luis Echeverría, and the Head of the Federal Security Directorate, Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios, assured the U.S. Embassy that the situation would soon be fully under control, with all acts of violence coming to an end.25
Despite increasing repression in response to months of nationwide student strikes, no one anticipated the brutal massacre that would occur at Tlatelolco. On October 2, 1968, a large, peaceful march of around 10,000 university and high school students reached the Plaza of the Three Cultures, where they had gathered for speeches. Unbeknown to the protesters, a covert group of ten officials armed with submachine guns had been strategically positioned in surrounding buildings with orders to open fire on the unarmed civilians. The scale of the violence stunned the nation. When the shooting stopped, hundreds lay dead or injured, while military forces rounded up thousands of surviving protesters, forcibly detaining them.26
The Mexican government initially asserted that the Armed Forces had been provoked by protesters who allegedly fired upon them, a claim that the United States government accepted. An early cia report aligned with this narrative, suggesting that the first shots were fired by students who had occupied an apartment building in the plaza. According to this report, army troops discovered a significant cache of weapons and ammunition in the building. However, revealing accounts published in 1999 and declassified documents released from 2000 onward indicate that government-employed snipers were responsible for the violence. The exact death toll remains disputed, with estimates ranging from 300 to 400; eyewitnesses reported hundreds of fatalities. The Federal Directorate of Security documented 1,345 arrests.27
Following the massacre, U.S. intelligence reports began to assess the likelihood of military coups and revolutionary movements in Mexico. There was a growing awareness that the combination of riots, widespread poverty, and political repression could eventually lead Mexicans to recognize the repressive nature of the authoritarian regime. “The capital is rife with rumors of revolution or military takeover, and the government expects a major act of sabotage before the opening of the Olympics.”28
The ongoing violence, which the fbi dubbed “the worst in the hemisphere,” revealed deep and widespread discontent with the regime and significantly tarnished Mexico’s reputation as the most stable and progressive nation in Latin America. The student movement persisted until December 6, 1968, when the cnh was dissolved. However, state violence did not cease. The government continued to target and arrest political and social activists connected to the mobilization, at least until February 1969.29
Methodology
To address how U.S. intelligence assessed Mexico during the Cold War—specifically the depth and intensity of reporting on strategic rivalries, governance challenges, and transnational issues—this study employs content analysis on declassified pdbs from the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations. Content analysis systematically captures recurring themes, words, and concepts, making it ideal for examining the nuances of U.S. intelligence reporting on Mexico’s perceived security threats. By applying this method, we gain a comprehensive understanding of how Mexico was portrayed as a security concern across multiple U.S. administrations, offering insight into the shifts in U.S. priorities. These records encompass nearly 5,000 documents and 47,000 pages.
The initial dataset comprised 2,483 documents from the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and 2,506 documents from the Nixon and Ford administrations. The pdbs were converted into text using Optical Character Recognition (ocr). A preliminary dataset was created by filtering all documents containing the word Mexico. A second search using Mexico as the query ensured that all relevant reports mentioning Mexico were captured and irrelevant mentions, such as references to the Gulf of Mexico or New Mexico, were excluded to maintain focus on intelligence assessments of Mexico itself.
The dataset was further refined to include pdbs where Mexico was the primary intelligence target, or where significant information about Mexico was presented. For instance, peripheral mentions of Mexico, such as the July 19, 1961, pdb documenting Caracas’ rejection of a Soviet goodwill mission, were excluded to prevent unrelated geopolitical events from diluting the focus on Mexico-specific intelligence concerns. Similarly, a pdb from July 26, 1963, which detailed flight delays in Mexico City affecting attendance at a rally in Cuba commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution, was also excluded. Heavily redacted pdbs were excluded to maintain a dataset capable of full analysis, particularly important for assessing the depth and number of sub-issues discussed in relation to Mexico.
The final dataset consisted of 145 pdbs, with 115 (79.3%) directly analyzing Mexico as the primary intelligence target. The remaining thirty pdbs included important insights relevant to Mexico, focusing on other countries but addressing Mexico’s strategic interests. These documents were analyzed for the range and depth of sub-issues that they addressed, such as governance concerns, strategic rivalries, and transnational issues. This refined dataset enabled a focused analysis of how U.S. intelligence framed Mexico across different political contexts.30
To provide a clearer and more systematic analytical framework, we adapted Lowenthal’s intelligence agenda to examine the complex nature of U.S. intelligence on Mexico during this period. This customized framework organizes intelligence issues into three main categories: strategic rivalries, governance and governability, and transnational issues. This structure allowed for a focused analysis of how Mexico was framed as a security concern. The framework also enabled the detection of patterns in U.S. intelligence reports, including shifts in how these issues were viewed over time.
For this research, Lowenthal’s Soviet issue was broadened into “strategic rivalries,” enabling the detection of scenarios where Mexico was depicted as a security threat from a geopolitical standpoint. Similarly, the “current nation-state” concerns category was adapted to “governance and governability,” reflecting Mexico’s internal stability, government plans, and leadership intentions. The transnational intelligence category was refined to focus on specific concerns between Mexico and the United States, incorporating issues like the Colorado River’s salinity problem and counternarcotic strategies but excluding irrelevant topics like cyberspace. Further adjustments were made to subcategories of the Soviet issue and current nation-state concerns, such as Mexico’s military capabilities or assessments of the country as a failed state. These exclusions were made to ensure that the analysis accurately reflected the most significant security threats identified by U.S. intelligence.31
The coding process was designed to categorize systematically each text fragment related to Mexico under one of the three primary analytical categories and their respective subcategories. The codebook was adapted to match the nuanced reporting found in the pdbs, ensuring alignment between the coding process and the complexity of U.S. intelligence assessments. A pilot coding test was conducted on a subset of documents to ensure accuracy and consistency, resulting in refinements to the codebook and ensuring its applicability across the entire dataset.32
The coding process revealed several methodological challenges, particularly in coding overlapping events. Given the complex nature of intelligence reporting, events were often coded under multiple categories when relevant. For example, a pdb might discuss both internal unrest and the involvement of international actors. This approach accurately captures the full scope of U.S. intelligence assessments—acknowledging the interconnectedness of domestic and international issues. A notable example is the May 19, 1964, pdb, which reported President López Mateos’ concerns about potential Communist-instigated disturbances in Mexico City, drawing parallels to similar unrest during the previous December’s Venezuelan elections. To account for these overlaps, documents were coded under multiple relevant categories, thus ensuring that the analysis captured the full depth and nuance of intelligence reporting.
The dataset’s thorough coding allowed for the quantification of both the breadth and intensity of reporting. Descriptive statistics, including frequency counts and cross-tabulations, were used to analyze not only the occurrence of intelligence references to Mexico, but also the depth with which these issues were explored through sub-issues in the coded reports. This approach offered a clearer understanding of how U.S. intelligence priorities shifted by administration and topic. By focusing on sub-issues, the analysis provided greater insight into U.S. intelligence assessments. Additionally, all frequency counts were normalized per 100 days in office, allowing for proportional comparisons across administrations and ensuring that the data reflected intensity rather than mere frequency.
Analysis
By examining code frequencies and sub-issue breakdowns, the analysis provides insight into the depth and intensity of reporting. It offers a detailed view of how U.S. intelligence priorities shifted and evolved across different presidential administrations and changing geopolitical contexts. Table 1 offers a detailed breakdown of the relative code frequency of pdbs across the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations between 1961 and 1977.
Frequency Codes of Strategic, Governance, and Transnational Concerns by Presidential Administration (1961–1977)
| subcategory . | kennedy . | johnson . | nixon . | ford . | total . |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1961–1963) . | (1963–1969) . | (1969–1974) . | (1974–1977) . | ||
| 1,036 days . | 1,886 days . | 2,027 days . | 895 days . | ||
| Strategic | 14 | 12 | 5 | 2 | 33 |
| (31.8%) | (8.5%) | (12.8%) | (2.7%) | (11.1%) | |
| Governance | 27 | 126 | 33 | 67 | 253 |
| (61.4%) | (88.7%) | (84.6%) | (91.8%) | (84.9%) | |
| Transnational | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 12 |
| (6.8%) | (2.8%) | (2.6%) | (5.5%) | (4.0%) | |
| Total | 44 | 142 | 39 | 73 | 298 |
| (100%) | (100%) | (100%) | (100%) | (100%) |
| subcategory . | kennedy . | johnson . | nixon . | ford . | total . |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1961–1963) . | (1963–1969) . | (1969–1974) . | (1974–1977) . | ||
| 1,036 days . | 1,886 days . | 2,027 days . | 895 days . | ||
| Strategic | 14 | 12 | 5 | 2 | 33 |
| (31.8%) | (8.5%) | (12.8%) | (2.7%) | (11.1%) | |
| Governance | 27 | 126 | 33 | 67 | 253 |
| (61.4%) | (88.7%) | (84.6%) | (91.8%) | (84.9%) | |
| Transnational | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 12 |
| (6.8%) | (2.8%) | (2.6%) | (5.5%) | (4.0%) | |
| Total | 44 | 142 | 39 | 73 | 298 |
| (100%) | (100%) | (100%) | (100%) | (100%) |
The most striking finding is the overwhelming focus on governance and governability, which constituted 84.9% of all codes. This focus significantly overshadowed strategic concerns, which accounted for just 11.1%, and transnational matters, comprising a mere 4.0%. These data highlight that U.S. intelligence placed greater emphasis on Mexico’s internal governance than on external threats or transnational challenges during this period.
The second key takeaway from Table 1 is the variation in focus within each administration. Under Kennedy, strategic concerns held a much larger share, accounting for 31.8% of the codes. Fears of Soviet and Cuban infiltration and expansion in Latin America were especially pronounced, with 1.35 codes per 100 days dedicated to these issues. This heightened anxiety was fueled by the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, Castro’s alignment with the Soviet Union, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. During this period, reports frequently emphasized “probes or expansion of rivals” and “allies or surrogates of rivals,” underscoring the perceived risk of communist influence penetrating Mexico through these channels. A notable example can be found in the pdb from May 22, 1962, which reported the introduction of Czech-made automatic weapons into Mexico. It was believed that they had been smuggled through Cuba. Similarly, the pdb from September 8, 1962, highlighted growing concerns over Cuba’s expanding military capabilities, particularly its Soviet-backed naval forces. These reports underscore U.S. anxieties that Mexico could become a strategic entry point for communist penetration into the Western Hemisphere, reinforcing broader concerns about Soviet–Cuban encroachment in the region.33
However, Table 2 shows that the intensity of reporting on strategic rivalries gradually declined across subsequent administrations. By the end of the Johnson administration, the frequency of strategic rivalry codes had dropped to 0.64 per 100 days, signaling a shift in intelligence priorities. Concerns over Soviet and Cuban influence in the region remained—particularly regarding Mexico’s pragmatic decision to maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba—but the heightened fears of communist expansion that had defined the Kennedy era began to wane. This shift reflects a broader recalibration of U.S. intelligence priorities, moving away from Cold War anxieties toward more nuanced concerns about Mexico’s internal stability and governance.
Frequency Codes and Proportion of Strategic Rivalry Concerns by Presidential Administration (1961–1977)
| subcategory . | kennedy . | johnson . | nixon . | ford . | total . |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1961–1963) . | (1963–1969) . | (1969–1974) . | (1974–1977) . | ||
| 1,036 days . | 1,886 days . | 2,027 days . | 895 days . | ||
| Probes or Expansion of Rivals | 4 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 11 |
| (0.39/100 days) | (0.27/100 days) | (0.10/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (33.3%) | |
| Allies or Surrogates of Rivals | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 15 |
| (0.39/100 days) | (0.32/100 days) | (0.15/100 days) | (0.22/100 days) | (45.5%) | |
| Strengths or Weaknesses of Rivals | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 7 |
| (0.58/100 days) | (0.05/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (21.2%) | |
| Total | 14 | 12 | 5 | 2 | 33 |
| (1.35/100 days) | (0.64/100 days) | (0.25/100 days) | (0.22/100 days) | (100%) |
| subcategory . | kennedy . | johnson . | nixon . | ford . | total . |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1961–1963) . | (1963–1969) . | (1969–1974) . | (1974–1977) . | ||
| 1,036 days . | 1,886 days . | 2,027 days . | 895 days . | ||
| Probes or Expansion of Rivals | 4 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 11 |
| (0.39/100 days) | (0.27/100 days) | (0.10/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (33.3%) | |
| Allies or Surrogates of Rivals | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 15 |
| (0.39/100 days) | (0.32/100 days) | (0.15/100 days) | (0.22/100 days) | (45.5%) | |
| Strengths or Weaknesses of Rivals | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 7 |
| (0.58/100 days) | (0.05/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (21.2%) | |
| Total | 14 | 12 | 5 | 2 | 33 |
| (1.35/100 days) | (0.64/100 days) | (0.25/100 days) | (0.22/100 days) | (100%) |
Under Johnson, governance and governability became the dominant focus of U.S. intelligence, with 88.7% of the codes centered on Mexico’s internal political dynamics. This heightened attention to governance, reflected in 126 total codes (6.68 per 100 days), underscored U.S. concerns about Mexico’s political instability during this period, which coincided with the widespread student demonstrations and culminated in the Tlatelolco massacre.
The pdbs from this era closely tracked the escalating student protests and social unrest, with thirty-four instances (1.80 codes per 100 days) referring the scale and intensity of dissent. Notably, the pdb from October 2, 1968, documented the violent suppression of student protests in Mexico City, raising concerns about the Mexican government’s ability to maintain political stability. Additionally, twelve codes were devoted to “stamping out dissent” (0.64 codes per 100 days), reflecting U.S. fears that the government’s repressive tactics could further destabilize the situation. Simultaneously, U.S. intelligence increased its focus on the Mexican leadership’s intentions, with thirty instances (1.59 codes per 100 days) analyzing how the Díaz Ordaz administration responded to both domestic and international pressures. His handling of the 1968 protests became a critical point of analysis as U.S. intelligence evaluated his strategies for quelling the turmoil. These reports indicate a growing concern that Mexico’s internal political challenges could have broader implications for U.S.–Mexico relations, prompting the United States to monitor closely the unfolding crisis to protect its regional interests.
Table 3 shows that U.S. intelligence broadened its scope during the Johnson administration, concentrating on subcategories such as the solidity of the state, the nature and strength of dissent, and leadership intentions. These concerns, particularly in the aftermath of the social unrest of the 1960s, reflected a growing preoccupation with Mexico’s internal political dynamics rather than external geopolitical alignments.
Frequency Codes and Proportion of Governance Concerns by Presidential Administration (1961–1977)
| subcategory . | kennedy . | johnson . | nixon . | ford . | total . |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1961–1963) . | (1963–1969) . | (1969–1974) . | (1974–1977) . | ||
| 1,036 days . | 1,886 days . | 2,027 days . | 895 days . | ||
| Internal Stability | |||||
| Solidity of the State | 3 | 12 | 3 | 2 | 20 |
| (0.29/100 days) | (0.64/100 days) | (0.15/100 days) | (0.22/100 days) | (7.91%) | |
| Level of Public Support | 0 | 4 | 0 | 5 | 9 |
| (0.00/100 days) | (0.21/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.56/100 days) | (3.56%) | |
| Stamping Out Dissent | 0 | 12 | 3 | 0 | 15 |
| (0.00/100 days) | (0.64/100 days) | (0.15/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (5.93%) | |
| Nature and Strength of Dissent | 2 | 34 | 1 | 1 | 38 |
| (0.19/100 days) | (1.8/100 days) | (0.05/100 days) | (0.11/100 days) | (15.02%) | |
| Leaders | |||||
| Health | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| (0.00/100 days) | (0.11/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.79%) | |
| Successors | 1 | 8 | 4 | 3 | 16 |
| (0.10/100 days) | (0.42/100 days) | (0.20/100 days) | (0.34/100 days) | (6.32%) | |
| Domestic Intentions | 5 | 30 | 10 | 17 | 62 |
| (.48/100 days) | (1.59/100 days) | (0.49/100 days) | (1.45/100 days) | (24.51%) | |
| Foreign Intentions | 13 | 17 | 10 | 13 | 53 |
| (1.25/100 days) | (0.90/100 days) | (0.49/100 days) | (1.45/100 days) | (20.95%) | |
| Economy | |||||
| Size and Output | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.34/100 days) | (1.19%) | |
| Oil | 1 | 2 | 1 | 11 | 15 |
| (0.10/100 days) | (0.11/100 days) | (0.05/100 days) | (1.23/100 days) | (5.93%) | |
| Trade | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 7 |
| (0.10/100 days) | (0.16/100 days) | (0.05/100 days) | (0.22/100 days) | (2.77%) | |
| Facilities | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 5 |
| (0.10/100 days) | (0.11/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.22/100 days) | (1.98%) | |
| Macroeconomics | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.34/100 days) | (1.19%) | |
| Economic Levers | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.45/100 days) | (1.58%) | |
| Other Economic Issues | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.11/100 days) | (0.40%) | |
| Total | 27 | 126 | 33 | 67 | 253 |
| (2.61/100 days) | (6.68/100 days) | (1.63/100 days) | (7.49/100 days) | (100%) | |
| subcategory . | kennedy . | johnson . | nixon . | ford . | total . |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1961–1963) . | (1963–1969) . | (1969–1974) . | (1974–1977) . | ||
| 1,036 days . | 1,886 days . | 2,027 days . | 895 days . | ||
| Internal Stability | |||||
| Solidity of the State | 3 | 12 | 3 | 2 | 20 |
| (0.29/100 days) | (0.64/100 days) | (0.15/100 days) | (0.22/100 days) | (7.91%) | |
| Level of Public Support | 0 | 4 | 0 | 5 | 9 |
| (0.00/100 days) | (0.21/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.56/100 days) | (3.56%) | |
| Stamping Out Dissent | 0 | 12 | 3 | 0 | 15 |
| (0.00/100 days) | (0.64/100 days) | (0.15/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (5.93%) | |
| Nature and Strength of Dissent | 2 | 34 | 1 | 1 | 38 |
| (0.19/100 days) | (1.8/100 days) | (0.05/100 days) | (0.11/100 days) | (15.02%) | |
| Leaders | |||||
| Health | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| (0.00/100 days) | (0.11/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.79%) | |
| Successors | 1 | 8 | 4 | 3 | 16 |
| (0.10/100 days) | (0.42/100 days) | (0.20/100 days) | (0.34/100 days) | (6.32%) | |
| Domestic Intentions | 5 | 30 | 10 | 17 | 62 |
| (.48/100 days) | (1.59/100 days) | (0.49/100 days) | (1.45/100 days) | (24.51%) | |
| Foreign Intentions | 13 | 17 | 10 | 13 | 53 |
| (1.25/100 days) | (0.90/100 days) | (0.49/100 days) | (1.45/100 days) | (20.95%) | |
| Economy | |||||
| Size and Output | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.34/100 days) | (1.19%) | |
| Oil | 1 | 2 | 1 | 11 | 15 |
| (0.10/100 days) | (0.11/100 days) | (0.05/100 days) | (1.23/100 days) | (5.93%) | |
| Trade | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 7 |
| (0.10/100 days) | (0.16/100 days) | (0.05/100 days) | (0.22/100 days) | (2.77%) | |
| Facilities | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 5 |
| (0.10/100 days) | (0.11/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.22/100 days) | (1.98%) | |
| Macroeconomics | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.34/100 days) | (1.19%) | |
| Economic Levers | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.45/100 days) | (1.58%) | |
| Other Economic Issues | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.11/100 days) | (0.40%) | |
| Total | 27 | 126 | 33 | 67 | 253 |
| (2.61/100 days) | (6.68/100 days) | (1.63/100 days) | (7.49/100 days) | (100%) | |
This trend continued in the Nixon administration, when strategic rivalry codes fell to 0.25 per 100 days, reflecting reduced concern over Mexico’s ties to the communist bloc. A notable exception was the pdb from March 18, 1971, which reported the arrest of nineteen members of the Revolutionary Action Movement (mar), a Marxist-Leninist group trained by North Korea, that sought to overthrow the Mexican government. This event illustrates the overlap between governance and strategic rivalries; a follow-up pdb the next day noted that the arrest led Echeverría to expel the Soviet chargé d’affaires and four other Soviet diplomats. By the early 1970s, U.S. intelligence had shifted focus from external threats to internal dynamics, with 84.6% of Nixon-era reports centered on domestic issues. However, reporting on internal governance dropped to thirty-three codes (1.63 per 100 days) as attention shifted to economic governance. This focus intensified under Ford, when 91.8% of the codes were dedicated to governance and governability, particularly Mexico’s economy and oil industry.
Reports on oil governance surged, with eleven codes (1.23 codes per 100 days) reflecting U.S. interests in Mexico’s emergence as a major oil exporter. The pdb from October 18, 1974, highlighted the discovery of significant petroleum resources near the Gulf of Mexico, raising concerns about the potential economic and diplomatic ramifications of Mexico’s newfound oil wealth. This shift from political to economic issues underscores changing U.S. priorities, with oil governance becoming central to assessment of Mexico’s long-term stability.
There was also an increase in reporting on trade and economic levers, with two and four instances, respectively. U.S. intelligence closely monitored Mexico’s management of its economic growth amid challenges, such as the global oil crisis and the peso devaluation crisis, which led to capital flight and concerns over economic mismanagement. The pdbs highlighted how Mexico’s handling of its oil wealth and economic instability could have broader implications for U.S.–Mexico relations and regional stability.
Under Ford, there was a noticeable rise in transnational concerns, particularly narcotics trafficking, which accounted for 5.5% of codes. As Table 4 illustrates, the Ford administration marked a significant shift, recording the highest overall intensity of reporting on transnational matters, with 0.45 codes per 100 days. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the focus was primarily on environmental concerns, such as the salinity of the Colorado River. Other transnational issues were minimal, overshadowed by Cold War dynamics and internal governance concerns. In contrast, the 1970s saw narcotics trafficking emerge as a critical issue, aligning with broader U.S. domestic priorities, especially with the onset of the War on Drugs. Mexico’s growing role in the international drug trade became more apparent. Although narcotics first appeared in U.S. intelligence assessments under Nixon—recorded in just one instance (0.05 codes per 100 days)—this change marked the beginning of a focus that would intensify in the following years. By the end of the Ford administration, narcotics trafficking had moved to the forefront, with three instances (0.34 codes per 100 days). pdbs from 1974, 1975, and 1976 highlighted Mexico’s antinarcotics operations, including efforts against opium and heroin production, and noted U.S. support for these initiatives. This shift reflects growing U.S. concerns about Mexico’s involvement in the international drug trade, especially in regions like Culiacán, which would later gain notoriety for cartel activity.34
Frequency Codes and Proportion of Transnational Concerns by Presidential Administration (1961–1977)
| subcategory . | kennedy . | johnson . | nixon . | ford . | total . |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1961–1963) . | (1963–1969) . | (1969–1974) . | (1974–1977) . | ||
| 1,036 days . | 1,886 days . | 2,027 days . | 895 days . | ||
| Migration | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.11/100 days) | (8.33%) | |
| Narcotics | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.05/100 days) | (0.34/100 days) | (33.33%) | |
| Salinity | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 7 |
| (0.29/100 days) | (0.21/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (58.33%) | |
| Total | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 12 |
| (0.29/100 days) | (0.21/100 days) | (0.05/100 days) | (0.45/100 days) | (100%) |
| subcategory . | kennedy . | johnson . | nixon . | ford . | total . |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1961–1963) . | (1963–1969) . | (1969–1974) . | (1974–1977) . | ||
| 1,036 days . | 1,886 days . | 2,027 days . | 895 days . | ||
| Migration | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.11/100 days) | (8.33%) | |
| Narcotics | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.05/100 days) | (0.34/100 days) | (33.33%) | |
| Salinity | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 7 |
| (0.29/100 days) | (0.21/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (0.00/100 days) | (58.33%) | |
| Total | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 12 |
| (0.29/100 days) | (0.21/100 days) | (0.05/100 days) | (0.45/100 days) | (100%) |
Additionally, Ford’s administration was the first to report on migration, though it was recorded only once (0.11 codes per 100 days). Narcotics dominated the transnational agenda under Ford, and environmental concerns, particularly the salinity problem, received diminishing attention. The reduced focus on migration and environmental issues during this period highlights that U.S. intelligence primarily viewed Mexico through the lens of economic governance and, increasingly, narcotics trafficking, rather than broader transnational concerns.
This article reveals that, despite Mexico’s significant geopolitical role in the U.S.–Soviet rivalry, particularly after the Cuban Revolution, U.S. intelligence concerns during the Cold War were overwhelmingly focused on internal stability rather than external threats. Nearly 85 percent of the coded material centered on internal affairs, underscoring a consistent U.S. perception that Mexico’s domestic issues posed a greater risk to regional security than its external alignments. Early 1960s assessments reflected significant apprehension about Soviet and Cuban influence, but U.S. intelligence priorities shifted as Mexico’s internal challenges intensified. By the time of the 1968 student protests, it was clear that the primary threat to Mexico’s stability came from within, prompting the Johnson administration to track Mexican domestic unrest. This emphasis further evolved under the Nixon and Ford administrations, which gradually moved from concerns about political instability to a focus on economic governance.
By demonstrating that U.S. intelligence assessments primarily focused on Mexico’s political and economic stability, this article addresses a critical gap in the literature on U.S.–Mexico Cold War relations and highlights the centrality of internal governance in the United States’ strategic calculations. These findings challenge the prevailing narratives that the U.S.–Soviet rivalry was the main driver of U.S. actions in the region, suggesting instead that concerns about domestic stability took precedence.
This article also showed how Mexico skillfully navigated Cold War dynamics by balancing autonomy with cooperation. The pri effectively leveraged international tensions to suppress dissent and maintain stability, positioning itself as a regional stabilizer. This nuanced strategy enabled Mexico to sustain relations with Cuba while simultaneously serving U.S. intelligence interests, challenging the traditional view of Mexico as a passive Cold War actor. Despite its public support of Cuba, the pri secretly collaborated with the United States, facilitating intelligence operations and sharing critical information about communist activities. The covert intelligence-sharing program LITEMPO is a prime example of this deep cooperation, revealing that Mexico’s outward stance of neutrality concealed a significant role in U.S. efforts to monitor and counter communist influence. This dual approach underscores how Mexico’s apparent autonomy during the Cold War was often coupled with substantial strategic alignment with U.S. interests. This equilibrium allowed pri officials greater freedom in domestic affairs, provided that they adhered to U.S. red lines. Unlike countries such as Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Chile, which faced direct U.S. interventions due to their inability to adapt to Cold War pressures, Mexico successfully preserved its sovereignty, highlighting its unique position in the region.35
Notes
Originally called The President’s Intelligence Checklists, the pdbs provided high-level national security summaries to the president and key advisors, drawing on contributions from the Central Intelligence Agency (cia) and other agencies.
Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Los Angeles, 2022), 347–431. Content analysis, as used in this study, refers to a methodology for systematically categorizing and interpreting qualitative data to detect recurring themes, patterns, and shifts over time, making it particularly relevant for understanding the evolution of intelligence assessments. For a study on how intelligence analysis shaped the image of adversaries, see Paul Maddrell (ed.), The Image of the Enemy: Intelligence Analysis of Adversaries since 1945 (Washington, D.C., 2015), 1–27. For examples of Soviet and U.S. intelligence activities aimed at assessing mutual intentions and capabilities, see Lawrence Aronsen, “Seeing Red: US Air Force Assessment of the Soviet Union, 1945–49,” Intelligence and National Security, XVI (2001), 103–132; David Easter, “Soviet Bloc and Western Bugging of Opponent’s Diplomatic Premises During the Early Cold War,” Intelligence and National Security, XXXI (2016), 28–48; Jonathan M. Acuff and Madison J. Nowlin, “Competitive Intelligence and National Intelligence Estimates,” Intelligence and National Security, XXXIV (2019), 654–672.
For Mexico’s strategic importance in regional security before, during, and after the Cold War, see María Emilia Paz, Strategy, Security, and Spies: Mexico and the US as Allies in World War II (University Park, PA, 1997), 181–208; Jefferson Morley, Our Man in Mexico: Winston Scott and the Hidden History of the cia (Lawrence, KS, 2008), 92; Aaron W. Navarro, Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico, 1938–54 (University Park, PA, 2010), 151; Renata Keller, Mexico’s Cold War: Cuba, the United States, and the Legacy of the Mexican Revolution (New York, 2015), 70–74. Regarding Mexico’s participation in key inter-American conferences, such as those at Chapultepec (1945), Rio (1947), and Bogotá (1948), as well as the economic tension between Mexico’s focus on import substitution industrialization and Washington’s push for a liberal economic order, see Vanni Pettinà, “From Bilateralism to Globalism: Mexico’s Early Cold War Foreign Policy, 1947–64,” Monde(s), XVIII (2020), 73–94. During the Cold War, Mexico City was considered a “paradise of spies,” with its cia station playing a pivotal role in countering communism in Latin America. The Soviet Union’s embassy in Mexico City was the largest espionage center in Latin America, and, after the Cuban Revolution, the city became one of the most significant hubs for international intelligence pertaining to Cuba. See Patrick Iber, “Paraíso de espías: La Ciudad de México y la Guerra Fría,” Nexos, XXVI (2014), available at https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=20004 (accessed February 5, 2025); David Priess, The President’s Book of Secrets (New York, 2017), 146. For Mexico’s internal governance, economic progress, and its maneuvering between alignment with U.S. interests and the building of presidentialist authoritarian institutions, see Soledad Loaeza and Arturo Rocha, “A La Sombra De La Superpotencia,” Revista Mexicana De Política Exterior, XXIV (2022), 297–307. On Mexico’s marginalization in U.S. security documents during the Cold War, see Sergio Aguayo and Julián Brody, “Mexico and the United States during the Cold War,” in Aguayo (ed.), Myths and [Mis]perceptions: Changing U.S. Elite Visions of Mexico (Mexico City, 1998), 132–155. For U.S. covert operations and activities in Latin America, see David Isenberg, “The Pitfalls of U.S. Covert Operations,” Policy Analysis, LXIV (1989), 12–33; William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–92 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1998), 3–148; Peter Kornbluh, “Nixon on Chile Intervention: White House Tape Acknowledges Instructions to Block Salvador Allende,” National Security Archive, XXI (2004), 67–89; Lars Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: The United States and the Cuban Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC, 2009), 142–240.
For a discussion on how Latin American countries, including Mexico, were active participants in Cold War dynamics, see Gilbert M. Joseph, “What We Now Know and Should Know: Bringing Latin America More Meaningfully into Cold War Studies,” in idem and Daniela Spenser (eds.), In From the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War (Durham, NC, 2008), 3–46. Joseph highlights the limited attention that Mexico has received in Cold War studies despite its status as one of Latin America’s two “middle powers” alongside Brazil and as the southern neighbor of the United States. On the interconnected nature of domestic and international events in Mexico, see Keller, Mexico’s Cold War, 233. Keller contends that the railroad movement of 1958/9 and the Cuban Revolution represent the convergence of two critical events—one domestic and one external—that marked Mexico’s entry into the Cold War. For a broader discussion on the role of political parties and other actors in Latin America’s Cold War, see Pettinà, A Compact History of Latin America’s Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC, 2022), 37–56.
Victor Bulmer-Thomas and James Dunkerley (eds.), The United States and Latin America: The New Agenda (Cambridge, MA, 1999), 34–35; James G. Hershberg, “Their Men in Havana: Anglo-American Intelligence Exchanges and the Cuban Crises, 1961–62,” Intelligence and National Security, XV (2000), 121–176; Scott Lucas and Alistair Morey, “The Hidden Alliance: The cia and mi6 Before and After Suez,” Intelligence and National Security, XVI (2000), 95–120; Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, “The Impact of the Cold War on Latin America,” in Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (eds.), Origins of the Cold War: An International History (New York, 2005), 299–316; Don Munton, “Intelligence Cooperation Meets International Studies Theory: Explaining Canadian Operations in Castro’s Cuba,” Intelligence and National Security, XXIV (2009), 119–138; Bevan Sewell, “The Pragmatic Face of the Covert Idealist: The Role of Allen Dulles in US Policy Discussions on Latin America: 1953–61,” Intelligence and National Security, XXVI (2011), 269–290; Pettinà, “From Bilateralism to Globalism,” 73–94.
Keller, Mexico’s Cold War, 3–4; Pettinà, “Mexican-Soviet Relations, 1958–64: The Limits of Engagement,” Cold War International History Project, available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/mexican-soviet-relations-1958-1964-the-limits-engagement (accessed February 5, 2025).
Keller, Mexico’s Cold War, 3–4.
Ibid.
Ibid., 5.
Ibid., 6.
Ibid.
Morley, Our Man in Mexico, 107.
Keller, Mexico’s Cold War, 165–166.
Ibid., 26.
Morley, “LITEMPO: The cia’s Eyes on Tlatelolco,” National Security Archive, available at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB204/ (accessed February 5, 2025); Keller, Mexico’s Cold War, 25–27; Aguayo, Mexico 68: The Students, the President and the cia (Mexico City, 2019), chap. 1.
See Iber, “Paraíso de Espías,” 146; Priess, The President’s Book, 146. Priess reveals that U.S. briefers to the president routinely highlighted relevant issues in the pdbs concerning global hot spots, including Poland, Lebanon, and Mexico. For Mexico’s role in the U.S.-Cuban and Soviet rivalry, see Keller, Mexico’s Cold War, 154, 190–191. On the cia’s involvement in Mexico, particularly during the 1968 student protests, see Aguayo, Mexico 68, chap. 1. The referenced pdbs are from cia, The President’s Daily Brief, 22 Sept. 1961; 5 May 1964; 19 May 1964, including the report of the attempted assassination or capture of López Mateos and the September 1961 terrorist attacks.
Ibid., 24 May 1962; 8 June 1962.
Ibid., 25 Nov. 1963; Morley, Our Man in Mexico, 177–178; Priess, The President’s Book, 42; Bethell and Roxborough, “Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War: Some Reflections on the 1945–48 Conjuncture,” Journal of Latin American Studies, XX (1988), 167–189.
Keller, Mexico’s Cold War, 202.
Enrique Krauze, Mexico: Biography of Power (New York, 1997), 694–696; Jesús Vargas Valdez, “Student Movement of 1968,” in Encyclopedia of Mexico: History, Society & Culture (Chicago, 1997), II, 1379; Keller, Mexico’s Cold War, 202–206.
Keller, Mexico’s Cold War, 202–208; cia Station in Mexico, information cable, “Mexican Military Alert for Possible Cuban Infiltration of Arms Destined for Student Use,” 30 Aug. 1968, National Security Archive, available at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB99/Doc64.pdf (accessed February 5, 2025); White House, memorandum, “Mexico Riots,” 14 Oct. 1968, National Security Archive, available at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB99/Doc104.pdf (accessed February 5, 2025).
cia, The President’s Daily Brief, 29 July 1968; United States Embassy in Mexico, secret telegram, “Communist Role in Student Protests,” 30 July 1968, National Security Archive, available at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB99/Doc5.pdf (accessed February 5, 2025); Keller, Mexico’s Cold War, 202–208; Mehmet Koca, “The Cuban Revolution and its Reflection to the Turkish Press: The Case of Milliyet Newspaper,” Birey Ve Toplum Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, I (2020), 43–66.
White House, memorandum, “Mexico Riots.”
cia, The President’s Daily Brief, 8 Aug 1968; 9 Aug. 1968; 29 Aug. 1968; Krauze, Mexico: Biography of Power, 694–696; Vargas Valdez, “Student Movement of 1968,” 1379; United States Embassy in Mexico, secret telegram, “Civil Disorder—Student Activities,” 30 Aug. 1968, National Security Archive, available at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB99/Doc12.pdf (accessed February 5, 2025).
cia, The President’s Daily Brief, 10 Sept. 1968; 23 Sept. 1968; 24 Sept. 1968; United States Embassy in Mexico, secret telegram, “Mexican Government Continues Crack Down,” 26 Sept. 1968, National Security Archive, available at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB99/Doc16.pdf (accessed February 5, 2025).
Krauze, Mexico: Biography of Power, 694–696; Vargas Valdez, “Student Movement of 1968,” 1379.
Morley, Our Man in Mexico, 268–271; cia Station in Mexico, confidential cable, 3 Oct. 1968, available at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB99/Doc74.pdf (accessed February 5, 2025); Keller, Mexico’s Cold War, 210–218.
cia, The President’s Daily Brief, 5 Oct. 1968; Keller, Mexico’s Cold War, 6.
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, confidential working draft, “Student Violence and Attitudes in Latin America,” 15 Nov. 1968, available https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB99/Doc43.pdf (accessed February 5, 2025); Aguayo, Mexico 68, chap. 10; Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History, s.v. “The Mexican Student Movement of 1968,” by Eugenia Allier-Montaño, available at https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.013.828 (accessed February 5, 2025).
The cia’s Reading Room for the President’s Daily Brief can be consulted at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/presidents-daily-brief. The following pdbs were included in the database. For 1961: 22 Sept., 24 Nov.; for 1962: 9 Mar., 4 May, 22 May, 24 May, 8 June, 10 Aug., 8 Sept., 11 Sept., 3 Nov., 5 Nov., 19 Dec.; for 1963: 6 Feb., 28 Feb., 29 Mar., 17 May, 22 May, 13 Sept., 23 Sept., 17 Oct., 4 Nov., 11 Nov., 15 Nov., 25 Nov., 9 Dec.; for 1964: 8 Jan., 14 Jan., 23 Jan., 25 Jan., 9 Mar., 23 Mar., 28 Mar., 9 Apr., 1 May, 18 May, 19 May, 23 June, 24 June, two on 4 July, 9 July, 2 Oct., 16 Oct., 14 Nov.; for 1965: 15 Feb., 14 Apr.; for 1966: 24 Sept., 27 Sept., 14 Oct.; for 1967: 24 Jan., 30 Jan., 19 May, 23 June, 7 July, 21 July; for 1968: 1 Feb., 3 July, 29 July, 31 July, 1 Aug., 2 Aug., 8 Aug., 9 Aug., 15 Aug., 22 Aug., 29 Aug., 31 Aug., 3 Sept., 9 Sept., 10 Sept., 13 Sept., 14 Sept., 20 Sept., 23 Sept., 24 Sept., 26 Sept., 27 Sept., 1 Oct., 3 Oct., 4 Oct., 5 Oct., 8 Oct., 10 Oct., 11 Oct., 31 Oct., 7 Nov., 21 Nov., 30 Nov., 3 Dec., 12 Dec., 17 Dec.; for 1969: 4 Jan., 17 Jan., 26 Feb., 7 Oct., 24 Oct.; for 1970: 4 June, two on 2 Dec.; for 1971: 18 Mar., 19 Mar., 26 Mar.; for 1972: 30 Sept.; for 1973: 5 May, 7 May, 8 May, 13 June, 30 June, 19 Nov.; for 1974: 9 Feb., 21 Feb., 11 July, 21 Aug., 16 Oct., 18 Oct., 4 Nov., 27 Nov., 29 Nov., 19 Dec.; for 1975: 3 Jan., 6 Jan., 9 Jan., 20 Jan., 23 Jan., 30 Jan., 24 Feb., 27 Feb., 15 Mar., 30 Aug., 15 Nov., 31 Dec.; for 1976: 3 Feb., 10 Mar., 26 Apr., 5 May, 3 July, 1 Sept., 2 Sept., 29 Oct., 23 Nov., 29 Nov., 2 Dec., 4 Dec., 7 Dec.
Lowenthal, Intelligence, 347–431.
The coding process utilized a detailed codebook of intelligence agenda issues. Strategic rivalries included likely areas of expansion by rivals or proxies, identifying key regions or sectors where influence could be extended. This category also captured likely allies or surrogates of rivals and assessed the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. adversaries. Governance and governability encompassed issues such as internal stability, public support for policies, the role of security forces in suppressing dissent, and the nature and strength of internal dissent. Leadership was also evaluated through factors like the health of key figures, cabinet changes, and domestic and international policy preferences. The economy category focused on the size and output of the economy, oil as a critical resource, trade activities, and macroeconomic policies. Lastly, transnational issues examined migration patterns, narcotics production and trafficking, and specific environmental concerns such as salinity, which affected economic and agricultural viability.
cia, The President’s Daily Brief, 22 May 1962; 8 Sept. 1962.
cia, The President’s Daily Brief, 9 Feb. 1974; 23 Jan. 1975; 23 June 1975; 15 Nov. 1975; 10 Mar. 1976.
Morley, Our Man in Mexico, 90–94; Keller, Mexico’s Cold War, 50–86; Pettinà, “From Bilateralism to Globalism,” 89; Loaeza and Rocha, “A La Sombra,” 297–307.