The speeding-up of neural processing associated with attended events (i.e., the prior-entry effect) has long been proposed as a viable mechanism by which attention can prioritize our perception and action. In the brain, this has been thought to be regulated through a sensory gating mechanism, increasing the amplitudes of early evoked potentials while leaving their latencies unaffected. However, the majority of previous research has emphasized speeded responding and has failed to emphasize fine temporal discrimination, thereby potentially lacking the sensitivity to reveal putative modulations in the timing of neural processing. In the present study, we used a cross-modal temporal order judgment task while shifting attention between the visual and tactile modalities to investigate the mechanisms underlying selective attention electrophysiologically. Our results indicate that attention can indeed speed up neural processes during visual perception, thereby providing the first electrophysiological support for the existence of prior entry.

Extensive clinical and imaging research has characterized the neural networks mediating the adaptive distribution of spatial attention. In everyday behavior, the distribution of attention is guided not only by extrapersonal targets but also by mental representations of their spatial layout. We used eventrelated functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify the neural system involved in directing attention to locations in arrays held as mental representations, and to compare it with the system for directing spatial attention to locations in the external world. We found that these two crucial aspects of spatial cognition are subserved by extensively overlapping networks. However, we also found that a region of right parietal cortex selectively participated in orienting attention to the extrapersonal space, whereas several frontal lobe regions selectively participated in orienting attention within on-line mental representations.

Despite the intuition that we can shift cognitive set on instruction, some behavioral studies have suggested that set shifting might only be accomplished once we engage in performance of the new task. It is possible that set switching consists of more than one component cognitive process and that the component processes might segregated in time. We recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) during two set-switching tasks to test whether different component processes were responsible for (i) set initiation and reconfiguration when presented with the instruction to switch, and (ii) the implementation of the new set once subjects engaged in performing the new task. The response switching (RS) task required shifts of intentional set; subjects selected between responses according to one of two conflicting intentional sets. The results demonstrated the existence of more than one constituent process. Some of the processes were linked to the initiation and reconfiguration of the set prior to actual performance of the new task. Other processes were time locked to performance of new task items. Set initiation started with modulation of medial frontal ERPs and was followed by modulation over parietal electrodes. Implementation of intentional set was associated with modulation of response-related ERPs.

The meaning of a sentence differs from the sum of the meanings of its constituents. Left anterior temporal cortex responds to sentences more strongly than to unconnected words. We hypothesized that the anterior temporal response to sentences is due to this difference in meaning (compositional semantics). Using positron emission tomography (PET), we studied four experimental conditions (2 × 2 factorial design): In one condition, subjects read normal sentences. In a second condition, they read grammatically correct sentences containing numerous semantic violations (semantically random sentences). In a third condition, we scrambled the word order within the normal sentences, and, in a fourth condition, the word order was scrambled within the semantically random sentences. The left anterior temporal pole responded strongly to sentences compared to scrambled versions of sentences. A similar although weaker response occurred in the left anterior superior temporal sulcus and the left posterior middle temporal gyrus. A subset of voxels within the left anterior temporal pole responded more to semantically random sentences and their scrambled versions than to normal sentences and the corresponding scrambled versions (main effect of semantic randomness). Finally, the grammatical and the semantic factor interacted in a subset of voxels within the anterior temporal pole: Activity was higher when subjects read normal sentences compared to their scrambled versions but not for semantically random sentences compared to their corresponding scrambled versions. The effects of grammar and meaning and, most importantly, the interaction between grammatical and semantic factors are compatible with the hypothesis that the left anterior temporal pole contributes to the composition of sentence meaning.