Scene-selective regions of the human brain form allocentric representations of locations in our environment. These representations are independent of heading direction and allow us to know where we are regardless of our direction of travel. However, we know little about how these location-based representations are formed. Using fMRI representational similarity analysis and linear mixed models, we tracked the emergence of location-based representations in scene-selective brain regions. We estimated patterns of activity for two distinct scenes, taken before and after participants learnt they were from the same location. During a learning phase, we presented participants with two types of panoramic videos: (1) an overlap video condition displaying two distinct scenes (0° and 180°) from the same location and (2) a no-overlap video displaying two distinct scenes from different locations (which served as a control condition). In the parahippocampal cortex (PHC) and retrosplenial cortex (RSC), representations of scenes from the same location became more similar to each other only after they had been shown in the overlap condition, suggesting the emergence of viewpoint-independent location-based representations. Whereas these representations emerged in the PHC regardless of task performance, RSC representations only emerged for locations where participants could behaviorally identify the two scenes as belonging to the same location. The results suggest that we can track the emergence of location-based representations in the PHC and RSC in a single fMRI experiment. Further, they support computational models that propose the RSC plays a key role in transforming viewpoint-independent representations into behaviorally relevant representations of specific viewpoints.

Hippocampal–medial prefrontal interactions are thought to play a crucial role in mental simulation. Notably, the frontal midline/medial pFC (mPFC) theta rhythm in humans has been linked to introspective thought and working memory. In parallel, theta rhythms have been proposed to coordinate processing in the medial temporal cortex, retrosplenial cortex (RSc), and parietal cortex during the movement of viewpoint in imagery, extending their association with physical movement in rodent models. Here, we used noninvasive whole-head MEG to investigate theta oscillatory power and phase-locking during the 18-sec postencoding delay period of a spatial working memory task, in which participants imagined previously learned object sequences either on a blank background (object maintenance), from a first-person viewpoint in a scene (static imagery), or moving along a path past the objects (dynamic imagery). We found increases in 4- to 7-Hz theta power in mPFC when comparing the delay period with a preencoding baseline. We then examined whether the mPFC theta rhythm was phase-coupled with ongoing theta oscillations elsewhere in the brain. The same mPFC region showed significantly higher theta phase coupling with the posterior medial temporal lobe/RSc for dynamic imagery versus either object maintenance or static imagery. mPFC theta phase coupling was not observed with any other brain region. These results implicate oscillatory coupling between mPFC and medial temporal lobe/RSc theta rhythms in the dynamic mental exploration of imagined scenes.

The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is consistently implicated in the network supporting autobiographical memory. Whereas more posterior regions in this network have been related to specific processes, such as the generation of visuospatial imagery or the association of items and contexts, the functional contribution of the mPFC remains unclear. However, the involvement of mPFC in estimation of value during decision-making suggests that it might play a similar role in memory. We investigated whether mPFC activity reflects the subjective value of elements in imagined scenarios. Participants in an MRI scanner imagined scenarios comprising a spatial context, a physiological state of need (e.g., thirst), and two items that could be congruent (e.g., drink) or incongruent (e.g., food) with the state of need. Memory for the scenarios was tested outside the scanner. Our manipulation of subjective value by imagined need was verified by increased subjective ratings of value for congruent items and improved subsequent memory for them. Consistent with our hypothesis, fMRI signal in mPFC reflected the modulation of an item's subjective value by the imagined physiological state, suggesting the mPFC selectively tracked subjective value within our imagination paradigm. Further analyses showed uncorrected effects in non-mPFC regions, including increased activity in the insula when imagining states of need, the caudate nucleus when imagining congruent items, and the anterior hippocampus/amygdala when imagining subsequently remembered items. We therefore provide evidence that the mPFC plays a role in constructing the subjective value of the components of imagined scenarios and thus potentially in reconstructing the value of components of autobiographical recollection.

Stimulus repetition often leads to facilitated processing, resulting in neural decreases (repetition suppression) and faster RTs (repetition priming). Such repetition-related effects have been attributed to the facilitation of repeated cognitive processes and/or the retrieval of previously encoded stimulus–response (S-R) bindings. Although previous research has dissociated these two forms of learning, their interaction in the brain is not fully understood. Utilizing the spatial and temporal resolutions of fMRI and EEG, respectively, we examined a long-lag classification priming paradigm that required response repetitions or reversals at multiple levels of response representation. We found a repetition effect in occipital/temporal cortex (fMRI) that was time-locked to stimulus onset (EEG) and robust to switches in response, together with a repetition effect in inferior pFC (fMRI) that was time-locked to response onset (EEG) and sensitive to switches in response. The response-sensitive effect occurred even when changing from object names (words) to object pictures between repetitions, suggesting that S-R bindings can code abstract representations of stimuli. Most importantly, we found evidence for interference effects when incongruent S-R bindings were retrieved, with increased neural activity in inferior pFC, demonstrating that retrieval of S-R bindings can result in facilitation or interference, depending on the congruency of response between repetitions.