Timing emerges from a hierarchy of computations ranging from early encoding of physical duration (time sensation) to abstract time representations (time perception) suitable for storage and decisional processes. However, the neural basis of the perceptual experience of time remains elusive. To address this, we dissociate brain activity uniquely related to lower-level sensory and higher-order perceptual timing operations, using event-related fMRI. Participants compared subsecond (500 msec) sinusoidal gratings drifting with constant velocity (standard) against two probe stimuli: (1) control gratings drifting at constant velocity or (2) accelerating gratings, which induced illusory shortening of time. We tested two probe intervals: a 500-msec duration (Short) and a longer duration required for an accelerating probe to be perceived as long as the standard (Long—individually determined). On each trial, participants classified the probe as shorter or longer than the standard. This allowed for comparison of trials with an “Objective” (physical) or “Subjective” (perceived) difference in duration, based on participant classifications. Objective duration revealed responses in bilateral early extrastriate areas, extending to higher visual areas in the fusiform gyrus (at more lenient thresholds). By contrast, Subjective duration was reflected by distributed responses in a cortical/subcortical areas. This comprised the left superior frontal gyrus and the left cerebellum, and a wider set of common timing areas including the BG, parietal cortex, and posterior cingulate cortex. These results suggest two functionally independent timing stages: early extraction of duration information in sensory cortices and Subjective experience of duration in a higher-order cortical–subcortical timing areas.

The temporal preparation of motor responses to external events (temporal preparation) relies on internal representations of the accumulated elapsed time (temporal representations) before an event occurs and on estimates about its most likely time of occurrence (temporal expectations). The precision (inverse of uncertainty) of temporal preparation, however, is limited by two sources of uncertainty. One is intrinsic to the nervous system and scales with the length of elapsed time such that temporal representations are least precise for longest time durations. The other is external and arises from temporal variability of events in the outside world. The precision of temporal expectations thus decreases if events become more variable in time. It has long been recognized that the processing of time durations within the range of hundreds of milliseconds (interval timing) strongly depends on dopaminergic (DA) transmission. The role of DA for the precision of temporal preparation in humans, however, remains unclear. This study therefore directly assesses the role of DA in the precision of temporal preparation of motor responses in healthy humans. In a placebo-controlled double-blind design using a selective D2-receptor antagonist (sulpiride) and D1/D2 receptor antagonist (haloperidol), participants performed a variable foreperiod reaching task, under different conditions of internal and external temporal uncertainty. DA blockade produced a striking impairment in the ability of extracting temporal expectations across trials and on the precision of temporal representations within a trial. Large Weber fractions for interval timing, estimated by fitting subjective hazard functions, confirmed that this effect was driven by an increased uncertainty in the way participants were experiencing time. This provides novel evidence that DA regulates the precision with which we process time when preparing for an action.