Behavioral choice can be characterized along two axes. One axis distinguishes reflexive, model-free systems that slowly accumulate values through experience and a model-based system that uses knowledge to reason prospectively. The second axis distinguishes Pavlovian valuation of stimuli from instrumental valuation of actions or stimulus–action pairs. This results in four values and many possible interactions between them, with important consequences for accounts of individual variation. We here explored whether individual variation along one axis was related to individual variation along the other. Specifically, we asked whether individuals' balance between model-based and model-free learning was related to their tendency to show Pavlovian interferences with instrumental decisions. In two independent samples with a total of 243 participants, Pavlovian–instrumental transfer effects were negatively correlated with the strength of model-based reasoning in a two-step task. This suggests a potential common underlying substrate predisposing individuals to both have strong Pavlovian interference and be less model-based and provides a framework within which to interpret the observation of both effects in addiction.

It has been suggested that the target areas of dopaminergic midbrain neurons, the dorsal (DS) and ventral striatum (VS), are differently involved in reinforcement learning especially as actor and critic. Whereas the critic learns to predict rewards, the actor maintains action values to guide future decisions. The different midbrain connections to the DS and the VS seem to play a critical role in this functional distinction. Here, subjects performed a dynamic, reward-based decision-making task during fMRI acquisition. A computational model of reinforcement learning was used to estimate the different effects of positive and negative reinforcements on future decisions for each subject individually. We found that activity in both the DS and the VS correlated with reward prediction errors. Using functional connectivity, we show that the DS and the VS are differentially connected to different midbrain regions (possibly corresponding to the substantia nigra [SN] and the ventral tegmental area [VTA], respectively). However, only functional connectivity between the DS and the putative SN predicted the impact of different reinforcement types on future behavior. These results suggest that connections between the putative SN and the DS are critical for modulating action values in the DS according to both positive and negative reinforcements to guide future decision making.