Detecting the presence of an object is a different process than identifying the object as a particular object. This difference has not been taken into account in designing experiments on the neural correlates of consciousness. We compared the electrophysiological correlates of conscious detection and identification directly by measuring ERPs while participants performed either a task only requiring the conscious detection of the stimulus or a higher-level task requiring its conscious identification. Behavioral results showed that, even if the stimulus was consciously detected, it was not necessarily identified. A posterior electrophysiological signature 200–300 msec after stimulus onset was sensitive for conscious detection but not for conscious identification, which correlated with a later widespread activity. Thus, we found behavioral and neural evidence for elementary visual experiences, which are not yet enriched with higher-level knowledge. The search for the mechanisms of consciousness should focus on the early elementary phenomenal experiences to avoid the confounding effects of higher-level processes.

Humans are rapid in categorizing natural scenes. Electrophysiological recordings reveal that scenes containing animals can be categorized within 150 msec, which has been interpreted to indicate that feedforward flow of information from V1 to higher visual areas is sufficient for visual categorization. However, recent studies suggest that recurrent interactions between higher and lower levels in the visual hierarchy may also be involved in categorization. To clarify the role of recurrent processing in scene categorization, we recorded EEG and manipulated recurrent processing with object substitution masking while the participants performed a go/no-go animal/nonanimal categorization task. The quality of visual awareness was measured with a perceptual awareness scale after each trial. Masking reduced the clarity of perceptual awareness, slowed down categorization speed for scenes that were not clearly perceived, and reduced the electrophysiological difference elicited by animal and nonanimal scenes after 150 msec. The results imply that recurrent processes enhance the resolution of conscious representations and thus support categorization of stimuli that are difficult to categorize on the basis of the coarse feedforward representations alone.

Chromatic information is processed by the visual system both at an unconscious level and at a level that results in conscious perception of color. It remains unclear whether both conscious and unconscious processing of chromatic information depend on activity in the early visual cortex or whether unconscious chromatic processing can also rely on other neural mechanisms. In this study, the contribution of early visual cortex activity to conscious and unconscious chromatic processing was studied using single-pulse TMS in three time windows 40–100 msec after stimulus onset in three conditions: conscious color recognition, forced-choice discrimination of consciously invisible color, and unconscious color priming. We found that conscious perception and both measures of unconscious processing of chromatic information depended on activity in early visual cortex 70–100 msec after stimulus presentation. Unconscious forced-choice discrimination was above chance only when participants reported perceiving some stimulus features (but not color).

Patients suffering from Alzheimer's disease (AD) have severe difficulties in tasks requiring the use of semantic knowledge. The semantic deficits associated with AD have been extensively studied by using behavioral methods. Many of these studies indicate that AD patients have a general deficit in voluntary access to semantic representations but that the structure of the representations themselves might be preserved. However, several studies also provide evidence that to some extent semantic representations in AD may in fact be degraded. Recently, a few studies have utilized event-related brain potentials (ERPs) that are sensitive to semantic factors in order to investigate the electrophysiological correlates of the semantic impairment in AD. Interest has focused on the N400 component, which is known to reºect the on-line semantic processing of linguistic and pictorial stimuli. The results from studies of N400 changes in AD remain somewhat controversial: Some studies report normal or enlarged N400 components in AD, whereas others report diminished ones. One issue not reported in previous studies is whether word-elicited ERPs other than N400 remain normal in AD. In the present study our aim was to find out whether the ERP waveforms N1, P2, N400, and Late Positive Component (LPC) to semantically congruous and incongruous spoken words are abnormal in AD and whether such abnormalities specifically reºect deficiencies in semantic activation in AD. Auditory ERPs from 20 scalp sites to semantically congruous and incongruous final words in spoken sentences were recorded from 17 healthy elderly adults and 9 AD patients. The early ERP waveforms N1 and P2 were relatively normal for the AD patients, but the N400 and LPC effects (amplitude difference between congruous and incongruous conditions) were significantly reduced. We interpret the present results as showing that semantic-conceptual activation and other high-level integration processes are defective in AD. However, a word congruity effect earlier than N400 (phonological mismatch negativity), reflecting lexical selection processes, is at least to some extent preserved in AD.