Sometime in the past two decades, neuroimaging and behavioral research converged on pFC as an important locus of cognitive control and decision-making, and that seems to be the last thing anyone has agreed on since. Every year sees an increase in the number of roles and functions attributed to distinct subregions within pFC, roles that may explain behavior and neural activity in one context but might fail to generalize across the many behaviors in which each region is implicated. Emblematic of this ongoing proliferation of functions is dorsal ACC (dACC). Novel tasks that activate dACC are followed by novel interpretations of dACC function, and each new interpretation adds to the number of functionally specific processes contained within the region. This state of affairs, a recurrent and persistent behavior followed by an illusory and transient relief, can be likened to behavioral pathology. In Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience , 29:10 we collect contributed articles that seek to move the conversation beyond specific functions of subregions of pFC, focusing instead on general roles that support pFC involvement in a wide variety of behaviors and across a variety of experimental paradigms.

Knowing whether core reward regions carry information about the positions of relevant objects is crucial for adjudicating between choice models. One limitation of previous studies, including our own, is that spatial positions can be consistently differentially associated with rewards, and thus position can be confounded with attention, motor plans, or target identity. We circumvented these problems by using a task in which value—and thus choices—was determined solely by a frequently changing rule, which was randomized relative to spatial position on each trial. We presented offers asynchronously, which allowed us to control for reward expectation, spatial attention, and motor plans in our analyses. We find robust encoding of the spatial position of both offers and choices in two core reward regions, orbitofrontal Area 13 and ventral striatum, as well as in dorsal striatum of macaques. The trial-by-trial correlation in noise in encoding of position was associated with variation in choice, an effect known as choice probability correlation, suggesting that the spatial encoding is associated with choice and is not incidental to it. Spatial information and reward information are not carried by separate sets of neurons, although the two forms of information are temporally dissociable. These results highlight the ubiquity of multiplexed information in association cortex and argue against the idea that these ostensible reward regions serve as part of a pure value domain.

Executive control refers to the regulation of cognition and behavior by mental processes and is a hallmark of higher cognition. Most approaches to understanding its mechanisms begin with the assumption that our brains have anatomically segregated and functionally specialized control modules. The modular approach is intuitive: Control is conceptually distinct from basic mental processing, so an organization that reifies that distinction makes sense. An alternative approach sees executive control as self-organizing principles of a distributed organization. In distributed systems, control and controlled processes are colocalized within large numbers of dispersed computational agents. Control then is often an emergent consequence of simple rules governing the interaction between agents. Because these systems are unfamiliar and unintuitive, here we review several well-understood examples of distributed control systems, group living insects and social animals, and emphasize their parallels with neural systems. We then reexamine the cognitive neuroscience literature on executive control for evidence that its neural control systems may be distributed.

Flexible decision-making, a defining feature of human cognition, is typically thought of as a canonical pFC function. Recent work suggests that the striatum may participate as well; however, its role in this process is not well understood. We recorded activity of neurons in both the ventral (VS) and dorsal (DS) striatum while rhesus macaques performed a version of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, a classic test of flexibility. Our version of the task involved a trial-and-error phase before monkeys could identify the correct rule on each block. We observed changes in firing rate in both regions when monkeys switched rules. Specifically, VS neurons demonstrated switch-related activity early in the trial-and-error period when the rule needed to be updated, and a portion of these neurons signaled information about the switch context (i.e., whether the switch was intradimensional or extradimensional). Neurons in both VS and DS demonstrated switch-related activity at the end of the trial-and-error period, immediately before the rule was fully established and maintained, but these signals did not carry any information about switch context. We also observed associative learning signals (i.e., specific responses to options associated with rewards in the presentation period before choice) that followed the same pattern as switch signals (early in VS, later in DS). Taken together, these results endorse the idea that the striatum participates directly in cognitive set reconfiguration and suggest that single neurons in the striatum may contribute to a functional handoff from the VS to the DS during reconfiguration processes.