Cognitive neuroscience exploring the architecture of semantics has shown that coherent supramodal concepts are computed in the anterior temporal lobes (ATL), but it is unknown how/where modular information implemented by posterior cortices (word/object/face forms) is conveyed to the ATL hub. We investigated the semantic module-hub network in healthy adults ( n = 19) and in semantic dementia patients ( n = 28) by combining semantic assessments of verbal and nonverbal stimuli and MRI-based fiber tracking using seeds in three module-related cortices implementing (i) written word forms (visual word form area), (ii) abstract lexical representations (posterior–superior temporal cortices), and (iii) face/object representations (face form area). Fiber tracking revealed three key tracts linking the ATL with the three module-related cortices. Correlation analyses between tract parameters and semantic scores indicated that the three tracts subserve semantics, transferring modular verbal or nonverbal object/face information to the left and right ATL, respectively. The module-hub tracts were functionally and microstructurally damaged in semantic dementia, whereas damage to non-module-specific ATL tracts (inferior longitudinal fasciculus, uncinate fasciculus) had more limited impact on semantic failure. These findings identify major components of the white matter module-hub network of semantics, and they corroborate/materialize claims of cognitive models positing direct links between modular and semantic representations. In combination with modular accounts of cognition, they also suggest that the currently prevailing “hub-and-spokes” model of semantics could be extended by incorporating an intermediate module level containing invariant representations, in addition to “spokes,” which subserve the processing of a near-unlimited number of sensorimotor and speech-sound features.

When a decision between alternative actions has to be made, the primate brain is able to uncouple motor execution from mental deliberation, providing time for higher cognitive processes such as remembering and reasoning. The mental deliberation leading to the decision and the motor execution applying the decision are likely to involve different neuronal circuits linking the basal ganglia and the frontal cortex. Behavioral and physiological studies in monkeys indicate that dopamine depletion may result in a loss of functional segregation between these circuits, hence, in interference between the deliberation and execution processes. To test this hypothesis in humans, we analyzed the movements of parkinsonian patients in a go/no-go task, contrasting periods of uncertainty with periods of knowledge about the rule to be applied. Two groups of patients were compared to healthy subjects: one group was treated with dopaminergic medication and the other with deep brain stimulation; both groups were also tested without any treatment. In healthy subjects, the movement time was unaffected by uncertainty. In untreated patients, the movement time increased with uncertainty, reflecting interference between deliberation and execution processes. This interference was fully corrected with dopaminergic medication but was unchanged with deep brain stimulation. Moreover, decision-related hesitations were detectable in the movements of dopamine-depleted patients, revealing a temporal coupling of deliberation and execution. We suggest that such coupling may be related to the loss of dopamine-mediated functional segregation between basal ganglia circuits processing different stages of goal-directed behavior.

Control of action occurs at different stagesof the executive process, in particular at those of sensory-motor integration and conscious monitoring. The aim of this study was to determine the implication of the prefrontal cortex in the control of action. For that purpose, we compared the performance of 15 patients with frontal lobe lesions and 15 matched controls on an experimental paradigm generating a conflict between the action planned and the sensory-motor feedback. Subjects had to trace a sagittal line witha stylus on a graphic tablet. The hand was hidden by a mirror on which the traced line, processed by a computer, was projected. Without informing the subjects, the line traced was modified by introducing a bias to the right, which increased progressively from 2° to 42°. To succeed the task, subjects had to modify their motor program and deviate their hand in the opposite direction. The sensory-motor adjustment to the bias was evaluated by the surface between the line traced and the ideal line to compensate for the deviation. The awareness of the conflict was measured by the angle of the bias at which subjects expressed the feeling that the line they traced was not the same as the line they saw. The deviation was similarly compensated for by patients and controls until24°. Then 14 controls but only3 patients were aware of a conflict. After that, the variability of performance increased significantly for the unaware patients. These results suggest that the prefrontal cortex is required at the level of conscious monitoring of actions, but not at the level of sensory-motor integration.

Dysfunction of the basal ganglia and the brain nuclei interconnected with them leads to disturbances of movement and cognition, including disordered timing of movement and perceptual timing deflcits. Patients with Parkinson's disease (PD) were studied in temporal reproduction tasks. We examined PD patients when brain dopamine (DA) transmission was impaired (OFF state) and when DA transmission was reestablished, at the time of maximal clinical beneflt following administration of levodopa + apomorphine (ON state). Patients reproduced target times of 8 and 21 sec trained in blocked trials with the peak interval procedure, which were veridical in the ON state, comparable to normative performance by healthy young and aged controls (Experiment 1). In the OFF state, temporal reproduction was impaired in both accuracy and precision (variance). The 8-sec signal was reproduced as longer and the 21-sec signal was reproduced as shorter than they actually were (Experiment 1). This fimigrationfl effect was dependent upon training of two different durations. When PD patients were trained on 21 sec only (Experiment 2), they showed a reproduction error in the long direction, opposite to the error produced under the dual training condition of Experiment 1. The results are discussed as a mutual attraction between temporal processing systems, in memory and clock stages, when dopaminergic regulation in the striatum is dysfunctional.