Modulations of sensory processing in early visual areas are thought to play an important role in conscious perception. To date, most empirical studies focused on effects occurring before or during visual presentation. By contrast, several emerging theories postulate that sensory processing and conscious visual perception may also crucially depend on late top–down influences, potentially arising after a visual display. To provide a direct test of this, we performed an fMRI study using a postcued report procedure. The ability to report a target at a specific spatial location in a visual display can be enhanced behaviorally by symbolic auditory postcues presented shortly after that display. Here we showed that such auditory postcues can enhance target-specific signals in early human visual cortex (V1 and V2). For postcues presented 200 msec after stimulus termination, this target-specific enhancement in visual cortex was specifically associated with correct conscious report. The strength of this modulation predicted individual levels of performance in behavior. By contrast, although later postcues presented 1000 msec after stimulus termination had some impact on activity in early visual cortex, this modulation no longer related to conscious report. These results demonstrate that within a critical time window of a few hundred milliseconds after a visual stimulus has disappeared, successful conscious report of that stimulus still relates to the strength of top–down modulation in early visual cortex. We suggest that, within this critical time window, sensory representation of a visual stimulus is still under construction and so can still be flexibly influenced by top–down modulatory processes.

We used concurrent TMS–fMRI to test directly for hemispheric differences in causal influences of the right or left fronto-parietal cortex on activity (BOLD signal) in the human occipital cortex. Clinical data and some behavioral TMS studies have been taken to suggest right-hemisphere specialization for top–down modulation of vision in humans, based on deficits such as spatial neglect or extinction in lesioned patients, or findings that TMS to right (vs. left) fronto-parietal structures can elicit stronger effects on visual performance. But prior to the recent advent of concurrent TMS and neuroimaging, it was not possible to directly examine the causal impact of one (stimulated) brain region upon others in humans. Here we stimulated the frontal or intraparietal cortex in the left or right hemisphere with TMS, inside an MR scanner, while measuring with fMRI any resulting BOLD signal changes in visual areas V1–V4 and V5/MT+. For both frontal and parietal stimulation, we found clear differences between effects of right- versus left-hemisphere TMS on activity in the visual cortex, with all differences significant in direct statistical comparisons. Frontal TMS over either hemisphere elicited similar BOLD decreases for central visual field representations in V1–V4, but only right frontal TMS led to BOLD increases for peripheral field representations in these regions. Hemispheric differences for effects of parietal TMS were even more marked: Right parietal TMS led to strong BOLD changes in V1–V4 and V5/MT+, but left parietal TMS did not. These data directly confirm that the human frontal and parietal cortex show right-hemisphere specialization for causal influences on the visual cortex.

The possible impact upon human visual cortex from saccades to remembered target locations was investigated using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). A specific location in the upper-right or upper-left visual quadrant served as the saccadic target. After a delay of 2400 msec, an auditory signal indicated whether to execute a saccade to that location (go trial) or to cancel the saccade and remain centrally fixated (no-go). Group fMRI analysis revealed activation specific to the remembered target location for executed saccades, in the contralateral lingual gyrus. No-go trials produced similar, albeit significantly reduced, effects. Individual retinotopic mapping confirmed that on go trials, quadrant-specific activations arose in those parts of ventral V1, V2, and V3 that coded the target location for the saccade, whereas on no-go trials, only the corresponding parts of V2 and V3 were significantly activated. These results indicate that a spatial–motor saccadic task (i.e., making an eye movement to a remembered location) is sufficient to activate retinotopic visual cortex spatially corresponding to the target location, and that this activation is also present (though reduced) when no saccade is executed. We discuss the implications of finding that saccades to remembered locations can affect early visual cortex, not just those structures conventionally associated with eye movements, in relation to recent ideas about attention, spatial working memory, and the notion that recently activated representations can be “refreshed” when needed.

Attending to the location of an expected visual target can lead to anticipatory activations in spatiotopic occipital cortex, emerging before target onset. But less is known about how the brain may prepare for a distractor at a known location remote from the target. In a psychophysical experiment, we found that trial-to-trial advance knowledge about the presence of a distractor in the target-opposite hemifield significantly reduced its behavioral cost. In a subsequent functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment with similar task and stimuli, we found anticipatory activations in the occipital cortex contralateral to the expected distractor, but no additional target modulation, when participants were given advance information about a distractor's subsequent presence and location. Several attention-related control structures (frontal eye fields and superior parietal cortex) were active during attentional preparation for all trials, whereas the left superior prefrontal and right angular gyri were additionally activated when a distractor was anticipated. The right temporoparietal junction showed stronger functional coupling with occipital regions during preparation for trials with an isolated target than for trials with a distractor expected. These results show that anticipation of a visual distractor at a known location, remote from the target, can lead to (1) a reduction in the behavioral cost of that distractor, (2) preparatory modulation of the occipital cortex contralateral to the location of the expected distractor, and (3) anticipatory activation of distinct parietal and frontal brain structures. These findings indicate that specific components of preparatory visual attention may be devoted to minimizing the impact of distractors, not just to enhancements of target processing.

Deductive reasoning is fundamental to science, human culture, and the solution of problems in daily life. It starts with premises and yields a logically necessary conclusion that is not explicit in the premises. Here we investigated the neurocognitive processes underlying logical thinking with event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging. We specifically focused on three temporally separable phases: (1) the premise processing phase, (2) the premise integration phase, and (3) the validation phase in which reasoners decide whether a conclusion logically follows from the premises. We found distinct patterns of cortical activity during these phases, with initial temporo-occipital activation shifting to the prefrontal cortex and then to the parietal cortex during the reasoning process. Activity in these latter regions was specific to reasoning, as it was significantly decreased during matched working memory problems with identical premises and equal working memory load.

The goal of this study was to investigate the neurocognitive processes of mental imagery in deductive reasoning. Behavioral studies yielded four sorts of verbal relations: (1) visuospatial relations that are easy to envisage both visually and spatially; (2) visual relations that are easy to envisage visually but hard to envisage spatially; (3) spatial relations that are hard to envisage visually but easy to envisage spatially; and (4) control relations that are hard to envisage both visually and spatially. In three experiments, visual relations slowed the process of reasoning in comparison with control relations, whereas visuospatial and spatial relations yielded inferences comparable to those of control relations. An experiment using functional magnetic resonance imaging showed that in the absence of any correlated visual input (problems were presented acoustically via headphones), all types of reasoning problems evoked activity in the left middle temporal gyrus, in the right superior parietal cortex, and bilaterally in the precuneus. In the prefrontal cortex, increased activity was found in the middle and inferior frontal gyri. However, only the problems based on visual relations also activated areas of the visual association cortex corresponding to V2. The results indicate that cortical activity during reasoning depends on the nature of verbal relations. All relations elicit mental models that underlie reasoning, but visual relations in addition elicit visual images. This account resolves inconsistencies in the previous literature.