The differences between erroneous actions that are consciously perceived as errors and those that go unnoticed have recently become an issue in the field of performance monitoring. In EEG studies, error awareness has been suggested to influence the error positivity (Pe) of the response-locked event-related brain potential, a positive voltage deflection prominent approximately 300 msec after error commission, whereas the preceding error-related negativity (ERN) seemed to be unaffected by error awareness. Erroneous actions, in general, have been shown to promote several changes in ongoing autonomic nervous system (ANS) activity, yet such investigations have only rarely taken into account the question of subjective error awareness. In the first part of this study, heart rate, pupillometry, and EEG were recorded during an antisaccade task to measure autonomic arousal and activity of the CNS separately for perceived and unperceived errors. Contrary to our expectations, we observed differences in both Pe and ERN with respect to subjective error awareness. This was replicated in a second experiment, using a modified version of the same task. In line with our predictions, only perceived errors provoke the previously established post-error heart rate deceleration. Also, pupil size yields a more prominent dilatory effect after an erroneous saccade, which is also significantly larger for perceived than unperceived errors. On the basis of the ERP and ANS results as well as brain–behavior correlations, we suggest a novel interpretation of the implementation and emergence of error awareness in the brain. In our framework, several systems generate input signals (e.g., ERN, sensory input, proprioception) that influence the emergence of error awareness, which is then accumulated and presumably reflected in later potentials, such as the Pe.

Humans display a remarkable capacity to use tools instead of their biological effectors. Yet, little is known about the mechanisms that support these behaviors. Here, participants learned to grasp objects, appearing in a variety of orientations, with a novel, handheld mechanical tool. Following training, psychophysical functions relating grip preferences (i.e., pronated vs. supinated) to stimulus orientations indicate a reliance on distinct, effector-specific internal representations when planning grasping actions on the basis of the tool versus the hands. Accompanying fMRI data show that grip planning in both hand and tool conditions was associated with similar increases in activity within the same regions of the anterior intraparietal and caudal ventral premotor cortices, a putative homologue of the macaque anterior intraparietal–ventral premotor (area F5) “grasp circuit.” These findings suggest that tool use is supported by effector-specific representations of grasping with the tool that are functionally independent of previously existing representations of the hand and yet occur within the same parieto-frontal regions involved in manual prehension. These levels of representation are critical for accurate planning and execution of actions in a manner that is sensitive to the respective properties of these effectors. These effector-specific representations likely coexist with effector-independent representations. The latter were recently reported in macaque F5 [Umiltà, M. A., Escola, L., Intskirveli, I., Grammont, F., Rochat, M., Caruana, F., et al. When pliers become fingers in the monkey motor system. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A., 105, 2209–2213, 2008] and appear to be established by tool use training through modification of existing representations of grasping with the hand. These more abstract levels of representation may facilitate the transfer of skills between hand and tool.