The core network refers to a set of neural regions that have been consistently associated with episodic memory retrieval and episodic future simulation. This network is thought to support the constructive thought processes that allow the retrieval and flexible combination of stored information to reconstruct past and construct novel future experiences. Recent behavioral research points to an overlap between these constructive processes and those also engaged during divergent thinking—the ability to think creatively and generate novel ideas—but the extent to which they involve common neural correlates remains unclear. Using fMRI, we sought to address this question by assessing brain activity as participants recalled past experiences, simulated future experiences, or engaged in divergent thinking. Consistent with past work, we found that episodic retrieval and future simulation activated the core network compared with a semantic control condition. Critically, a triple conjunction of episodic retrieval, future simulation, and divergent thinking revealed common engagement of core network regions, including the bilateral hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus, as well as other regions involved in memory retrieval (inferior frontal gyrus) and mental imagery (middle occipital gyrus). The results provide further insight into the roles of the hippocampus and the core network in episodic memory retrieval, future simulation, and divergent thinking and extend recent work highlighting the involvement of constructive episodic processes in creative cognition.

To engage in purposeful behavior, it is important to make plans, which organize subsequent actions. Most studies of planning involve “look-ahead” puzzle tasks that are unrelated to personal goals. We developed a task to assess autobiographical planning, which involves the formulation of personal plans in response to real-world goals, and examined autobiographical planning in 63 adults during fMRI scanning. Autobiographical planning was found to engage the default network, including medial-temporal lobe and midline structures, and executive control regions in lateral pFC and parietal cortex and caudate. To examine how specific qualitative features of autobiographical plans modulate neural activity, we performed parametric modulation analyses. Ratings of plan detail, novelty, temporal distance, ease of plan formulation, difficulty in goal completion, and confidence in goal accomplishment were used as covariates in six hierarchical linear regression models. This modeling procedure removed shared variance among the ratings, allowing us to determine the independent relationship between ratings of interest and trial-wise BOLD signal. We found that specific autobiographical planning, describing a detailed, achievable, and actionable planning process for attaining a clearly envisioned future, recruited both default and frontoparietal brain regions. In contrast, abstract autobiographical planning, plans that were constructed from more generalized semantic or affective representations of a less tangible and distant future, involved interactions among default, sensory perceptual, and limbic brain structures. Specific qualities of autobiographical plans are important predictors of default and frontoparietal control network engagement during plan formation and reflect the contribution of mnemonic and executive control processes to autobiographical planning.

Human cognition is increasingly characterized as an emergent property of interactions among distributed, functionally specialized brain networks. We recently demonstrated that the antagonistic “default” and “dorsal attention” networks—subserving internally and externally directed cognition, respectively—are modulated by a third “frontoparietal control” network that flexibly couples with either network depending on task domain. However, little is known about the intrinsic functional architecture underlying this relationship. We used graph theory to analyze network properties of intrinsic functional connectivity within and between these three large-scale networks. Task-based activation from three independent studies were used to identify reliable brain regions (“nodes”) of each network. We then examined pairwise connections (“edges”) between nodes, as defined by resting-state functional connectivity MRI. Importantly, we used a novel bootstrap resampling procedure to determine the reliability of graph edges. Furthermore, we examined both full and partial correlations. As predicted, there was a higher degree of integration within each network than between networks. Critically, whereas the default and dorsal attention networks shared little positive connectivity with one another, the frontoparietal control network showed a high degree of between-network interconnectivity with each of these networks. Furthermore, we identified nodes within the frontoparietal control network of three different types—default-aligned, dorsal attention-aligned, and dual-aligned—that we propose play dissociable roles in mediating internetwork communication. The results provide evidence consistent with the idea that the frontoparietal control network plays a pivotal gate-keeping role in goal-directed cognition, mediating the dynamic balance between default and dorsal attention networks.

Neuroimaging studies of episodic memory in young adults demonstrate greater functional neural activity in ventrolateral pFC and hippocampus during retrieval of relational information as compared with item information. We tested the hypothesis that healthy older adults—individuals who exhibit behavioral declines in relational memory—would show reduced specificity of ventrolateral prefrontal and hippocampal regions during relational retrieval. At study, participants viewed two nouns and were instructed to covertly generate a sentence that related the words. At retrieval, fMRIs were acquired during item and relational memory tasks. In the relational task, participants indicated whether the two words were previously seen together. In the item task, participants indicated whether both items of a pair were previously seen. In young adults, left posterior ventrolateral pFC and bilateral hippocampal activity was modulated by the extent to which the retrieval task elicited relational processing. In older adults, activity in these regions was equivalent for item and relational memory conditions, suggesting a reduction in ventrolateral pFC and hippocampal specificity with normal aging.

Human behavioral studies demonstrate that healthy aging is often accompanied by increases in memory distortions or errors. Here we used event-related fMRI to examine the neural basis of age-related memory distortions. We used the memory conjunction error paradigm, a laboratory procedure known to elicit high levels of memory errors. For older adults, right parahippocampal gyrus showed significantly greater activity during false than during accurate retrieval. We observed no regions in which activity was greater during false than during accurate retrieval for young adults. Young adults, however, showed significantly greater activity than old adults during accurate retrieval in right hippocampus. By contrast, older adults demonstrated greater activity than young adults during accurate retrieval in right inferior and middle prefrontal cortex. These data are consistent with the notion that age-related memory conjunction errors arise from dysfunction of hippocampal system mechanisms, rather than impairments in frontally mediated monitoring processes.

Metamemory refers to knowledge and monitoring of one's own memory. Metamemory monitoring can be done prospectively with respect to subsequent memory retrieval or retrospectively with respect to previous memory retrieval. In this study, we used fMRI to compare neural activity during prospective feeling-of-knowing and retrospective confidence tasks in order to examine common and distinct mechanisms supporting multiple forms of metamemory monitoring. Both metamemory tasks, compared to non-metamemory tasks, were associated with greater activity in medial prefrontal, medial parietal, and lateral parietal regions, which have previously been implicated in internally directed cognition. Furthermore, compared to non-metamemory tasks, metamemory tasks were associated with less activity in occipital regions, and in lateral inferior frontal and dorsal medial prefrontal regions, which have previously shown involvement in visual processing and stimulus-oriented attention, respectively. Thus, neural activity related to metamemory is characterized by both a shift toward internally directed cognition and away from externally directed cognition. Several regions demonstrated differences in neural activity between feeling-of-knowing and confidence tasks, including fusiform, medial temporal lobe, and medial parietal regions; furthermore, these regions also showed interaction effects between task and the subjective metamemory rating, suggesting that they are sensitive to the information monitored in each particular task. These findings demonstrate both common and distinct neural mechanisms supporting metamemory processes and also serve to elucidate the functional roles of previously characterized brain networks.

Everyday contextual settings create associations that later afford generating predictions about what objects to expect in our environment. The cortical network that takes advantage of such contextual information is proposed to connect the representation of associated objects such that seeing one object (bed) will activate the visual representations of other objects sharing the same context (pillow). Given this proposal, we hypothesized that the cortical activity elicited by seeing a strong contextual object would predict the occurrence of false memories whereby one erroneously “remembers” having seen a new object that is related to a previously presented object. To test this hypothesis, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging during encoding of contextually related objects, and later tested recognition memory. New objects that were contextually related to previously presented objects were more often falsely judged as “old” compared with new objects that were contextually unrelated to old objects. This phenomenon was reflected by activity in the cortical network mediating contextual processing, which provides a better understanding of how the brain represents and processes context.

Young and older adults are more likely to remember emotional information than neutral information. The present functional magnetic resonance imaging study examined the neural processes supporting young (ages 18–35) and older (ages 62–79) adults' successful encoding of positive, negative, and neutral objects (e.g., a sundae, a grenade, a canoe). The results revealed general preservation of the emotional memory network across the age groups. Both groups recruited the amygdala and the orbito-frontal cortex during the successful encoding of positive and negative information. Both ages also showed valence-specific recruitment: right fusiform activity was greatest during the successful encoding of negative information, whereas left prefrontal and temporal activity was greatest during the successful encoding of positive information. These valence-specific processes are consistent with behavioral evidence that negative information is processed with perceptual detail, whereas positive information is processed at a conceptual or schematic level. The only age differences in emotional memory emerged during the successful encoding of positive items: Older adults showed more activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and along the cingulate gyrus than young adults. Because these regions often are associated with self-referential processing, these results suggest that older adults' mnemonic boost for positive information may stem from an increased tendency to process this information in relation to themselves.

Some studies have suggested that emotion primarily increases memory for “gist,” and does not enhance memory for detail. There are, however, some instances in which negative objects (e.g., snake, grenade) are remembered with more visual detail than neutral objects (e.g., barometer, blender). In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we examined the encoding processes that lead a person to remember the exact visual details of negative and neutral objects, and to remember which of two decisions were made about the objects (a size decision or an animacy decision). The enhancement in memory for a negative item's visual details appeared to result from enhanced visual processing: The right fusiform gyrus, a region known to be critical for processing exemplar-specific details, showed a greater extent and magnitude of activity during the successful encoding of negative objects. Activity in the right amygdala also corresponded with memory for visual detail, although it did not relate to memory for the task performed with the item. These data provide strong evidence that engagement of some amygdalar regions can correspond with enhanced memory for certain types of details, but does not ensure successful encoding of all contextual details.

According to the distinctiveness heuristic, subjects rely more on detailed recollections (and less on familiarity) when memory is tested for pictures relative to words, leading to reduced false recognition. If so, then neural regions that have been implicated in effortful postretrieval monitoring (e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) might be recruited less heavily when trying to remember pictures. We tested this prediction with the criterial recollection task. Subjects studied black words, paired with either the same word in red font or a corresponding colored picture. Red words were repeated at study to equate recognition hits for red words and pictures. During fMRI scanning, alternating red word memory tests and picture memory tests were given, using only white words as test stimuli (say “yes” only if you recollect a corresponding red word or picture, respectively). These tests were designed so that subjects had to rely on memory for the criterial information. Replicating prior behavioral work, we found enhanced rejection of lures on the picture test compared to the red word test, indicating that subjects had used a distinctiveness heuristic. Critically, dorsolateral prefrontal activity was reduced when rejecting familiar lures on the picture test, relative to the red word test. These findings indicate that reducing false recognition via the distinctiveness heuristic is not heavily dependent on frontally mediated postretrieval monitoring processes.

Event-related potentials (ERPs) were used to investigate the neural processes underlying the distinctiveness heuristic— a response mode in which participants expect to remember vivid details of an experience and make recognition decisions based on this metacognitive expectation. One group of participants studied pictures and auditory words; another group studied visual and auditory words. Studied and novel items were presented at test as words only, with all novel items repeating after varying lags. ERP differences were seen between the word and picture groups for both studied and novel items. For the novel items, ERP differences were largest in frontal and central midline electrodes. In separate analyses, the picture group showed the greatest ERP differences between item types in a parietally based component from 550 to 1000 msec, whereas the word group showed the greatest differences in a frontally based component from 1000 to 2000 msec. The authors suggest that the distinctiveness heuristic is a retrieval orientation that facilitates reliance upon recollection to differentiate between item types. Although the picture group can use this heuristic and its retrieval orientation on the basis of recollection, the word group must engage additional postretrieval processes to distinguish between item types, reflecting the use of a different retrieval orientation.

Misattribution refers to the act of attributing a memory or idea to an incorrect source, such as successfully remembering a bit of information but linking it to an inappropriate person or time [Jacoby, L. L., Kelley, C., Brown, J., & Jasechko, J. (1989). Becoming famous overnight: Limits on the ability to avoid unconscious influences of the past. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 326–338; Schacter, D. L. (1999). The seven sins of memory: Insights from psychology and cognitive neuroscience. American Psychologist, 54, 182–203; Schacter, D. L. (2001). The seven sins of memory: How the mind forgets and remembers. Boston: Houghton Mifflin]. Cognitive studies have suggested that misattribution errors may occur in the absence of recollection for the details of an initial encounter with a stimulus, but little is known about the neural basis of this memory phenomenon. Here we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the hypothesized role of recollection in counteracting the illusory truth effect, a misattribution error whereby perceivers systematically overrate the truth of previously presented information. Imaging was conducted during the encoding and subsequent judgment of unfamiliar statements that were presented as true or false. Event-related fMRI analyses were conditionalized as a function of subsequent performance. Results demonstrated that encoding activation in regions previously associated with successful recollection—including the hippocampus and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC)—correlated with the successful avoidance of misattribution errors, providing initial neuroimaging support for earlier cognitive accounts of misattribution.

Successful memory typically implies both objective accuracy and subjective confidence, but there are instances when confidence and accuracy diverge. This dissociation suggests that there may be distinct neural patterns of activation related to confidence and accuracy. We used event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging to study the encoding of novel face–name associations, assessed with a postscan memory test that included objective measures of accuracy and subjective measures of confidence. We showed specific neural activity in the left inferior prefrontal cortex associated with trials when subjects expressed high confidence that they had chosen the correct name for the face and made a correct identification. Moreover, we found that this region was also associated with imparting high confidence when subjects chose the incorrect name. However, medial temporal lobe regions showed activity only for high-confidence correct trials. Many functional magnetic resonance imaging studies have shown that the medial temporal lobe and left prefrontal regions are particularly important for the successful formation of memories by using a combination of subjective and objective measures. Our findings suggest that these regions may be differentially involved in the objective and subjective components of memory and that the origins of confidence–accuracy dissociations may be related to incomplete activation of the neural pattern seen in successful encoding. These findings may also aid understanding of eyewitness misidentifications and memory distortions.

Source memory research suggests that attempting to remember specific contextual aspects surrounding prior stimulus encounters results in greater left prefrontal cortex (PFC) activity than simple item-based old/new recognition judgments. Here, we tested a complementary hypothesis that predicts increases in the right PFC with tasks requiring close monitoring of item familiarity. More specifically, we compared a judgment of frequency (JOF) task to an item memory task, in which the former required estimating the number of previous picture encounters and the latter required discriminating old from new exemplars of previously seen items. In comparison to standard old/new recognition, both source memory and the JOF task examined here require more precise mnemonic judgments. However, in contrast to source memory, cognitive models suggest the JOF task relies heavily upon item familiarity, not specific contextual recollections. Event-related fMRI demonstrated greater recruitment of right, not left, dorso-lateral and frontopolar PFC regions during the JOF compared to item memory task. These data suggest a role for right PFC in the close monitoring of the familiarity of objects, which becomes critical when contextual recollection is ineffective in satisfying a memory demand.

People often falsely recognize nonstudied lures that are semantically similar to previously studied words. Behavioral research suggests that such false recognition is based on high semantic overlap between studied items and lures that yield a feeling of familiarity, whereas true recognition is more often associated with the recollection of details. Despite this behavioral evidence for differences between true and false recognition, research measuring brain activity (PET, fMRI, ERP) has not clearly differentiated corresponding differences in brain activity. A median split was used to separate subjects into Good and Poor performers based on their discrimination of studied targets from similar lures. Only Good performers showed late (1000-1500 msec), right frontal event-related brain potentials (ERPs) that were more positive for targets and lures compared with new items. The right frontal differences are interpreted as reflecting postretrieval evaluation processes that were more likely to be engaged by Good than Poor performers. Both Good and Poor performers showed a parietal ERP old/new effect (400-800 msec), but only Poor performers showed a parietal old/lure difference. These results are consistent with the view that the parietal and frontal ERP old/new effects reflect dissociable processes related to recollection.

Human memory consists of multiple forms, including priming and explicit memory. Although considerable evidence indicates that priming and explicit memory are functionally and neuroanatomically distinct, little is know about when and how these different forms of memory interact. Here, behavioral and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) methods were used to examine a novel and counterintuitive hypothesis: Priming during episodic encoding may be negatively associated with subsequent explicit memory. Using an experimental design that exploited known properties of spacing or lag effects, the magnitudes of behavioral and neural priming during a second study episode were varied and the relation between these magnitudes of priming during re-encoding and performance on a subsequent explicit memory test was examined. Results revealed that greater behavioral priming (reduced reaction times) and neural priming (reduced left inferior prefrontal brain activation) during re-encoding were associated with lower levels of subsequent explicit memory. Moreover, those subjects who demonstrated greater behavioral and neural priming effects during re-encoding following a long lag tended to demonstrate the least benefit in subsequent explicit memory due to this second study episode. These findings suggest that priming for past experiences can hinder new episodic encoding.

Previous neuroimaging studies of perceptual priming have reported priming-related decreases in the extrastriate cortex. However, because these experiments have used visual stimuli, it is unclear whether the observed decreases are associated specifically with some aspect of visual perceptual processing or with more general aspects of priming. We studied within-and cross-modality priming using an auditory word stem completion paradigm. Positron emission tomography (PET) images were obtained during stem completion and a fixation task. Within-modality auditory priming was associated with blood flow decreases in the extrastriate cortex (bilateral), medial/ right anterior prefrontal cortex, right angular gyrus, and precuneus. In cross-modality priming, the study list was presented visually, and subjects completed auditory word stems. Cross-modality priming was associated with trends for blood flow decreases in the left angular gyrus and increases in the medial/right anterior prefrontal cortex. Results thus indicate that reduced activity in the extrastriate cortex accompanies within-modality priming in both visual and auditory modalities.

False recognition occurs when people mistakenly claim that a novel item is familiar. After studying lists of semantically related words, healthy controls show extraordinarily high levels of false recognition to nonstudied lures that are semantic associates of study list words. In previous experiments, we found that both Korsakoff and non-Korsakoff amnesic patients show reduced levels of false recognition to semantic associates, implying that the medial temporal/diencephalic structures that are damaged in amnesic patients are involved in the encoding and/or retrieval of information that underlies false recognition. These data contrast with earlier results indicating greater false recognition in Korsakoff amnesics than in control subjects. The present experiment tests the hypothesis that greater or lesser false recognition of semantic associates in amnesic patients, relative to normal controls, can be demonstrated by creating conditions that are more or less conducive to allowing true recognition to suppress false recognition. With repeated presentation and testing of lists of semantic associates, control subjects and both Korsakoff and non-Korsakoff amnesics showed increasing levels of true recognition across trials. However, control subjects exhibited decreasing levels of false recognition across trials, whereas Korsakoff amnesic patients showed increases across trials and non-Korsakoff amnesics showed a fluctuating pattern. Consideration of signal detection analyses and differences between the two types of amnesic patients provides insight into how mechanisms of veridical episodic memory can be used to suppress false recognition.

Research examining the relation between explicit and implicit forms of memory has generated a great deal of evidence concerning the issue of multiple memory systems. This article focuses on an extensively studied implicit memory phenomenon, known as direct or repetition priming, and examines the hypothesis that priming effects on various tasks reflect the operation of a perceptual representation system (PRS)—a class of cortically based subsystems that operate at a presemantic level and support non conscious expressions of memory. Three PRS subsystems are examined: visual word form, structural description, and auditory word form. Pertinent cognitive, neuropsychological, and neurobiological evidence is reviewed, alternative classificatory schemes are discussed, and important conceptual and terminological issues are considered.

As part of the general trend toward interdisciplinary research in recent years, a growing number of investigators have come to consider both cognitive and neuroscientific perspectives when theorizing about memory. Although such cognitive neuroscience analyses are a relatively recent development, the approach has precedents in earlier scientific thinking about memory. In this article we present a historical review of three major issues in memory research---consolidation processes, the nature of memory representations, and multiple memory systems. We discuss the nature of the relation between cognitive and neuroscientific approaches to each of these issues with respect to the distinction between collateral, complementary, and convergent relations (Schacter, 1986). Although some early investigators offered analyses that linked psychological and physiological perspectives, there is little historical evidence of systematic or sustained interdisciplinary research. However, more recent work, especially with respect to hypotheses about memory systems, suggests progress toward establishing programmatic interdisciplinary research.