Does the presence of irrelevant neuroscience information make explanations of psychological phenomena more appealing? Do fMRI pictures further increase that allure? To help answer these questions, 385 college students in four experiments read brief descriptions of psychological phenomena, each one accompanied by an explanation of varying quality (good vs. circular) and followed by superfluous information of various types. Ancillary measures assessed participants' analytical thinking, beliefs on dualism and free will, and admiration for different sciences. In Experiment 1, superfluous neuroscience information increased the judged quality of the argument for both good and bad explanations, whereas accompanying fMRI pictures had no impact above and beyond the neuroscience text, suggesting a bias that is conceptual rather than pictorial. Superfluous neuroscience information was more alluring than social science information (Experiment 2) and more alluring than information from prestigious “hard sciences” (Experiments 3 and 4). Analytical thinking did not protect against the neuroscience bias, nor did a belief in dualism or free will. We conclude that the “allure of neuroscience” bias is conceptual, specific to neuroscience, and not easily accounted for by the prestige of the discipline. It may stem from the lay belief that the brain is the best explanans for mental phenomena.

Awareness of change within a visual scene only occurs in the presence of focused attention. When two versions of a complex scene are presented in alternating sequence separated by a blank mask, unattended changes usually remain undetected, although they may be represented implicitly. To test whether awareness of change and focused attention had the same or separable neurophysiological substrates, and to search for the neural substrates of implicit representation of change, we recorded event-related brain potentials (ERPs) during a change blindness task. Relative to active search, focusing attention in the absence of a change enhanced an ERP component over frontal sites around 100–300 msec after stimulus onset, and in posterior sites at the 150–300 msec window. Focusing attention to the location of a change that subjects were aware of replicated those attentional effects, but also produced a unique positive deflection in the 350–600 msec window, broadly distributed with its epicenter in mediocentral areas. The unique topography and time course of this latter modulation, together with its dependence on the aware perception of change, distinguishes this “awareness of change” electrophysiological response from the electrophysiological effects of focused attention. Finally, implicit representation of change elicited a distinct electrophysiological event: Unaware changes triggered a positive deflection at the 240–300 msec window, relative to trials with no change. Overall, the present data suggest that attention, awareness of change, and implicit representation of change may be mediated by separate underlying systems.