The sense of touch is not restricted to the body but can also extend to external objects. When we use a handheld tool to contact an object, we feel the touch on the tool and not in the hand holding the tool. The ability to perceive touch on a tool actually extends along its entire surface, allowing the user to accurately localize where it is touched similarly as they would on their body. Although the neural mechanisms underlying the ability to localize touch on the body have been largely investigated, those allowing to localize touch on a tool are still unknown. We aimed to fill this gap by recording the electroencephalography signal of participants while they localized tactile stimuli on a handheld rod. We focused on oscillatory activity in the alpha (7–14 Hz) and beta (15–30 Hz) ranges, as they have been previously linked to distinct spatial codes used to localize touch on the body. Beta activity reflects the mapping of touch in skin-based coordinates, whereas alpha activity reflects the mapping of touch in external space. We found that alpha activity was solely modulated by the location of tactile stimuli applied on a handheld rod. Source reconstruction suggested that this alpha power modulation was localized in a network of fronto-parietal regions previously implicated in higher-order tactile and spatial processing. These findings are the first to implicate alpha oscillations in tool-extended sensing and suggest an important role for processing touch in external space when localizing touch on a tool.

Logical connectives (e.g., or , if , and not ) are central to everyday conversation, and the inferences they generate are made with little effort in pragmatically sound situations. In contrast, the neural substrates of logical inference-making have been studied exclusively in abstract tasks where pragmatic concerns are minimal. Here, we used fMRI in an innovative design that employed narratives to investigate the interaction between logical reasoning and pragmatic processing in natural discourse. Each narrative contained three premises followed by a statement. In Fully-deductive stories, the statement confirmed a conclusion that followed from two steps of disjunction–elimination (e.g., Xavier considers Thursday, Friday, or Saturday for inviting his girlfriend out; he removes Thursday before he rejects Saturday and declares “I will invite her out for Friday”). In Implicated-premise stories, an otherwise identical narrative included three premises that twice removed a single option from consideration (i.e., Xavier rejects Thursday for two different reasons). The conclusion therefore necessarily prompts an implication (i.e., Xavier must have removed Saturday from consideration as well). We report two main findings. First, conclusions of Implicated-premise stories are associated with more activity than conclusions of Fully-deductive stories in a bilateral frontoparietal system, suggesting that these regions play a role in inferring an implicated premise. Second, brain connectivity between these regions increases with pragmatic abilities when reading conclusions in Implicated-premise stories. These findings suggest that pragmatic processing interacts with logical inference-making when understanding arguments in narrative discourse.