Remembering when events occur in time is fundamental to episodic memory. Yet, many experiences repeat over time creating the potential for interference when attempting to recall temporally specific memories. Here, we argue that temporal memories are protected, in part, by reinstatement of temporal context information that is triggered by stimulus repetitions. We motivate this argument by integrating seminal findings across several distinct literatures and methodologies. Specifically, we consider key insights from foundational behavioral studies of temporal memory, recent electrophysiological and neuroimaging approaches to measuring memory reinstatement, and computational models that describe how temporal context representations shape memory processes. We also note several open questions concerning how temporal context reinstatement might influence subsequent temporal memory, including potential mediating effects of event spacing and event boundaries. These ideas and questions have the potential to guide future research and, ultimately, to advance theoretical accounts of how we preserve temporal memories.

Our subjective experience of remembering guides and monitors the reconstruction of past and simulation of the future, which enables us to identify mistakes and adjust our behavior accordingly. However, what underlies the process of subjective mnemonic experience remains incompletely understood. Here, we combined behavior, repetitive TMS, and functional neuroimaging to probe whether vividness and confidence are generated differently during retrieval. We found that preretrieval repetitive TMS targeting the left angular gyrus (AnG) selectively attenuated the vividness efficiency compared with control stimulation while keeping metacognitive efficiency and objective memory accuracy unaffected. Using trialwise data, we showed that AnG stimulation altered the mediating role of vividness in confidence in the accuracy of memory judgment. Moreover, resting-state functional connectivity of hippocampus and AnG was specifically associated with vividness efficiency, but not metacognitive efficiency across individuals. Together, these results identify the causal involvement of AnG in gauging the vividness, but not the confidence, of memory, thereby suggesting a differentiation account of conscious assessment of memory by functionally and anatomically dissociating the monitoring of vividness from confidence.