Prior intentions are abstract mental representations that are believed to be the prime cause of our intentional actions. To date, only a few studies have focused on the possibility that single prior intentions could be identified in people's minds. Here, for the first time, we used the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT) in order to identify a specific prior intention on the basis of a pattern of associations derived from reaction times (Experiment 1). The aIAT is based on two critical blocks: the block associating intentions with true sentences (congruent block) gave rise to faster reaction times (RTs) than the block associating intentions with false sentences (incongruent block). Furthermore, when comparing intentions with hopes, it was revealed that the reported effect was intention-specific: The pattern of associations reflected a congruency effect when intentions and the logical category “True” were paired, but not when hopes and the “True” category were paired (Experiment 2). Finally, we investigated the neural bases of the congruency effect that leads to the identification of an intention (Experiment 3). We found a reduced late positive component (LPC) for the incongruent with respect to the congruent block, suggesting that the incongruent block needs additional resources of cognitive control with respect to the congruent block.

Most studies examining category specificity are single-case studies of patients with living or nonliving deficits. Nevertheless, no explicit or agreed criteria exist for establishing category-specific deficits in single cases regarding the type of analyses, whether to compare with healthy controls, the number of tasks, or the type of tasks. We examined two groups of patients with neurological pathology frequently accompanied by impaired semantic memory (19 patients with Alzheimer's disease and 15 with Herpes Simplex Encephalitis). Category knowledge was examined using three tasks (picture naming, naming-to-description, and feature verification). Both patient groups were compared with age-and education-matched healthy controls. The profile in each patient was examined for consistency across tasks and across different analyses; however, both proved to be inconsistent. One striking finding was the presence of paradoxical dissociations (i.e., patients who were impaired for living things on one task and nonliving things on another task). The findings have significant implications for how we determine category effects and, more generally, for the methods used to document double dissociations across individual cases in this literature.

Semantic features are of different importance in concept representation. The concept elephant may be more easily identified from the feature <trunk> than from the feature <four legs>. We propose a new model of semantic memory to measure the relevance of semantic features for a concept and use this model to investigate the controversial issue of category specificity. Category-specific patients have an impairment in one domain of knowledge (e.g., living), whereas the other domain (e.g., nonliving) is relatively spared. We show that categories differ in the level of relevance and that, when concepts belonging to living and nonliving categories are equated to this parameter, the category-specific disorder disappears. Our findings suggest that category specificity, as well as other semantic-related effects, may be explained by a semantic memory model in which concepts are represented by semantic features with associated relevance values.