In numerical cognition, there is a well-known but contested hypothesis that proposes an abstract representation of numerical magnitude in human intraparietal sulcus (IPS). On the other hand, researchers of object cognition have suggested another hypothesis for brain activity in IPS during the processing of number, namely that this activity simply correlates with the number of visual objects or units that are perceived. We contrasted these two accounts by analyzing multivoxel activity patterns elicited by dot patterns and Arabic digits of different magnitudes while participants were explicitly processing the represented numerical magnitude. The activity pattern elicited by the digit “8” was more similar to the activity pattern elicited by one dot (with which the digit shares the number of visual units but not the magnitude) compared to the activity pattern elicited by eight dots, with which the digit shares the represented abstract numerical magnitude. A multivoxel pattern classifier trained to differentiate one dot from eight dots classified all Arabic digits in the one-dot pattern category, irrespective of the numerical magnitude symbolized by the digit. These results were consistently obtained for different digits in IPS, its subregions, and many other brain regions. As predicted from object cognition theories, the number of presented visual units forms the link between the parietal activation elicited by symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers. The current study is difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis that parietal activation elicited by numbers would reflect a format-independent representation of number.

Some of the brain areas in the ventral temporal lobe, such as the fusiform face area (FFA), are critical for face perception in humans, but what determines this specialization is a matter of debate. The face specificity hypothesis claims that faces are processed in a domain-specific way. Alternatively, the expertise hypothesis states that the FFA is specialized in processing objects of expertise. To disentangle these views, some previous experiments used an artificial class of novel objects called Greebles. These experiments combined a learning and fMRI paradigm. Given the high impact of the results in the literature, we replicated and further investigated this paradigm. In our experiment, eight participants were trained for ten 1-hr sessions at identifying Greebles. We scanned participants before and after training and examined responses in FFA and lateral occipital complex. Most importantly and in contrast to previous reports, we found a neural inversion effect for Greebles before training. This result suggests that people process the “novel” Greebles as faces, even before training. This prediction was confirmed in a postexperimental debriefing. In addition, we did not find an increase of the inversion effect for Greebles in the FFA after training. This indicates that the activity in the FFA for Greebles does not depend on the degree of expertise acquired with the objects but on the interpretation of the stimuli as face-related.

Previous studies have argued that faces and other objects are encoded in terms of their deviation from a class prototype or norm. This prototype is associated with a smaller neural population response compared with nonprototype objects. However, it is still unclear (1) whether a norm-based representation can emerge for unfamiliar or novel object classes through visual experience at the time scale of an experiment and (2) whether the results from previous studies are caused by the prototypicality of a stimulus, by the physical properties of individual stimuli independent from the stimulus distribution, and/or by the trial-to-trial adaptation. Here we show with a combined behavioral and event-related fMRI study in humans that a short amount of visual experience with exemplars from novel object classes determines which stimulus is represented as the norm. Prototypicality effects were observed at the behavioral level by behavioral asymmetries during a stimulus comparison task. The fMRI data revealed that class exemplars closest to the prototypes—the perceived average of each class—were associated with a smaller response in the anterior part of the visual object-selective cortex compared with other class exemplars. By dissociating between the physical characteristics and the prototypicality status of the stimuli and by controlling for trial-to-trial adaptation, we can firmly conclude for the first time that high-level visual areas represent the identity of exemplars using a dynamic, norm-based encoding principle.

There is substantial evidence that object representations in adults are dynamically updated by learning. However, it is not clear to what extent these effects are induced by active processing of visual objects in a particular task context on top of the effects of mere exposure to the same objects. Here we show that the task does matter. We performed an event-related fMRI adaptation study in which we derived neural selectivity from a release of adaptation. We had two training conditions: “categorized objects” were categorized at a subordinate level based on fine shape differences (Which type of fish is this?), whereas “control objects” were seen equally often in a task context requiring no subordinate categorization (Is this a vase or not?). After training, the object-selective cortex was more selective for differences among categorized objects than for differences among control objects. This result indicates that the task context during training modulates the extent to which object selectivity is enhanced as a result of training.