When seeing people perform actions, we are able to quickly predict the action's outcomes. These predictions are not solely based on the observed actions themselves but utilize our prior knowledge of others. It has been suggested that observed outcomes that are not in line with these predictions result in prediction errors, which require additional processing to be integrated or updated. However, there is no consensus on whether this is indeed the case for the kind of high-level social–cognitive processes involved in action observation. In this fMRI study, we investigated whether observation of unexpected outcomes causes additional activation in line with the processing of prediction errors and, if so, whether this activation overlaps with activation in brain areas typically associated with social–cognitive processes. In the first part of the experiment, participants watched animated movies of two people playing a bowling game, one experienced and one novice player. In cases where the player's score was higher or lower than expected based on their skill level, there was increased BOLD activity in areas that were also activated during a theory of mind task that participants performed in the second part of the experiment. These findings are discussed in the light of different theoretical accounts of human social–cognitive processing.

The role of motor experience in the processing of perceived actions is hotly debated on both behavioral (e.g., action understanding) and neural (e.g., activation of the motor system) levels of interpretation. Whereas some researchers focus on the role of motor experience in the understanding of and motor activity associated with perceived actions, others emphasize the role of visual experience with the perceived actions. The question of whether prior firsthand motor experience is critical to motor system activation during perception of actions performed by others is best addressed through studies with infants who have a limited repertoire of motor actions. In this way, infants can receive motor or visual training with novel actions that are not mere recombinations of previously acquired actions. In this study, 10-month-old infants received active training with a motorically unfamiliar action that resulted in a distinct sound effect. They received observational experience with a second, similarly unfamiliar action. Following training, we assessed infants' neural motor activity via EEG while they listened to the sounds associated with the actions relative to a novel sound. We found a greater decrease in mu power to sounds associated with the motorically learned action than to those associated with the observed action that the infants had never produced. This effect was directly related to individual differences in the degree of motor learning via motor training. These findings indicate a unique effect of active experience on neural correlates of action perception.

External feedback provides essential information for successful learning. Feedback is especially important for learning in early childhood, as toddlers strongly rely on external signals to determine the consequences of their actions. In adults, many electrophysiological studies have elucidated feedback processes using a neural marker called the feedback-related negativity (FRN). The neural generator of the FRN is assumed to be the ACC, located in medial frontal cortex. As frontal brain regions are the latest to mature during brain development, it is unclear when in early childhood a functional feedback system develops. Is feedback differentiated on a neural level in toddlers and in how far is neural feedback processing related to children's behavioral adjustment? In an EEG experiment, we addressed these questions by measuring the brain activity and behavioral performance of 2.5-year-old toddlers while they played a feedback-guided game on a touchscreen. Electrophysiological results show differential brain activity for feedback with a more negative deflection for incorrect than correct outcomes, resembling the adult FRN. This provides the first neural evidence for feedback processing in toddlers. Notably, FRN amplitudes were predictive of adaptive behavior: the stronger the differential brain activity for feedback, the better the toddlers' adaptive performance during the game. Thus, already in early childhood toddlers' feedback-guided performance directly relates to the functionality of their neural feedback processing. Implications for early feedback-based learning as well as structural and functional brain development are discussed.

A dominant hypothesis on how the brain processes numerical size proposes a spatial representation of numbers as positions on a “mental number line.” An alternative hypothesis considers numbers as elements of a generalized representation of sensorimotor-related magnitude, which is not obligatorily spatial. Here we show that individuals' relative use of spatial and nonspatial representations has a cerebral counterpart in the structural organization of the posterior parietal cortex. Interindividual variability in the linkage between numbers and spatial responses (faster left responses to small numbers and right responses to large numbers; spatial–numerical association of response codes effect) correlated with variations in gray matter volume around the right precuneus. Conversely, differences in the disposition to link numbers to force production (faster soft responses to small numbers and hard responses to large numbers) were related to gray matter volume in the left angular gyrus. This finding suggests that numerical cognition relies on multiple mental representations of analogue magnitude using different neural implementations that are linked to individual traits.

Research from the past decade has shown that understanding the meaning of words and utterances (i.e., abstracted symbols) engages the same systems we used to perceive and interact with the physical world in a content-specific manner. For example, understanding the word “grasp” elicits activation in the cortical motor network, that is, part of the neural substrate involved in planned and executing a grasping action. In the embodied literature, cortical motor activation during language comprehension is thought to reflect motor simulation underlying conceptual knowledge [note that outside the embodied framework, other explanations for the link between action and language are offered, e.g., Mahon, B. Z., & Caramazza, A. A critical look at the embodied cognition hypothesis and a new proposal for grouding conceptual content. Journal of Physiology, 102, 59–70, 2008; Hagoort, P. On Broca, brain, and binding: A new framework. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 416–423, 2005]. Previous research has supported the view that the coupling between language and action is flexible, and reading an action-related word form is not sufficient for cortical motor activation [Van Dam, W. O., van Dijk, M., Bekkering, H., & Rueschemeyer, S.-A. Flexibility in embodied lexical–semantic representations. Human Brain Mapping , doi: 10.1002/hbm.21365, 2011]. The current study goes one step further by addressing the necessity of action-related word forms for motor activation during language comprehension. Subjects listened to indirect requests (IRs) for action during an fMRI session. IRs for action are speech acts in which access to an action concept is required, although it is not explicitly encoded in the language. For example, the utterance “It is hot here!” in a room with a window is likely to be interpreted as a request to open the window. However, the same utterance in a desert will be interpreted as a statement. The results indicate (1) that comprehension of IR sentences activates cortical motor areas reliably more than comprehension of sentences devoid of any implicit motor information. This is true despite the fact that IR sentences contain no lexical reference to action. (2) Comprehension of IR sentences also reliably activates substantial portions of the theory of mind network, known to be involved in making inferences about mental states of others. The implications of these findings for embodied theories of language are discussed.

Embodied theories hold that cognitive concepts are grounded in our sensorimotor systems. Specifically, a number of behavioral and neuroimaging studies have buttressed the idea that language concepts are represented in areas involved in perception and action [Pulvermueller, F. Brain mechanisms linking language and action. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6, 576–582, 2005; Barsalou, L. W. Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 577–660, 1999]. Proponents of a strong embodied account argue that activity in perception/action areas is triggered automatically upon encountering a word and reflect static semantic representations. In contrast to what would be expected if lexical semantic representations are automatically triggered upon encountering a word, a number of studies failed to find motor-related activity for words with a putative action-semantic component [Raposo, A., Moss, H. E., Stamatakis, E. A., & Tyler, L. K. Modulation of motor and premotor cortices by actions, action words and action sentences. Neuropsychologia, 47, 388–396, 2009; Rueschemeyer, S.-A., Brass, M., & Friederici, A. D. Comprehending prehending: Neural correlates of processing verbs with motor stems. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19, 855–865, 2007]. In a recent fMRI study, Van Dam and colleagues [Van Dam, W. O., Van Dijk, M., Bekkering, H., & Rueschemeyer, S.-A. Flexibility in embodied lexical-semantic representations. Human Brain Mapping, in press] showed that the degree to which a modality-specific region contributes to a representation considerably changes as a function of context. In the current study, we presented words for which both motor and visual properties (e.g., tennis ball , boxing glove ) were important in constituting the concept. Our aim was to corroborate on earlier findings of flexible and context-dependent language representations by testing whether functional integration between auditory brain regions and perception/action areas is modulated by context. Functional connectivity was investigated by means of a psychophysiological interaction analysis, in which we found that bilateral superior temporal gyrus was more strongly connected with brain regions relevant for coding action information: (1) for Action Color words vs. Abstract words, and (2) for Action Color words presented in a context that emphasized action vs. a context that emphasized color properties.

In analyses of the motor system, two hierarchies are often posited: The first—the action hierarchy—is a decomposition of an action into subactions and sub-subactions. The second—the control hierarchy—is a postulated hierarchy in the neural control processes that are supposed to bring about the action. A general assumption in cognitive neuroscience is that these two hierarchies are internally consistent and provide complementary descriptions of neuronal control processes. In this article, we suggest that neither offers a complete explanation and that they cannot be reconciled in a logical or conceptually coherent way. Furthermore, neither pays proper attention to the dynamics and temporal aspects of neural control processes. We will explore an alternative hierarchical organization in which causality is inherent in the dynamics over time. Specifically, high levels of the hierarchy encode more stable (goal-related) representations, whereas lower levels represent more transient (actions and motor acts) kinematics. If employed properly, a hierarchy based on this latter principle of temporal extension is not subject to the problems that plague the traditional accounts.

Recent research indicates that language processing relies on brain areas dedicated to perception and action. For example, processing words denoting manipulable objects has been shown to activate a fronto-parietal network involved in actual tool use. This is suggested to reflect the knowledge the subject has about how objects are moved and used. However, information about how to use an object may be much more central to the conceptual representation of an object than information about how to move an object. Therefore, there may be much more fine-grained distinctions between objects on the neural level, especially related to the usability of manipulable objects. In the current study, we investigated whether a distinction can be made between words denoting (1) objects that can be picked up to move (e.g., volumetrically manipulable objects: bookend, clock) and (2) objects that must be picked up to use (e.g., functionally manipulable objects: cup, pen). The results show that functionally manipulable words elicit greater levels of activation in the fronto-parietal sensorimotor areas than volumetrically manipulable words. This suggests that indeed a distinction can be made between different types of manipulable objects. Specifically, how an object is used functionally rather than whether an object can be displaced with the hand is reflected in semantic representations in the brain.