The brain uses temporal structure in the environment, like rhythm in music and speech, to predict the timing of events, thereby optimizing their processing and perception. Temporal expectations can be grounded in different aspects of the input structure, such as a regular beat or a predictable pattern. One influential account posits that a generic mechanism underlies beat-based and pattern-based expectations, namely, entrainment of low-frequency neural oscillations to rhythmic input, whereas other accounts assume different underlying neural mechanisms. Here, we addressed this outstanding issue by examining EEG activity and behavioral responses during silent periods following rhythmic auditory sequences. We measured responses outlasting the rhythms both to avoid confounding the EEG analyses with evoked responses, and to directly test whether beat-based and pattern-based expectations persist beyond stimulation, as predicted by entrainment theories. To properly disentangle beat-based and pattern-based expectations, which often occur simultaneously, we used non-isochronous rhythms with a beat, a predictable pattern, or random timing. In Experiment 1 ( n = 32), beat-based expectations affected behavioral ratings of probe events for two beat-cycles after the end of the rhythm. The effects of pattern-based expectations reflected expectations for one interval. In Experiment 2 ( n = 27), using EEG, we found enhanced spectral power at the beat frequency for beat-based sequences both during listening and silence. For pattern-based sequences, enhanced power at a pattern-specific frequency was present during listening, but not silence. Moreover, we found a difference in the evoked signal following pattern-based and beat-based sequences. Finally, we show how multivariate pattern decoding and multiscale entropy—measures sensitive to non-oscillatory components of the signal—can be used to probe temporal expectations. Together, our results suggest that the input structure used to form temporal expectations may affect the associated neural mechanisms. We suggest climbing activity and low-frequency oscillations may be differentially associated with pattern-based and beat-based expectations.

Every day, we experience a rich and complex visual world. Our brain constantly translates meaningless fragmented input into coherent objects and scenes. However, our attentional capabilities are limited, and we can only report the few items that we happen to attend to. So what happens to items that are not cognitively accessed? Do these remain fragmentary and meaningless? Or are they processed up to a level where perceptual inferences take place about image composition? To investigate this, we recorded brain activity using fMRI while participants viewed images containing a Kanizsa figure, an illusion in which an object is perceived by means of perceptual inference. Participants were presented with the Kanizsa figure and three matched nonillusory control figures while they were engaged in an attentionally demanding distractor task. After the task, one group of participants was unable to identify the Kanizsa figure in a forced-choice decision task; hence, they were “inattentionally blind.” A second group had no trouble identifying the Kanizsa figure. Interestingly, the neural signature that was unique to the processing of the Kanizsa figure was present in both groups. Moreover, within-subject multivoxel pattern analysis showed that the neural signature of unreported Kanizsa figures could be used to classify reported Kanizsa figures and that this cross-report classification worked better for the Kanizsa condition than for the control conditions. Together, these results suggest that stimuli that are not cognitively accessed are processed up to levels of perceptual interpretation.

The presupplementary motor area (pre-SMA) is considered key in contributing to voluntary action selection during response conflict. Here we test whether individual differences in the ability to select appropriate actions in the face of strong (conscious) and weak (virtually unconscious) distracting alternatives are related to individual variability in pre-SMA anatomy. To this end, we scanned 58 participants, who performed a masked priming task in which conflicting response tendencies were elicited either consciously (through primes that were weakly masked) or virtually unconsciously (strongly masked primes), with structural magnetic resonance imaging. Voxel-based morphometry revealed that individual differences in pre-SMA gray-matter density are related to subjects' ability to voluntary select the correct action in the face of conflict, irrespective of the awareness level of conflict-inducing stimuli. These results link structural anatomy to individual differences in cognitive control ability, and provide support for the role of the pre-SMA in the selection of appropriate actions in situations of response conflict. Furthermore, these results suggest that flexible and voluntary behavior requires efficiently dealing with competing response tendencies, even those that are activated automatically and unconsciously.

Cognitive control allows humans to overrule and inhibit habitual responses to optimize performance in challenging situations. Contradicting traditional views, recent studies suggest that cognitive control processes can be initiated unconsciously. To further capture the relation between consciousness and cognitive control, we studied the dynamics of inhibitory control processes when triggered consciously versus unconsciously in a modified version of the stop task. Attempts to inhibit an imminent response were often successful after unmasked (visible) stop signals. Masked (invisible) stop signals rarely succeeded in instigating overt inhibition but did trigger slowing down of response times. Masked stop signals elicited a sequence of distinct ERP components that were also observed on unmasked stop signals. The N2 component correlated with the efficiency of inhibitory control when elicited by unmasked stop signals and with the magnitude of slowdown when elicited by masked stop signals. Thus, the N2 likely reflects the initiation of inhibitory control, irrespective of conscious awareness. The P3 component was much reduced in amplitude and duration on masked versus unmasked stop trials. These patterns of differences and similarities between conscious and unconscious cognitive control processes are discussed in a framework that differentiates between feedforward and feedback connections in yielding conscious experience.

In texture segregation, an example of scene segmentation, we can discern two different processes: texture boundary detection and subsequent surface segregation [Lamme, V. A. F., Rodriguez-Rodriguez, V., & Spekreijse, H. Separate processing dynamics for texture elements, boundaries and surfaces in primary visual cortex of the macaque monkey. Cerebral Cortex, 9, 406–413, 1999]. Neural correlates of texture boundary detection have been found in monkey V1 [Sillito, A. M., Grieve, K. L., Jones, H. E., Cudeiro, J., & Davis, J. Visual cortical mechanisms detecting focal orientation discontinuities. Nature, 378, 492–496, 1995; Grosof, D. H., Shapley, R. M., & Hawken, M. J. Macaque-V1 neurons can signal illusory contours. Nature, 365, 550–552, 1993], but whether surface segregation occurs in monkey V1 [Rossi, A. F., Desimone, R., & Ungerleider, L. G. Contextual modulation in primary visual cortex of macaques. Journal of Neuroscience, 21, 1698–1709, 2001; Lamme, V. A. F. The neurophysiology of figure ground segregation in primary visual-cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 15, 1605–1615, 1995], and whether boundary detection or surface segregation signals can also be measured in human V1, is more controversial [Kastner, S., De Weerd, P., & Ungerleider, L. G. Texture segregation in the human visual cortex: A functional MRI study. Journal of Neurophysiology, 83, 2453–2457, 2000]. Here we present electroencephalography (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging data that have been recorded with a paradigm that makes it possible to differentiate between boundary detection and scene segmentation in humans. In this way, we were able to show with EEG that neural correlates of texture boundary detection are first present in the early visual cortex around 92 msec and then spread toward the parietal and temporal lobes. Correlates of surface segregation first appear in temporal areas (around 112 msec) and from there appear to spread to parietal, and back to occipital areas. After 208 msec, correlates of surface segregation and boundary detection also appear in more frontal areas. Blood oxygenation level-dependent magnetic resonance imaging results show correlates of boundary detection and surface segregation in all early visual areas including V1. We conclude that texture boundaries are detected in a feedforward fashion and are represented at increasing latencies in higher visual areas. Surface segregation, on the other hand, is represented in “reverse hierarchical” fashion and seems to arise from feedback signals toward early visual areas such as V1.