The core functional organization of the primate brain is remarkably conserved across the order, but behavioral differences evident between species likely reflect derived modifications in the underlying neural processes. Here, we performed the first study to directly compare visual recognition memory in two primate species—rhesus macaques and marmoset monkeys—on the same visual preferential looking task as a first step toward identifying similarities and differences in this cognitive process across the primate phylogeny. Preferences in looking behavior on the task were broadly similar between the species, with greater looking times for novel images compared with repeated images as well as a similarly strong preference for faces compared with other categories. Unexpectedly, we found large behavioral differences among the two species in looking behavior independent of image familiarity. Marmosets exhibited longer looking times, with greater variability compared with macaques, regardless of image content or familiarity. Perhaps most strikingly, marmosets shifted their gaze across the images more quickly, suggesting a different behavioral strategy when viewing images. Although such differences limit the comparison of recognition memory across these closely related species, they point to interesting differences in the mechanisms underlying active vision that have significant implications for future neurobiological investigations with these two nonhuman primate species. Elucidating whether these patterns are reflective of species or broader phylogenetic differences (e.g., between New World and Old World monkeys) necessitates a broader sample of primate taxa from across the Order.

Sleep affects declarative memory for emotional stimuli differently than it affects declarative memory for nonemotional stimuli. However, the interaction between specific sleep characteristics and emotional memory is not well understood. Recent studies on how sleep affects emotional memory have focused on rapid eye movement sleep (REM) but have not addressed non-REM sleep, particularly sleep spindles. This is despite the fact that sleep spindles are implicated in declarative memory as well as neural models of memory consolidation (e.g., hippocampal neural replay). Additionally, many studies examine a limited range of emotional stimuli and fail to disentangle differences in memory performance because of variance in valence and arousal. Here, we experimentally increase non-REM sleep features, sleep spindle density, and SWS, with pharmacological interventions using zolpidem (Ambien) and sodium oxybate (Xyrem) during daytime naps. We use a full spread of emotional stimuli to test all levels of valence and arousal. We find that increasing sleep spindle density increases memory discrimination ( d a ) for highly arousing and negative stimuli without altering measures of bias ( c a ). These results indicate a broader role for sleep in the processing of emotional stimuli with differing effects based on arousal and valence, and they raise the possibility that sleep spindles causally facilitate emotional memory consolidation. These findings are discussed in terms of the known use of hypnotics in individuals with emotional mood disorders.

fMRI studies of recognition memory have often been interpreted to mean that the hippocampus selectively subserves recollection and that adjacent regions selectively subserve familiarity. Yet, many of these studies have confounded recollection and familiarity with strong and weak memories. In a source memory experiment, we compared correct source judgments (which reflect recollection) and incorrect source judgments (often thought to reflect familiarity) while equating for old–new memory strength by including only high-confidence hits in the analysis. Hippocampal activity associated with both correct source judgments and incorrect source judgments exceeded the activity associated with forgotten items and did so to a similar extent. Further, hippocampal activity was greater for high-confidence old decisions relative to forgotten items even when source decisions were at chance. These results identify a recollection signal in the hippocampus and may identify a familiarity signal as well. Similar results were obtained in the parahippocampal gyrus. Unlike in the medial temporal lobe, activation in prefrontal cortex increased differentially in association with source recollection.

Remembering and knowing are states of awareness that accompany the retrieval of facts, faces, and experiences from our past. Although originally intended to separate episodic from semantic memory, the dominant view today is that recollection-based decisions underlie remember responses, whereas familiarity-based decisions underlie know responses. Many functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies as well as lesion studies have relied on the remember/know procedure to identify the neural correlates of recollection and familiarity. An implicit assumption of this approach is that know responses, which are thought to tap familiarity-based decisions, are devoid of recollection. We investigated this issue by using a source memory procedure and found that the accuracy of source recollection was significantly above chance for studied words that were declared to be old and known. Critically, this held true even when the source decision was made before the old/new decision (i.e., even after successful recollection had just occurred). Our results show that although recollection and familiarity may be different processes, the remember/know paradigm does not probe them directly. As such, dissociations involving remember/know judgments in fMRI studies and in studies involving amnesic patients should not be construed as dissociations between recollection and familiarity.