In the absence of sensory information, we can generate meaningful images and sounds from representations in memory. However, it remains unclear which neural systems underpin this process and whether tasks requiring the top–down generation of different kinds of features recruit similar or different neural networks. We asked people to internally generate the visual and auditory features of objects, either in isolation (car, dog) or in specific and complex meaning-based contexts (car/dog race). Using an fMRI decoding approach, in conjunction with functional connectivity analysis, we examined the role of auditory/visual cortex and transmodal brain regions. Conceptual retrieval in the absence of external input recruited sensory and transmodal cortex. The response in transmodal regions—including anterior middle temporal gyrus—was of equal magnitude for visual and auditory features yet nevertheless captured modality information in the pattern of response across voxels. In contrast, sensory regions showed greater activation for modality-relevant features in imagination (even when external inputs did not differ). These data are consistent with the view that transmodal regions support internally generated experiences and that they play a role in integrating perceptual features encoded in memory.

The neural mechanisms that mediate metacognitive ability (the capacity to accurately reflect on one's own cognition and experience) remain poorly understood. An important question is whether metacognitive capacity is a domain-general skill supported by a core neuroanatomical substrate or whether regionally specific neural structures underlie accurate reflection in different cognitive domains. Providing preliminary support for the latter possibility, recent findings have shown that individual differences in metacognitive ability in the domains of memory and perception are related to variation in distinct gray matter volume and resting-state functional connectivity. The current investigation sought to build on these findings by evaluating how metacognitive ability in these domains is related to variation in white matter microstructure. We quantified metacognitive ability across memory and perception domains and used diffusion spectrum imaging to examine the relation between high-resolution measurements of white matter microstructure and individual differences in metacognitive accuracy in each domain. We found that metacognitive accuracy for perceptual decisions and memory were uncorrelated across individuals and that metacognitive accuracy in each domain was related to variation in white matter microstructure in distinct brain areas. Metacognitive accuracy for perceptual decisions was associated with increased diffusion anisotropy in white matter underlying the ACC, whereas metacognitive accuracy for memory retrieval was associated with increased diffusion anisotropy in the white matter extending into the inferior parietal lobule. Together, these results extend previous findings linking metacognitive ability in the domains of perception and memory to variation in distinct brain structures and connections.

The mind flows in a “stream of consciousness,” which often neglects immediate sensory input in favor of focusing on intrinsic, self-generated thoughts or images. Although considerable research has documented the disruptive influences of task-unrelated thought for perceptual processing and task performance, the brain dynamics associated with these phenomena are not well understood. Here we investigate the possibility, suggested by several convergent lines of research, that task-unrelated thought is associated with a reduction in the trial-to-trial phase consistency of the oscillatory neural signal in response to perceptual input. Using an experience sampling paradigm coupled with continuous high-density electroencephalography, we observed that task-unrelated thought was associated with a reduction of the P1 ERP, replicating prior observations that mind-wandering is accompanied by a reduction of the brain-evoked response to sensory input. Time–frequency analysis of the oscillatory neural response revealed a decrease in theta-band cortical phase-locking, which peaked over parietal scalp regions. Furthermore, we observed that task-unrelated thought impacted the oscillatory mode of the brain during the initiation of a task-relevant action, such that more cortical processing was required to meet task demands. Together, these findings document that the attenuation of perceptual processing that occurs during task-unrelated thought is associated with a reduction in the temporal fidelity with which the brain responds to a stimulus and suggest that increased neural processing may be required to recouple attention to a task. More generally, these data provide novel confirmatory evidence for the mechanisms through which attentional states facilitate the neural processing of sensory input.

Top–down control of visual sensory cortex has long been tied to the orienting of visual spatial attention on a rapid, moment-to-moment basis. Here, we examined whether sensory responses in visual cortex are also modulated by natural and comparatively slower fluctuations in whether or not one is paying attention to the task at hand. Participants performed a simple visual discrimination task at fixation as the ERPs to task-irrelevant probes in the upper visual periphery were recorded. At random intervals, participants were stopped and asked to report on their attentional state at the time of stoppage—either “on-task” or “off-task.” ERPs to the probes immediately preceding these subjective reports were then examined as a function of whether attention was in an on-task versus off-task state. We found that sensory-evoked responses to the probes were significantly attenuated during off-task relative to on-task states, as measured by the visual P1 ERP component. In two additional experiments, we replicated this effect while (1) finding that off-task sensory attenuation extends to the auditory domain, as measured by the auditory N1 ERP component, and (2) eliminating state-dependent shifts in general arousal as a possible explanation for the effects. Collectively, our findings suggest that sensory gain control in cortex is yoked to the natural ebb and flow in how much attention we pay to the current task over time.

Converging evidence from neuroscience suggests that our attention to the outside world waxes and wanes over time. We examined whether these periods of “mind wandering” are associated with reduced cortical analysis of the external environment. Participants performed a sustained attention to response task in which they responded to frequent “nontargets” (digits 0–9) and withheld responses for infrequent “targets” (the letter X). Mind wandering was defined both behaviorally, indicated by a failure to withhold a response to a target, and subjectively, via self-report at a thought probe. The P300 event-related potential component for nontargets was reduced prior to both the behavioral and subjective reports of mind wandering, relative to periods of being “on-task.” Regression analysis of P300 amplitude revealed significant common variance between behavioral and subjective markers of mind wandering, suggesting that both markers reflect a common underlying mental state. Finally, control analysis revealed that the effect of mind wandering on the P300 could not be ascribed to changes in motor activity nor was it associated with general arousal. Our data suggest that when trying to engage attention in a sustained manner, the mind will naturally ebb and flow in the depth of cognitive analysis it applies to events in the external environment.