The ability to maintain focus and avoid distraction by goal-irrelevant stimuli is critical for performing many tasks and may be a key deficit in attention-related problems. Recent studies have demonstrated that irrelevant stimuli that are consciously perceived may be filtered out on a neural level and not cause the distraction triggered by subliminal stimuli. However, in everyday situations, suprathreshold stimuli often do capture attention, but the neural mechanisms by which some stimuli rapidly and automatically trigger distraction remain unknown. Here, we investigated the neural basis of distraction by utilizing a particularly strong form of distractor: the abrupt appearance of a new object. Our results revealed a competitive relation between brain regions coding the locations of the target and the distractor, with distractor processing increasing and target processing decreasing, but only when the distractor was a new object; an equivalent luminance change to an existing object neither generated distraction nor affected target processing. Results also revealed changes in neural activity in intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) that were unique to the new object distractor condition. The strongest relations between behavioral distraction and neural activity were observed in these parietal regions. Furthermore, participants who were less susceptible to distraction showed a more consistent, albeit more moderate, level of activity in IPS and TPJ. The present results thus provide new evidence regarding the neural mechanisms underlying distraction and resistance to it.

Recent studies have generated debate regarding whether reflexive attention mechanisms are triggered in a purely automatic stimulus-driven manner. Behavioral studies have found that a nonpredictive “cue” stimulus will speed manual responses to subsequent targets at the same location, but only if that cue is congruent with actively maintained top-down settings for target detection. When a cue is incongruent with top-down settings, response times are unaffected, and this has been taken as evidence that reflexive attention mechanisms were never engaged in those conditions. However, manual response times may mask effects on earlier stages of processing. Here, we used event-related potentials to investigate the interaction of bottom-up sensory-driven mechanisms and top-down control settings at multiple stages of processing in the brain. Our results dissociate sensory-driven mechanisms that automatically bias early stages of visual processing from later mechanisms that are contingent on top-down control. An early enhancement of target processing in the extrastriate visual cortex (i.e., the P1 component) was triggered by the appearance of a unique bright cue, regardless of top-down settings. The enhancement of visual processing was prolonged, however, when the cue was congruent with top-down settings. Later processing in posterior temporal-parietal regions (i.e., the ipsilateral invalid negativity) was triggered automatically when the cue consisted of the abrupt appearance of a single new object. However, in cases where more than a single object appeared during the cue display, this stage of processing was contingent on top-down control. These findings provide evidence that visual information processing is biased at multiple levels in the brain, and the results distinguish automatically triggered sensory-driven mechanisms from those that are contingent on top-down control settings.