Selecting hand actions to manipulate an object is affected both by perceptual factors and by action goals. Affordances may contribute to “stimulus–response” congruency effects driven by habitual actions to an object. In previous studies, we have demonstrated an influence of the congruency between hand and object orientations on response times when reaching to turn an object, such as a cup. In this study, we investigated how the representation of hand postures triggered by planning to turn a cup was influenced by this congruency effect, in an fMRI scanning environment. Healthy participants were asked to reach and turn a real cup that was placed in front of them either in an upright orientation or upside–down. They were instructed to use a hand orientation that was either congruent or incongruent with the cup orientation. As expected, the motor responses were faster when the hand and cup orientations were congruent. There was increased activity in a network of brain regions involving object-directed actions during action planning, which included bilateral primary and extrastriate visual, medial, and superior temporal areas, as well as superior parietal, primary motor, and premotor areas in the left hemisphere. Specific activation of the dorsal premotor cortex was associated with hand–object orientation congruency during planning and prior to any action taking place. Activity in that area and its connectivity with the lateral occipito-temporal cortex increased when planning incongruent (goal-directed) actions. The increased activity in premotor areas in trials where the orientation of the hand was incongruent to that of the object suggests a role in eliciting competing representations specified by hand postures in lateral occipito-temporal cortex.

Timing emerges from a hierarchy of computations ranging from early encoding of physical duration (time sensation) to abstract time representations (time perception) suitable for storage and decisional processes. However, the neural basis of the perceptual experience of time remains elusive. To address this, we dissociate brain activity uniquely related to lower-level sensory and higher-order perceptual timing operations, using event-related fMRI. Participants compared subsecond (500 msec) sinusoidal gratings drifting with constant velocity (standard) against two probe stimuli: (1) control gratings drifting at constant velocity or (2) accelerating gratings, which induced illusory shortening of time. We tested two probe intervals: a 500-msec duration (Short) and a longer duration required for an accelerating probe to be perceived as long as the standard (Long—individually determined). On each trial, participants classified the probe as shorter or longer than the standard. This allowed for comparison of trials with an “Objective” (physical) or “Subjective” (perceived) difference in duration, based on participant classifications. Objective duration revealed responses in bilateral early extrastriate areas, extending to higher visual areas in the fusiform gyrus (at more lenient thresholds). By contrast, Subjective duration was reflected by distributed responses in a cortical/subcortical areas. This comprised the left superior frontal gyrus and the left cerebellum, and a wider set of common timing areas including the BG, parietal cortex, and posterior cingulate cortex. These results suggest two functionally independent timing stages: early extraction of duration information in sensory cortices and Subjective experience of duration in a higher-order cortical–subcortical timing areas.

This paper characterizes impulsive behavior using a patch-leaving paradigm and active inference—a framework for describing Bayes optimal behavior. This paradigm comprises different environments (patches) with limited resources that decline over time at different rates. The challenge is to decide when to leave the current patch for another to maximize reward. We chose this task because it offers an operational characterization of impulsive behavior, namely, maximizing proximal reward at the expense of future gain. We use a Markov decision process formulation of active inference to simulate behavioral and electrophysiological responses under different models and prior beliefs. Our main finding is that there are at least three distinct causes of impulsive behavior, which we demonstrate by manipulating three different components of the Markov decision process model. These components comprise (i) the depth of planning, (ii) the capacity to maintain and process information, and (iii) the perceived value of immediate (relative to delayed) rewards. We show how these manipulations change beliefs and subsequent choices through variational message passing. Furthermore, we appeal to the process theories associated with this message passing to simulate neuronal correlates. In future work, we will use this scheme to identify the prior beliefs that underlie different sorts of impulsive behavior—and ask whether different causes of impulsivity can be inferred from the electrophysiological correlates of choice behavior.