The oddball protocol has been used to study the neural and perceptual consequences of implicit predictions in the human brain. The protocol involves presenting a sequence of identical repeated events that are eventually broken by a novel “oddball” presentation. Oddball presentations have been linked to increased neural responding and to an exaggeration of perceived duration relative to repeated events. Because the number of repeated events in such protocols is circumscribed, as more repeats are encountered, the conditional probability of a further repeat decreases—whereas the conditional probability of an oddball increases. These facts have not been appreciated in many analyses of oddballs; repeats and oddballs have rather been treated as binary event categories. Here, we show that the human brain is sensitive to conditional event probabilities in an active, visual oddball paradigm. P300 responses (a relatively late component of visually evoked potentials measured with EEG) tended to be greater for less likely oddballs and repeats. By contrast, P1 responses (an earlier component) increased for repeats as a goal-relevant target presentation neared, but this effect occurred even when repeat probabilities were held constant, and oddball P1 responses were invariant. We also found that later, more likely oddballs seemed to last longer, and this effect was largely independent of the number of preceding repeats. These findings speak against a repetition suppression account of the temporal oddball effect. Overall, our data highlight an impact of event probability on later, rather than earlier, electroencephalographic measures previously related to predictive processes—and the importance of considering conditional probabilities in sequential presentation paradigms.

The neural dynamics underpinning binary perceptual decisions and their transformation into actions are well studied, but real-world decisions typically offer more than two response alternatives. How does decision-related evidence accumulation dynamically influence multiple action representations in humans? The heightened conservatism required in multiple compared with binary choice scenarios suggests a mechanism that compensates for increased uncertainty when multiple choices are present by suppressing baseline activity. Here, we tracked action representations using corticospinal excitability during four- and two-choice perceptual decisions and modeled them using a sequential sampling framework. We found that the predictions made by leaky competing accumulator models to accommodate multiple choices (i.e., reduced baseline activity to compensate increased uncertainty) were borne out by dynamic changes in human action representations. This suggests a direct and continuous influence of interacting evidence accumulators, each favoring a different decision alternative, on downstream corticospinal excitability during complex choice.

Many studies have shown that visuospatial orienting attention depends on a network of frontal and parietal areas in the right hemisphere. Rushworth et al. [Rushworth, M. F., Krams, M., & Passingham, R. E. The attentional role of the left parietal cortex: The distinct lateralization and localization of motor attention in the human brain. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 13 , 698–710, 2001] have recently provided evidence for a left-lateralized network of parietal areas involved in motor attention. Using two variants of a cued reaction time (RT) task, we set out to investigate whether high-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS; 5 Hz) delivered “off-line” in a virtual lesion paradigm over the right or left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) or the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) would affect performance in a motor versus a visual attention task. Although rTMS over the DLPFC on either side did not affect RT performance on a spatial orienting task, it did lead to an increase in the RTs of invalidly cued trials in a motor attention task when delivered to the left DLPFC. The opposite effect was found when rTMS was delivered to the PPC: In this case, conditioning the right PPC led to increased RTs in invalidly cued trials located in the left hemispace, in the spatial orienting task. rTMS over the PPC on either side did not affect performance in the motor attention task. This double dissociation was evident in the first 10 min after rTMS conditioning. These results enhance our understanding of the networks associated with attention. They provide evidence of a role for the left DLPFC in the mechanisms of motor preparation, and confirm Mesulam's original proposal for a right PPC dominance in spatial attention [Mesulam, M. M. A cortical network for directed attention and unilateral neglect. Annals of Neurology, 10 , 309–325, 1981].

Saccadic chronostasis refers to the subjective temporal lengthening of the first visual stimulus perceived after an eye movement, and is most commonly experienced as the “stopped clock” illusion. Other temporal illusions arising in the context of movement (e.g., “intentional binding”) appear to depend upon the volitional nature of the preceding motor act. Here we assess chronostasis across different saccade types, ranging from highly volitional (self-timed saccades, antisaccades) to highly reflexive (peripherally cued saccades, express saccades). Chronostasis was similar in magnitude across all these conditions, despite wide variations in their neural bases. The illusion must therefore be triggered by a “lowest common denominator” signal common to all the conditions tested and their respective neural circuits. Specifically, it is suggested that chronostasis is triggered by a low-level signal arising in response to efferent signals generated in the superior colliculus.