To explore whether the hippocampus might be important for certain spatial operations in addition to its well-known role in memory, we administered two tasks in which participants judged whether objects embedded in scenes or whether scenes themselves could exist in 3-D space. Patients with damage limited to the hippocampus performed as well as controls in both tasks. A patient with large medial-temporal lobe lesions had a bias to judge objects in scenes and scenes themselves as possible, performing well with possible stimuli but poorly with impossible stimuli in both tasks. All patients were markedly impaired at remembering the tasks. The hippocampus appears not to be essential for judging the structural coherence of objects in scenes or the coherence of scenes. The findings conform to what is now a sizeable literature emphasizing the importance of the hippocampus for memory. We discuss our results in light of findings that other patients have sometimes been reported to be disadvantaged by spatial tasks like the ones studied here, despite less hippocampal damage and milder memory impairment.

fMRI studies of recognition memory have often been interpreted to mean that the hippocampus selectively subserves recollection and that adjacent regions selectively subserve familiarity. Yet, many of these studies have confounded recollection and familiarity with strong and weak memories. In a source memory experiment, we compared correct source judgments (which reflect recollection) and incorrect source judgments (often thought to reflect familiarity) while equating for old–new memory strength by including only high-confidence hits in the analysis. Hippocampal activity associated with both correct source judgments and incorrect source judgments exceeded the activity associated with forgotten items and did so to a similar extent. Further, hippocampal activity was greater for high-confidence old decisions relative to forgotten items even when source decisions were at chance. These results identify a recollection signal in the hippocampus and may identify a familiarity signal as well. Similar results were obtained in the parahippocampal gyrus. Unlike in the medial temporal lobe, activation in prefrontal cortex increased differentially in association with source recollection.

Contrasts between implicit and explicit knowledge in the serial reaction time (SRT) paradigm have been challenged because they have depended on a single dissociation: intact implicit knowledge in the absence of corresponding explicit knowledge. In the SRT task, subjects respond with a corresponding keypress to a cue that appears in one of four locations. The cue follows a repeating sequence of locations, and subjects can exhibit knowledge of the repeating sequence through increasingly rapid performance (an implicit test) or by being able to recognize the sequence (an explicit test). In our study, amnesic patients were given extensive SRT training. Their implicit and explicit test performance was compared to the performance of control subjects who memorized the training sequence. Compared with control subjects, amnesic patients exhibited superior performance on the implicit task and impaired performance on the explicit task. This crossover interaction suggests that implicit and explicit knowledge of the embedded sequence are separate and encapsulated and that they presumably depend on different brain systems.

Recent studies have challenged the notion that priming for ostensibly novel stimuli such as pseudowords (REAB) reflects the creation of new representations. Priming for such stimuli could instead reflect the activation of familiar memory representations that are orthographically similar (READ) and/or the activation of subparts of stimuli (RE, EX, AR), which are familar because they occur commonly in English. We addressed this issue in three experiments that assessed perceptual identification priming and recognition memory for novel and familiar letter strings in amnesic patients and control subjects. Priming for words, pseudowords, and orthographically illegal nonwords was fully intact in the amnesic patients following a single exposure, whereas recognition memory was impaired for the same items. Thus, priming can occur for stimuli that are unlikely to have preexisting representations. Words and pseudowords exhibited twice as much priming as illegal nonwords, suggesting that activation may contribute to priming for words and wordlike stimuli. Additional results showed that priming for illegal nonwords resulted from the formation of new perceptual associations among the component letters of each nonword rather than the activation of individual letter representations. In summary, the results demonstrate that priming following a single exposure can depend on the creation of new perceptual representations and that such priming is independent of the brain structures essential for declarative memory.

The topic of multiple forms of memory is considered from a biological point of view. Fact-and-event (declarative, explicit) memory is contrasted with a collection of non conscious (non-declarative, implicit) memory abilities including skills and habits, priming, and simple conditioning. Recent evidence is reviewed indicating that declarative and non declarative forms of memory have different operating characteristics and depend on separate brain systems. A brain-systems framework for understanding memory phenomena is developed in light of lesion studies involving rats, monkeys, and humans, as well as recent studies with normal humans using the divided visual field technique, event-related potentials, and positron emission tomography (PET).