Humans have a tendency to think about themselves. What generates this self-focus? One clue may come from the observation that the same part of the brain that supports self-reflection—the medial pFC (MPFC/Brodmann's area 10 [BA 10])—also spontaneously engages by default whenever the brain is free from external demands to attention. Here, we test the possibility that the default tendency to engage MPFC/BA 10 primes self-referential thinking. Participants underwent fMRI while alternating between brief periods of rest and experimental tasks in which they thought about their own traits, another person's traits, or another location's traits. Greater default engagement in MPFC/BA 10 during momentary breaks preferentially facilitated task performance on subsequent self-reflection trials on a moment-to-moment basis. These results suggest that reflexively engaging MPFC/BA 10 by default may nudge self-referential thinking, perhaps explaining why humans think about themselves so readily.

The false consensus effect (FCE), the tendency to project our attitudes and opinions on to others, is a pervasive bias in social reasoning with a range of ramifications for individuals and society. Research in social psychology has suggested that numerous factors (anchoring and adjustment, accessibility, motivated projection, etc.) may contribute to the FCE. In this study, we examine the neural correlates of the FCE and provide evidence that motivated projection plays a significant role. Activity in reward regions (ventromedial pFC and bilateral nucleus accumbens) during consensus estimation was positively associated with bias, whereas activity in right ventrolateral pFC (implicated in emotion regulation) was inversely associated with bias. Activity in reward and regulatory regions accounted for half of the total variation in consensus bias across participants ( R 2 = .503). This research complements models of the FCE in social psychology, providing a glimpse into the neural mechanisms underlying this important phenomenon.

Humans readily adopt an intentional stance to other people, comprehending their behavior as guided by unobservable mental states such as belief, desire, and intention. We used fMRI in healthy adults to test the hypothesis that this stance is primed by the default mode of human brain function present when the mind is at rest. We report three findings that support this hypothesis. First, brain regions activated by actively adopting an intentional rather than nonintentional stance to a social stimulus were anatomically similar to those demonstrating default responses to fixation baseline in the same task. Second, moment-to-moment variation in default activity during fixation in the dorsomedial PFC was related to the ease with which participants applied an intentional—but not nonintentional—stance to a social stimulus presented moments later. Finally, individuals who showed stronger dorsomedial PFC activity at baseline in a separate task were generally more efficient when adopting the intentional stance and reported having greater social skills. These results identify a biological basis for the human tendency to adopt the intentional stance. More broadly, they suggest that the brain's default mode of function may have evolved, in part, as a response to life in a social world.

Although research on theory of mind has strongly implicated the dorsomedial pFC (incuding medial BA 8 and BA 9), the unique contributions of medial pFC (MPFC; corresponding to medial BA 10) to mentalizing remain uncertain. The extant literature has considered the possibility that these regions may be specialized for self-related cognition or for reasoning about close others, but evidence for both accounts has been inconclusive. We propose a novel theoretical framework: MPFC selectively implements “person-specific theories of mind” (ToM p ) representing the unique, idiosyncratic traits or attributes of well-known individuals. To test this hypothesis, we used fMRI to assess MPFC responses in Democratic and Republican participants as they evaluated more or less subjectively well-known political figures. Consistent with the ToM p account, MPFC showed greater activity to subjectively well-known targets, irrespective of participants' reported feelings of closeness or similarity. MPFC also demonstrated greater activity on trials in which targets (whether politicians or oneself) were judged to be relatively idiosyncratic, making a generic theory of mind inapplicable. These results suggest that MPFC may supplement the generic theory of mind process, with which dorsomedial pFC has been associated, by contributing mentalizing capacities tuned to individuated representations of specific well-known others.

Discordant development of brain regions responsible for cognitive control and reward processing may render adolescents susceptible to risk taking. Identifying ways to reduce this neural imbalance during adolescence can have important implications for risk taking and associated health outcomes. Accordingly, we sought to examine how a key family relationship—family obligation—can reduce this vulnerability. Forty-eight adolescents underwent an fMRI scan during which they completed a risk-taking and cognitive control task. Results suggest that adolescents with greater family obligation values show decreased activation in the ventral striatum when receiving monetary rewards and increased dorsolateral PFC activation during behavioral inhibition. Reduced ventral striatum activation correlated with less real-life risk-taking behavior and enhanced dorsolateral PFC activation correlated with better decision-making skills. Thus, family obligation may decrease reward sensitivity and enhance cognitive control, thereby reducing risk-taking behaviors.

A reliable observation in neuroimaging studies of cognitive control is the response of dorsal ACC (dACC) to events that demand increased cognitive control (e.g., response conflicts and performance errors). This observation is apparently at odds with a comparably reliable association of the dACC with the subjective experience of negative affective states such as pain, fear, and anxiety. Whereas “affective” associates of the dACC are based on studies that explicitly manipulate and/or measure the subjective experience of negative affect, the “cognitive” associates of dACC are based on studies using tasks designed to manipulate the demand for cognitive control, such as the Stroop, flanker, and stop-signal tasks. Critically, extant neuroimaging research has not systematically considered the extent to which these cognitive tasks induce negative affective experiences and, if so, to what extent negative affect can account for any variance in the dACC response during task performance. While undergoing fMRI, participants in this study performed a stop-signal task while regularly reporting their experience of performance on several dimensions. We observed that within-subject variability in the dACC response to stop-signal errors tracked changes in subjective frustration throughout task performance. This association remained when controlling for within-subject variability in subjective reports of cognitive engagement and several performance-related variables indexing task difficulty. These results fit with existing models characterizing the dACC as a hub for monitoring ongoing behavior and motivating adjustments when necessary and further emphasize that such a function may be linked to the subjective experience of negative affect.

Empathy is a critical aspect of human emotion that influences the behavior of individuals as well as the functioning of society. Although empathy is fundamentally a subjective experience, no studies have yet examined the neural correlates of the self-reported experience of empathy. Furthermore, although behavioral research has linked empathy to prosocial behavior, no work has yet connected empathy-related neural activity to everyday, real-world helping behavior. Lastly, the widespread assumption that empathy is an automatic experience remains largely untested. It is also unknown whether differences in trait empathy reflect either variability in the automaticity of empathic responses or the capacity to feel empathy. In this study, 32 participants completed a diary study of helping behavior followed by an fMRI session, assessing empathic responses to sad images under three conditions: watching naturally, under cognitive load, and while empathizing. Across conditions, higher levels of self-reported experienced empathy were associated with greater activity in medial PFC (MPFC). Activity in MPFC was also correlated with daily helping behavior. Self-report of empathic experience and activity in empathy-related areas, notably MPFC, were higher in the empathize condition than in the load condition, suggesting that empathy is not a fully automatic experience. Additionally, high trait empathy participants displayed greater experienced empathy and stronger MPFC responses than low trait empathy individuals under cognitive load, suggesting that empathy is more automatic for individuals high in trait empathy. These results underline the critical role that MPFC plays in the instantiation of empathic experience and consequent behavior.

Humans commonly understand the unobservable mental states of others by observing their actions. Embodied simulation theories suggest that this ability may be based in areas of the fronto-parietal mirror neuron system, yet neuroimaging studies that explicitly investigate the human ability to draw mental state inferences point to the involvement of a “mentalizing” system consisting of regions that do not overlap with the mirror neuron system. For the present study, we developed a novel action identification paradigm that allowed us to explicitly investigate the neural bases of mentalizing observed actions. Across repeated viewings of a set of ecologically valid video clips of ordinary human actions, we manipulated the extent to which participants identified the unobservable mental states of the actor ( mentalizing ) or the observable mechanics of their behavior ( mechanizing ). Although areas of the mirror neuron system did show an enhanced response during action identification, its activity was not significantly modulated by the extent to which the observers identified mental states. Instead, several regions of the mentalizing system, including dorsal and ventral aspects of medial pFC, posterior cingulate cortex, and temporal poles, were associated with mentalizing actions, whereas a single region in left lateral occipito-temporal cortex was associated with mechanizing actions. These data suggest that embodied simulation is insufficient to account for the sophisticated mentalizing that human beings are capable of while observing another and that a different system along the cortical midline and in anterior temporal cortex is involved in mentalizing an observed action.

Persuasion is at the root of countless social exchanges in which one person or group is motivated to have another share its beliefs, desires, or behavioral intentions. Here, we report the first three functional magnetic resonance imaging studies to investigate the neurocognitive networks associated with feeling persuaded by an argument. In the first two studies, American and Korean participants, respectively, were exposed to a number of text-based persuasive messages. In both Study 1 and Study 2, feeling persuaded was associated with increased activity in posterior superior temporal sulcus bilaterally, temporal pole bilaterally, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. The findings suggest a discrete set of underlying mechanisms in the moment that the persuasion process occurs, and are strengthened by the fact that the results replicated across two diverse linguistic and cultural groups. Additionally, a third study using region-of-interest analyses demonstrated that neural activity in this network was also associated with persuasion when a sample of American participants viewed video-based messages. In sum, across three studies, including two different cultural groups and two types of media, persuasion was associated with a consistent network of regions in the brain. Activity in this network has been associated with social cognition and mentalizing and is consistent with models of persuasion that emphasize the importance of social cognitive processing in determining the efficacy of persuasive communication.

Goal pursuit in humans sometimes involves approaching unpleasant and avoiding pleasant stimuli, such as when a dieter chooses to eat vegetables (although he does not like them) instead of doughnuts (which he greatly prefers). Previous neuroscience investigations have established a left–right prefrontal asymmetry between approaching pleasant and avoiding unpleasant stimuli, but these investigations typically do not untangle the roles of action motivation (approach vs. avoidance) and stimulus valence (pleasant vs. unpleasant) in this asymmetry. Additionally, studies on asymmetry have been conducted almost exclusively using electroencephalography and have been difficult to replicate using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The present fMRI study uses a novel goal pursuit task that separates action motivation from stimulus valence and a region-of-interest analysis approach to address these limitations. Results suggest that prefrontal asymmetry is associated with action motivation and not with stimulus valence. Specifically, there was increased left (vs. right) activation in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during approach (vs. avoidance) actions regardless of the stimulus valence, but no such effect was observed for pleasant compared to unpleasant stimuli. This asymmetry effect during approach–avoidance action motivations occurred in the dorsolateral but not orbito-frontal aspects of prefrontal cortex. Also, individual differences in approach–avoidance motivation moderated the effect such that increasing trait approach motivation was associated with greater left-sided asymmetry during approach actions (regardless of the stimulus valence). Together, these results support the notion that prefrontal asymmetry is associated with action motivation regardless of stimulus valence and, as such, might be linked with goal pursuit processes more broadly.

Previous neuroimaging research with adults suggests that the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the medial posterior parietal cortex (MPPC) are engaged during self-knowledge retrieval processes. However, this has yet to be assessed in a developmental sample. Twelve children and 12 adults (average age = 10.2 and 26.1 years, respectively) reported whether short phrases described themselves or a highly familiar other (Harry Potter) while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging. In both children and adults, the MPFC was relatively more active during self- than social knowledge retrieval, and the MPPC was relatively more active during social than self-knowledge retrieval. Direct comparisons between children and adults indicated that children activated the MPFC during self-knowledge retrieval to a much greater extent than adults. The particular regions of the MPPC involved varied between the two groups, with the posterior precuneus engaged by adults, but the anterior precuneus and posterior cingulate engaged by children. Only children activated the MPFC significantly above baseline during self-knowledge retrieval. Implications for social cognitive development and the processing functions performed by the MPFC are discussed.

Artificial grammar learning (Reber, 1967) is a form of implicit learning in which cognitive, rather than motor, implicit learning has been found. After viewing a series of letter strings formed according to a finite state rule system, people are able to classify new letter strings as to whether or not they are formed according to these grammatical rules despite little conscious insight into the rule structure. Previous research has shown that these classification judgments are based on knowledge of abstract rules as well as superficial similarity (“chunk strength”) to training strings. Here we used event-related fMRI to identify neural regions involved in using both sources of information as test stimuli were designed to unconfound chunk strength from rule use. Using functional connectivity analyses, the extent to which the sources of information are complementary or competitive was also assessed. Activation in the right caudate was associated with rule adherence, whereas medial temporal lobe activations were associated with chunk strength. Additionally, functional connectivity analyses revealed caudate and medial temporal lobe activations to be strongly negatively correlated (r = −88) with one another during the performance of this task.