Mechanisms of motor-sensory prediction are dependent on expectations regarding when self-generated feedback will occur. Existing behavioral and electrophysiological research suggests that we have a default expectation for immediate sensory feedback after executing an action. However, studies investigating the adaptability of this temporal expectation have been limited in their ability to differentiate modified expectations per se from effects of stimulus repetition. Here, we use a novel, within-participant procedure that allowed us to disentangle the effect of repetition from expectation and allowed us to determine whether the default assumption for immediate feedback is fixed and resistant to modification or is amenable to change with experience. While EEG was recorded, 45 participants completed a task in which they repeatedly pressed a button to produce a tone that occurred immediately after the button press (immediate training) or after a 100-msec delay (delayed training). The results revealed significant differences in the patterns of cortical change across the two training conditions. Specifically, there was a significant reduction in the cortical response to tones across delayed training blocks but no significant change across immediate training blocks. Furthermore, experience with delayed training did not result in increased cortical activity in response to immediate feedback. These findings suggest that experience with action–sensation delays broadens the window of temporal expectations, allowing for the simultaneous anticipation of both delayed and immediate motor-sensory feedback. This research provides insights into the mechanisms underlying motor-sensory prediction and may represent a novel therapeutic avenue for psychotic symptoms, which are ostensibly associated with sensory prediction abnormalities.

Despite advances in understanding the brain structures involved in the expression of stereotypes and prejudice, little is known about the brain structures involved in their acquisition. Here, we combined fMRI, a task involving learning the valence of different social groups, and modeling of the learning process involved in the development of biases in thinking about social groups that support prejudice. Participants read descriptions of valenced behaviors performed by members of novel social groups, with majority groups being more frequently encountered during learning than minority groups. A model-based fMRI analysis revealed that the anterior temporal lobe tracked the trial-by-trial changes in the valence associated with each group encountered in the task. Descriptions of behavior by group members that deviated from the group average (i.e., prediction errors) were associated with activity in the left lateral PFC, dorsomedial PFC, and lateral anterior temporal cortex. Minority social groups were associated with slower acquisition rates and more activity in the ventral striatum and ACC/dorsomedial PFC compared with majority groups. These findings provide new insights into the brain regions that (a) support the acquisition of prejudice and (b) detect situations in which an individual's behavior deviates from the prejudicial attitude held toward their group.