Primate vision is characterized by constant, sequential processing and selection of visual targets to fixate. Although expected reward is known to influence both processing and selection of visual targets, similarities and differences between these effects remain unclear mainly because they have been measured in separate tasks. Using a novel paradigm, we simultaneously measured the effects of reward outcomes and expected reward on target selection and sensitivity to visual motion in monkeys. Monkeys freely chose between two visual targets and received a juice reward with varying probability for eye movements made to either of them. Targets were stationary apertures of drifting gratings, causing the end points of eye movements to these targets to be systematically biased in the direction of motion. We used this motion-induced bias as a measure of sensitivity to visual motion on each trial. We then performed different analyses to explore effects of objective and subjective reward values on choice and sensitivity to visual motion to find similarities and differences between reward effects on these two processes. Specifically, we used different reinforcement learning models to fit choice behavior and estimate subjective reward values based on the integration of reward outcomes over multiple trials. Moreover, to compare the effects of subjective reward value on choice and sensitivity to motion directly, we considered correlations between each of these variables and integrated reward outcomes on a wide range of timescales. We found that, in addition to choice, sensitivity to visual motion was also influenced by subjective reward value, although the motion was irrelevant for receiving reward. Unlike choice, however, sensitivity to visual motion was not affected by objective measures of reward value. Moreover, choice was determined by the difference in subjective reward values of the two options, whereas sensitivity to motion was influenced by the sum of values. Finally, models that best predicted visual processing and choice used sets of estimated reward values based on different types of reward integration and timescales. Together, our results demonstrate separable influences of reward on visual processing and choice, and point to the presence of multiple brain circuits for the integration of reward outcomes.

Perceptual decision-making has been shown to be influenced by reward expected from alternative options or actions, but the underlying neural mechanisms are currently unknown. More specifically, it is debated whether reward effects are mediated through changes in sensory processing, later stages of decision-making, or both. To address this question, we conducted two experiments in which human participants made saccades to what they perceived to be either the first or second of two visually identical but asynchronously presented targets while we manipulated expected reward from correct and incorrect responses on each trial. By comparing reward-induced bias in target selection (i.e., reward bias) during the two experiments, we determined whether reward caused changes in sensory or decision-making processes. We found similar reward biases in the two experiments indicating that reward information mainly influenced later stages of decision-making. Moreover, the observed reward biases were independent of the individual's sensitivity to sensory signals. This suggests that reward effects were determined heuristically via modulation of decision-making processes instead of sensory processing. To further explain our findings and uncover plausible neural mechanisms, we simulated our experiments with a cortical network model and tested alternative mechanisms for how reward could exert its influence. We found that our experimental observations are more compatible with reward-dependent input to the output layer of the decision circuit. Together, our results suggest that, during a temporal judgment task, reward exerts its influence via changing later stages of decision-making (i.e., response bias) rather than early sensory processing (i.e., perceptual bias).